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[W] e conclude that the interrogation procedures that you
propose would not violate Section [18 U.S.C. § 2340A]. We
wish to emphasize that this is our best reading of the law;
however, you should be aware that there are no cases
construing the statute; just as there have been no prosecutions
brought under it.I -
-August 1, 2002 Office of Legal Counsel,
Memorandum on the Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States tortured detainees during the so-called
War on Terror.2 While this has been asserted on many occa-
sions, it is difficult to overlook the number of admissions that
have now been made by U.S. government officials.
On August 1, 2014, President Obama was discussing the
anticipated release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence's ("SSCI") long-awaited report on the Central Intelli-
1. Memorandum forJohn Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/
legacy/2010/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf.
2. See, e.g., JAMEEL JAFFER & AMRIT SINGH, ADMINISTRATION OF TORTURE:
A DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM WASHINGTON TO ABU GHRAIB AND BEYOND
(2007) (describing interrogation in overseas detention centers); JOSEPH
MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2007)
(examining executive war powers with respect to extreme interrogation at
Guantanamo Bay); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How
THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008)
(describing the path the Bush administration took to using controversial in-
terrogation techniques); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO
AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008) (detailing Donald Rum-
sfeld's signing of the Haynes Memo and its effects); THE TORTURE MEMOS:
RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE (David Cole ed., 2009) (presenting a col-
lection of legal memoranda regarding U.S. interrogation); THE TORTURE PA-
PERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005) (presenting a collection of legal memoranda regarding U.S. interroga-
tion); Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, N.Y. REv. BOOKS,
Apr. 9, 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2OO9/apr/O9/
us-torture-voices-ftom-the-black-sites/ (discussing the International Committee of
the Red Cross report on CIA detainee treatment); Major William T. Hen-
nessy, Willful and Outrageous Acts of Personal Abuse-Now OK for the CIA?, 57
NAVAL L. REv. 203 (2009) (arguing that Executive Order 13440 permits the
CIA to violate the Geneva Convention).
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gence Agency's ("CIA") Detention and Interrogation Pro-
gram.3 In his candid remarks, President Obama acknowledged
that detainees were tortured by the United States during the
War on Terror.4
[E]ven before I came into office I was very clear that
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 we did some
things that were wrong. We did a whole lot of things that
were right, but we tortured some folks. We did some things
that were contrary to our values. . . . [W] e did some
things that were wrong. And that's what that report
reflects. And that's the reason why, after I took office,
one of the first things I did was to ban some of the
extraordinary interrogation techniques that are the
subject of that report.
And my hope is, is that this report reminds us once
again that the character of our country has to be
measured in part not by what we do when things are
easy, but what we do when things are hard. And when
we engaged in some of these enhanced interrogation tech-
niques, techniques that I believe and I think any fair-
minded person would believe were torture, we crossed a line.
And that needs to be - that needs to be understood
and accepted. And we have to, as a country, take re-
sponsibility for that so that, hopefully, we don't do it
again in the future.5
On November 12, 2014, a U.S. government delegation ap-
peared before the U.N. Committee against Torture in Geneva
3. The program is also referred to as the "Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation Program." S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE
STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S DETENTION AND INTERROGA-
TION PROGRAM (2014), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
press/committee-releases-study-cias-detention-and-interrogation-program
[hereinafter SSCI REPORT].
4. The term "War on Terror" is used to describe the worldwide conflict
between the United States and Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.
See generally Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, US. Officials Retool Slogan for Ter-
ror War, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/26/
politics/us-officials-retool-slogan-for-terror-war.html (describing the Bush
administration's use of the phrase "the global war on terror" to characterize
the military campaign against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups).
5. Press Conference with Barack Obama, President (August 1, 2014),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/01 /press-
conference-president (emphasis added).
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as part of the U.S. submission of its Periodic Report to the
Committee. In their prepared remarks to the Committee, sev-
eral members of the U.S. delegation offered candid admis-
sions acknowledging that the United States had committed
torture. In his remarks, Tom Malinowski, the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, af-
firmed that torture is categorically prohibited at all times and
with no exceptions. He then acknowledged the United States
had committed torture when it interrogated detainees during
the War on Terror.
It's important to stress that we expect others to hold
us to the same high standards to which we hold them.
And we do not claim to be perfect. A little more than
ten years ago, our government was employing interrogation
methods that, as President Obama has said, any fair
minded person would believe were torture.6
The Acting Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State,
Mary McLeod, echoed these views in her own remarks to the
Committee.
The United States is proud of its record as a leader in
respecting, promoting, and defending human rights
and the rule of law, both at home and around the
world. But in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, we regret-
tably did not always live up to our own values, includ-
ing those reflected in the Convention. As President
Obama has acknowledged, we crossed the line and we take
responsibility for that.7
On December 9, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence released a portion of its report on the CIA's De-
tention and Interrogation Program ("SSCI Report").8 Only
6. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, Tom Malinowski, Opening Statement to the U.N. Com-
mittee against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014) (emphasis added), available at http:/
/tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_
CAT_STAUSA_18815_E.pdf.
7. Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Mary McLeod, Open-
ing Statement to the U.N. Committee against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014) (em-
phasis added), available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/
Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CAT STAUSA_18815-E.pdf.
8. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at app. 1. The SSCI's terms of reference
included: "A review of how the CIA created, operated, and maintained its
detention and interrogation program, including a review of the locations of
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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499 of the full report's 6,700 pages were released.9 While the
released materials were heavily redacted, they still offered a
detailed account of the Detention and Interrogation Program.
In the Foreword to the Executive Summary, the Committee's
Chairperson, Senator Dianne Feinstein, acknowledged that
detainees were tortured.
[Ilt is my personal conclusion that, under any common
meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also
believe that the conditions of confinement and the
use of authorized and unauthorized interrogation
and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman,
and degrading. I believe the evidence of this is over-
whelming and incontrovertible.' 0
Even the redacted Findings and Conclusions and accom-
panying Executive Summary offered extensive evidence that
torture occurred. According to the Executive Summary, the in-
terrogations of CIA detainees were "brutal."
the facilities and any arrangements and agreements made by the CIA or
other Intelligence Community officials with foreign entities in connection
with the program." Id. In addition, the SSCI was asked to evaluate "the infor-
mation acquired from the detainees including the periods during which en-
hanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were administered." Id.
9. President Obama vows actions in CIA report won't take place on his watch,
CHICAGo TRIBUNE (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/chi-cia-torture-report-20141209-story.html. See generally Rick
Gladstone & Robert Mackey, Overseas, Disclosures Leads to Calls for Retaliation,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2014, at Al (describing the SSCI Report release); Si-
obhan Gorman et al., Senate Report Calls CIA Interrogation Tactics Ineffective,
WALL ST.J., Dec. 9, 2014 (describing the released pages of the SSCI Report);
Greg Miller et al., Senate Report on CIA Program Details Brutality, Dishonesty,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 2014 (describing the takeaways from the released pages
of the SCCI Report). There were extensive discussions regarding the content
of the report and its eventual release. See Frontline: Secrets, Politics and Torture
(PBS May 19, 2015), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/secrets-politics-and-torture/.
10. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Foreword to SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 4
(emphasis added). Other members of the SSCI made similar statements in
their separate views. See Sen. Susan Collins, Additional Views, in SSCI REPORT,
supra note 3, at 2 (2014), available at http://wwv.intelligence.senate.gov/
sites/default/files/press/collins.pdf. ("[T]he report's findings lead me to
conclude that some detainees were subject to techniques that constituted
torture."); Sen. Angus King, Additional Views, in SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at
1 (2014), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/
press/king.pdf ("[I]t is clear to me that some detainees were subjected to
techniques that constituted torture.").
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Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu
Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the
CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques
with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time.
Interrogation techniques, such as slaps and "wallings"
(slamming detainees against a wall) were used in
combination, frequently concurrent with sleep depri-
vation and nudity. . . .
The waterboarding technique was physically harmful,
inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu Zubaydah,
for example, became "completely unresponsive, with
bubbles rising through his open, full mouth." Inter-
nal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid
Shaykh Mohammad as evolving into a "series of near
drownings."
Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake
for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress posi-
tions, at times with their hands shackled above their
heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing
hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation
and, in at least two of those cases, the CIA nonethe-
less continued the sleep deprivation."
Six members of the SSCI released a dissenting statement
that was highly critical of the SSCI Report.' 2 They criticized
the report's partisan nature and questioned its process, analy-
sis, and conclusions.' 3 However, they did not address or dis-
pute that detainees were tortured.
Under international law and, significantly, U.S. law, the
consequences of torture are clear. Individuals who commit, at-
tempt to commit, or conspire to commit torture are subject to
11. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (Executive Summary) (citations omit-
ted).
12. Minority views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch,
Coats, Rubio, and Coburn, SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at I (2014), available at
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/press/minority-views
.pdf (hereinafter SSCI MINORITY VIEWS].
13. SSCI MINORITY VIEws, supra note 12, at IV (stating that no witnesses
were interviewed in preparing the report and that the report took over five
years to complete).
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prosecution. And yet, no senior U.S. government official has
ever been prosecuted for torture.14
In January 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey ap-
pointed Assistant U.S. Attorney John Durham to conduct a
criminal investigation into the destruction of CIA interroga-
tion records.' 5 The investigation was expanded on August 24,
2009 by newly appointed Attorney General Eric Holder to de-
termine "whether federal laws were violated in connection
with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas loca-
tions." 16 In announcing the expanded inquiry, Holder added a
significant qualification to the investigation:
[T]he Department of Justice will not prosecute any-
one who acted in good faith and within the scope of
14. There have been several criminal prosecutions of military personnel
and private contractors arising out of the mistreatment of detainees. E.g.,
United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming the convic-
tion of David Passaro, who was convicted of felony assault for the beating of
Abdul Wali). See also Clyde Haberman, A Singular Conviction Amid the Debate
on Torture and Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/04/20/us/a-singular-conviction-amid-the-debate-on-torture-and-
terrorism.html (describing Passaro's conviction). In addition, there were sev-
eral prosecutions of military personnel for abuses perpetrated at Abu
Ghraib. CNN Library, Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 27,
2015), http://cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scan-
dal-fast-facts.
15. Ninety-two videotapes documenting CIA interrogation sessions with
detainees were destroyed. Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Says C.IA. Destroyed 92 Tapes of
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2009/03/03/washington/03web-intel.html. Several of the de-
stroyed videotapes recorded waterboarding sessions. Id. For a detailed his-
tory regarding the videotape controversy, see JOHN Rizzo, COMPANY MAN:
THIRTY YEARS OF CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS IN THE CIA 1-30 (2014); JOSE A.
RODRIGUEZ, JR., HARD MEAsuREs: How AGGRESSIVE CIA AcrIONs AFTER 9/11
SAVED AMERICAN LIVES 181-218 (2012). There is some uncertainty regarding
the number of videotapes that were destroyed. John Rizzo, former CIA Act-
ing General Counsel, indicated there were ninety-six videotapes whereas
other sources identified ninety-two tapes.
16. Eric Holder, Attorney General, Regarding a Preliminary Review into
the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-regarding-prelim-
inary-review-interrogation-certain-detainees. Holder based his decision to
broaden the inquiry upon his review of the Office of Professional Responsi-
bility's report on the Office of Legal Counsel's memoranda regarding en-
hanced interrogation techniques as well as the 2004 report by the CIA's In-
spector General regarding counterterrorism detention and interrogation ac-
tivities. Id.
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the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Coun-
sel regarding the interrogation of detainees. I want to
reiterate that point today, and to underscore the fact
that this preliminary review will not focus on those
individuals.' 7
On June 30, 2011, Holder announced that further investi-
gation regarding the use of unauthorized interrogation tech-
niques by CIA interrogators was not warranted.1 8 Nevertheless,
he authorized a full criminal investigation regarding the
deaths of two individuals who died while in U.S. custody.' 9 On
August 30, 2012, Holder announced the closure of this re-
maining investigation, stating there was insufficient admissible
evidence to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.20
17. Id. Despite Holder's statement, his decision was subject to extensive
criticism. E.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Cheney Offers Sharp Defense of C.I.A. Tactics,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
08/31/us/politics/31cheney.html (former Vice President Dick Cheney criti-
cizing Obama administration's decision to investigate interrogation tech-
niques). Holder's statement echoed the position of President Obama. When
the Department of Justice released several memos from the Office of Legal
Counsel that addressed the use of enhanced interrogation methods, Presi-
dent Obama emphasized that prosecutions of those who acted in good faith
upon legal advice from the DOJ would not occur. "In releasing these
memos, it is our intention to assure those who carried out their duties rely-
ing in good faith upon legal advice from the Department ofJustice that they
will not be subject to prosecution." Barack Obama, President of the United
States, Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of OLC Memos
(Apr. 16, 2009), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
statement-president-barack-obama-release-olc-memos.
18. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Statement of the Attorney General Regard-
ing Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (June 30,
2011), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-gen-
eral-regarding-investigation-interrogation-certain-detainees.
19. Id. While their names were not officially disclosed, it is believed the
two detainees were Gul Rahman and Manadel al-Jamadi. See Scott Shane, No
Charges Filed in Two Deaths Involving C.LA., N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 2012, at Al
(discussing the Justice Department's decision to not press criminal charges
in two cases of prisoner deaths during CIA interrogations, but that "officials
had previously confirmed the identities of the prisoners" as Rahman and al-
Jamadi). For more information on Gul Rahman's death, see Jane Mayer,
Who Killed Gul Rahman?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2010 (reporting on
Rahman's death, which remained a secret from 2002 until disclosed by the
Associated Press on March 28, 2010).
20. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder
on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees
(Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attor-
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
8 [Vol. 48:1
UNITED STATES V. GEORGE TENET
He added, however, that this decision did not address whether
the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques was appro-
priate. 21 "Our inquiry was limited to a determination of
whether prosecutable offenses were committed and was not in-
tended to, and does not resolve, broader questions regarding
the propriety of the examined conduct." 22 And so, despite nu-
merous admissions by U.S. government officials that detainees
were tortured, no prosecutions have occurred.23 The lack of
accountability is even more striking in light of the number of
reports issued by U.S. government agencies documenting
abuse and the malfeasance committed by U.S. government of-
ficials. 24
ney-general-eric-holder-closure-investigation-interrogation-certain-detainees.
Attorney General Holder indicated that Durham had reviewed various
sources, including "the Office of Professional Responsibility's report regard-
ing the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda related to enhanced interroga-
tion techniques, the 2004 CIA Inspector General's report on enhanced in-
terrogations, additional matters investigated by the CIA Office of Inspector
General, the February 2007 International Committee of the Red Cross Re-
port on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody,
and public source information." Id. Holder added that Durham had consid-
ered all "potentially applicable substantive criminal statutes as well as the
statutes of limitations and jurisdictional provisions that govern prosecutions
under those statutes." Id.
21. Id. During his Senate confirmation hearings, Holder indicated that
waterboarding was a form of torture. David Stout, Holder Tells Senators
Waterboarding is Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16holdercnd.html.
22. Holder, supra note 20.
23. The only prosecution arising out of the CIA's Detention and Interro-
gation Program was of a CIA officer for leaking information about the pro-
gram to the media. See Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Sentenced to 30
Months in Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2013, at All (describing the sentencing
of former CIA officer John C. Kiriakou for disclosing the identity of a CIA
officer involved in the interrogation program).
24. Even civil lawsuits raising claims of torture have been unsuccessful.
See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Constitutional Barriers and the Perils of Impunity, in
LESSONS AND LEGACIES OF THE WAR ON TERROR 49 (Gershon Shafir et al. eds.,
2013) (analyzing how the state secrets privilege and Bivens doctrine have
imposed barriers to civil redress for victims of the extraordinary rendition
program). In the absence of accountability, some commentators have sug-
gested that perpetrators should be pardoned. See Anthony D. Romero, Op-
Ed., Pardon Bush and Those Who Tortured, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014, at A31,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/pardon-bush-
and-those-who-tortured.html (arguing that, given the attendant difficulties
and hesitance of the Obama Administration to prosecute individuals for tor-
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This Article addresses the absence of accountability for
torture in the War on Terror.25 Part II examines the U.S. obli-
gation under international law to investigate and prosecute
acts of torture regardless of where such acts occurred.26 It also
reviews the domestic legislation that implements this interna-
tional obligation. Adopted by Congress to implement the Con-
vention against Torture, the Torture Statute (18 U.S.C.§ 2340A) establishes criminal liability for torture committed
outside the United States. Part III then reviews the first and
only case ever brought under the Torture Statute.27 Roy Bel-
fast, Jr., a U.S. citizen, was prosecuted and subsequently con-
ture, tacit pardons might be a signal for the future that such actions could be
prosecuted).
25. Numerous commentators have said that Bush administration officials
should be investigated and prosecuted for torture. Eg., MICHAEL RATNER &
THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE TRIAL OF DONALD RUMSFELD
(2008) (imagining a trial against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld); WORLD
ORGANIZATION FOR HuMAN RIGHTS USA ET AL., INDEFENSIBLE: A REFERENCE
FOR PROSECUTING TORTURE AND OTHER FELONIES COMMITTED BY U.S. OFFI-
CIALS FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11TH 1 (2012) ("The report urges a thorough
investigation of the high-ranking government officials who ordered and au-
thorized the Bush Administration's torture policies and also urges that do-
mestic courts play a vital role in holding these officials accountable."); Claire
Finkelstein & Michael Lewis, Debate, Should Bush Administration Lawyers Be
Prosecitedfor Authorizing Torture?, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNuMBRA 195 (2010),
available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1047&context=penn law review online (Professor Finkelstein taking the
position that Bush administration lawyers could have and should have been
prosecuted as accomplices to torture); Scott Horton, justice After Bush: Prose-
cuting an Outlaw Administration, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Dec. 2008, at 49 (assert-
ing that the Bush Administration not only committed crimes, but "waged
war against the law itself'), available at http://harpers.org/archive/2008/
12/justice-after-bush/; John Sifton, United States Military and Central Intelli-
gence Agency Personnel Abroad: Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 487 (2006) (recommending methodologies for removing hurdles to
prosecution).
26. This Article focuses on allegations of torture arising out of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. It does not address allegations of mis-
treatment committed by other government agencies or the military.
27. The Justice Department's reluctance to pursue cases of torture has
long been recognized. E.g., WILLIAMJ. ACEVES, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A
SAFE HAVEN FOR TORTURERS (2002); Elise Keppler, et al., First Prosecution in
the United States for Torture Committed Abroad: The Trial of Charles 'Chuckie' Tay-
lor, Jr., HUM. RTs. BRIEF 18 (2008).
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victed in 2008 for committing torture in Liberia.28 The Belfast
case addressed several issues relating to the Torture Statute,
including the definition of torture, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. law, and the viability of potential defenses.
Using the Belfast prosecution as a model, Part IV exam-
ines the criminal liability of George Tenet, who served as the
Director of Central Intelligence during the time when several
detainees listed in the SSCI Report were tortured. 2 9 Tenet was
responsible for the development and implementation of the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. He personally au-
thorized the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on
"high value" detainees who were held at CIA "black sites"
around the world. Finally, Part V provides a criminal indict-
ment of Tenet based on the treatment of four detainees: Abu
Zubaydah, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Abd al-Rahim al-
Nashiri, and Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh.3 0 These detainees were held
by the CIA at various facilities around the world during
Tenet's tenure as the Director of Central Intelligence. Under
the guise of enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA sub-
jected each detainee to horrific treatment. They were, in fact,
tortured.3 1
28. Thomas J. G. Scott, Prosecuting Charles Taylor's Son for Torture: A Step
Toward Domestication of International Law, 8 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 33,
33-35 (2010). For more information on this case, see Laura R. Brownlee,
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction in the United States: American Attitudes and Practices in
the Prosecution of Charles "Chuckie" Taylor Jr., 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv.
331 (2010).
29. In addition to the Torture Statute, numerous other federal statutes
may be implicated, including: 18 U.S.C. § 113 (assault); 18 U.S.C. § 114
(maiming); 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping); and 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (war
crimes).
30. Detainee names are spelled as they appear in the original documents.
Accordingly, their names may be spelled differently throughout this article.
31. This article does not address the prohibition against cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment. While cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is
also prohibited by the Convention against Torture, it is not subject to the
same prosecution obligations as torture. Convention against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 16, Dec.
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention against Torture]. In ad-
dition, there is no federal statute implementing the prohibition against
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
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II. THE PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE
Few international norms are more universal than the pro-
hibition against torture. Torture is generally understood as
acts or threatened acts of public officials that intentionally in-
flict severe physical or mental pain or suffering on an individ-
ual in order to fulfill a certain purpose.3 2 The prohibition
against torture is codified in several multilateral and regional
instruments. It is also expressed in numerous other forms of
state practice, including the decisions of international and re-
gional tribunals, the statements of international and regional
organizations, and in national legislation throughout the
world. A critical element in the prohibition against torture is
the obligation to punish perpetrators.
A. International Codqication
In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration"),
which is one of the most well-recognized and respected state-
ments of international human rights norms.3 3 While the Uni-
versal Declaration is not a treaty, it is recognized to embody
the rules of international human rights law that all govern-
ments are bound to respect. Article 5 of the Universal Declara-
tion states that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."3 4
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration, numerous
agreements have affirmed this prohibition. For example, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
in 1966, codifies many of the rights set forth in the Universal
Declaration. 5 Article 7 provides that "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment."3 6 The General Assembly reaffirmed the pro-
hibition against torture in its 1975 Declaration on the Protec-
32. See generally SIR NIGEL S. RODLEY & MATr POLLARD, THE TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 85-88 (3d ed. 2009) (describing
the definition of torture under international law).
33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
34. Id. at art. 5.
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N Doc. Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (prohibiting deprivations of life and reaffirming
the prohibition against torture).
36. Id. at art. 7.
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tion of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.3 7
In 1984, the prohibition against torture was formally codi-
fied in the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention
against Torture")." The Convention against Torture provides
the most detailed codification of the prohibition against tor-
ture.39 Article 1 of the Convention provides in pertinent part:
"[T]orture" means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.40
Pursuant to the Convention against Torture, states must
take effective legislative, administrative, and judicial measures
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under their jurisdic-
tion. 4 1 Significantly, Article 2(2) provides that "[n]o excep-
tional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
37. G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/30/3452 (Dec. 9, 1975).
38. Convention against Torture, supra note 31.
39. See generally AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE
AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT (1999) (evaluating the ability of the
convention to protect and enforce the right to be free from torture); J. HER-
MAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1988) (describ-
ing the convention's drafting process); MANFRED NoWAK & ELIZABETH MCAR-
THUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A COMMENTARY
(2008) (examining a variety of issues related to the convention).
40. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 1.
41. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 2(1). States are also
obligated to prevent in any territory under their jurisdiction other acts of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture when such acts are committed with the consent or acqui-
escence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Id.
at art. 16(1).
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threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as ajustification of torture." 42 Arti-
cle 2(3) adds that "[a]n order from a superior officer or a pub-
lic authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture."43
The Convention against Torture provides that each State
Party shall ensure that all acts of torture, attempts to commit
torture, and acts which constitute complicity or participation
in torture, are offenses under the state's criminal law.44 These
offenses must be punishable by appropriate penalties that take
into account their grave nature. In addition, the Convention
requires a State Party to establish jurisdiction over these of-
fenses in the following cases: "(a) when the offenses are com-
mitted in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship
or aircraft registered in that State; (b) When the alleged of-
fender is a national of that State; (c) When the victim is a na-
tional of that State if that State considers it appropriate;" 45 or
when the alleged offender is present in any territory under its
jurisdiction and it does not extradite him.4 6
The Convention against Torture is quite detailed in its
description of the State Party obligation to investigate persons
suspected of torture.47 If a person alleged to have committed
acts of torture is found in the territory of a State Party, that
state is obligated to investigate and, where appropriate, to take
him into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his
presence. Investigations must be prompt and impartial.4 8 Cus-
tody may only continue as long as necessary to enable criminal
or extradition proceedings to be initiated.49 The State Party
must make a preliminary inquiry into the facts of the alleged
torture and notify the state where the offenses were committed
or where the alleged offender or victim is a national. It must
also indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction over
42. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 2(1).
43. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 2(3).
44. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 4(1).
45. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 5.
46. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 5.
47. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 6.
48. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 12.
49. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 6(1). Throughout
custody, a detained individual must be allowed to communicate with a repre-
sentative of the state where he is a national. Id. at art. 6(3).
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the person. If requested, a State Party may extradite an alleged
offender.50
If a State Party does not extradite the alleged offender,
the Convention against Torture requires that the State Party
submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution.5 '
In these proceedings, the standards of evidence required for
prosecution and conviction cannot be less stringent than the
standards required in other criminal cases.5 2 All persons must
be guaranteed fair treatment at each stage of the proceedings.
The Convention also requires states to provide each other the
greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal pro-
ceedings brought in respect to any acts of torture.53
The Convention against Torture requires State Parties to
provide education and adequate training to all persons who
may be involved in the "custody, interrogation or treatment of
any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment."5 4 In addition, interrogation rules, instruc-
tions, methods, and practices along with arrangements for the
custody and treatment of persons must be periodically re-
viewed.55
To ensure that the international community adheres to
the prohibition against torture, the Convention against Tor-
ture established the Committee against Torture.56 The Com-
mittee is authorized to review and comment upon national re-
ports submitted by member states describing their compliance
50. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 7(1). Under the
principle of non-refoulement, however, a State Party may not extradite a per-
son to another state when there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Convention against Tor-
ture, supra note 31, at art. 3. For the purpose of determining whether there
are such grounds, a State Party must take into account all relevant considera-
tions, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or
mass violations of human rights in the requesting state. Convention against
Torture, supra note 31, at art. 3.
51. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 7(1).
52. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 7(2).
53. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 9(1).
54. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 10(1).
55. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 11.
56. See Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at arts. 17-24 (estab-
lishing a committee, which will accept State reports and produce its own).
See generally CHRis INGELSE, THE UN COMMrrEE AGAINST TORTURE (2001)
(examining the role of the committee in the development of the conven-
tion).
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with the Convention against Torture.57 The Committee is also
authorized to receive state and individual communications al-
leging noncompliance by member states.5 8 In such cases, how-
ever, the member state must have previously accepted the
competence of the Committee to review these types of com-
munications. While the United States is obligated to submit
reports to the Committee and has accepted its competence to
receive and consider state communications, it has not ac-
cepted the competence of the Committee to review individual
communications. As a result, the Committee cannot consider
any claims brought by individuals against the United States al-
leging violations of the Convention.
As part of its mandate, the Committee against Torture has
issued General Comments that offer interpretations and clari-
fications regarding treaty provisions. In General Comment No.
2, for example, the Committee emphasized the jus cogens na-
ture of the prohibition against torture and its non-derogable
nature.5 9
Article 2, paragraph 2, provides that the prohibition
against torture is absolute and non-derogable. It em-
phasizes that no exceptional circumstances whatso-
ever may be invoked by a State Party to justify acts of
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. The
Convention identifies as among such circumstances,
a state of war or threat thereof, internal political in-
stability or any other public emergency. This includes
any threat of terrorist acts or violent crime as well as
armed conflict, international or non-international.
The Committee is deeply concerned at and rejects
absolutely any efforts by States to justify torture and
ill-treatment as a means to protect public safety or
avert emergencies in these and all other situations.
Similarly, it rejects any religious or traditional justifi-
cation that would violate this absolute prohibition.
The Committee considers that amnesties or other im-
pediments which preclude or indicate unwillingness
57. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 19.
58. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at arts. 21-22.
59. Comm. against Torture, General Comment No. 2, U.N. Doc. CAT/
C/GC/2 (2008), available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ layouts/treaty
bodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatylD=1&DocTypelD=11.
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to provide prompt and fair prosecution and punish-
ment of perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment vio-
late the principle of non-derogability.c0
The Committee has also emphasized the importance of
prosecuting acts of torture. Accordingly, it has stated that im-
munities and other impediments to prosecution are inconsis-
tent with the Convention against Torture. 61
In addition to the Convention against Torture, the prohi-
bition against torture has also been codified in several interna-
tional humanitarian law agreements. 62 Common Article 3 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, provides mini-
mum standards of conduct that must be applied in cases of
armed conflict that are not of an international character.63
This provision precludes "violence to life and person, in partic-
ular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and tor-
ture" as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment."64 Other provisions of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide similar protections
against torture in cases of international armed conflicts. The
60. Id. at para. 5.
61. Comm. against Torture, General Comment No.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/
GC/3 (2012), available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/treatybody
external/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatylD=1&DocTypelD=11.
62. In addition to multilateral agreements, the prohibition against tor-
ture is recognized in several regional agreements. E.g., African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5,June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58. ("All forms of
exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade, tor-
ture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be pro-
hibited."); American Convention on Human Rights art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969,
114 U.N.T.S. 123 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhu-
man or degrading punishment or treatment."); European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.").
63. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Conven-
tion]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Ge-
neva Convention].
64. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 63, at art. 3; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 63, at art. 3.
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prohibition against torture also appears in Additional Proto-
cols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.65
In sum, the international community recognizes that acts
of torture cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. This
universal condemnation has led the international community
to place torture in that narrow realm of jus cogens norms-
nonderogable obligations that bind all states. 66 Indeed, the
crime of torture has attained such opprobrium that the Con-
vention against Torture authorizes the assertion of universal
jurisdiction for such acts-states are authorized to prosecute
an alleged torturer located in their territory regardless of
where the act took place.67 These elements have been force-
65. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
66. See THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER:
Jus COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-
Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006) (addressing the existence and meaning of jus
cogens norms); LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 1,
509 (1988) (stating that prohibition of torture, among other brutal forms of
treatment, is a jus cogens norm); CHRISTOs L. ROzAmS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS
COGENS IN THE LAw OF TREATIES (1976) (describing the status ofjus cogens
norms under international law); LISA YARWOOD, STATE ACCOUNTABILITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw: HOLDING STATES ACCOUNTABLE FOR A BREACH OF
Jus COGENS NORMS (2011) (discussing potential jus cogens norms including
prohibition of torture).
67. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, at art. 5(2). The Commit-
tee against Torture has indicated that "even before the entry into force of
the Convention against Torture, there existed a general rule of international
law which should oblige all States to take effective measures to prevent tor-
ture and to punish acts of torture." Rep. of the Comm. against Torture, para.
7.2 (Annex V), U.N. Doc. A/45/44, GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44 (June
21, 1990), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N90/154/75/IMG/N9015475.pdf. See generally Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JU-
RISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2003) (ex-
amining the basis and conditions for universal jurisdiction); William J.
Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the
Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 129, 154 (2000) (arguing for universal jurisdiction for certain legal viola-
tions and noting that the Convention against Torture "explicitly authorizes
universal jurisdiction"); Jeffrey Rabkin, Universal justice: The Role of Federal
Courts in International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2140 (1995)
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fully acknowledged by various courts, from the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the British
House of Lords. 68
B. Domestic Implementation
The United States signed the Convention against Torture
on April 18, 1988. President Ronald Reagan submitted the
treaty to the Senate for consideration on May 20, 1988. In his
transmittal letter, President Reagan indicated that U.S. ratifica-
tion "will clearly express United States opposition to torture,
an abhorrent practice unfortunately still prevalent in the
world today." 69
In support of the submission, the Reagan administration
prepared a Summary and Analysis of each treaty provision
drafted by the State Department. While the administration
supported the treaty, it had concerns with several provisions.
In its analysis of Article 1 of the Convention against Torture,
the Reagan administration expressed some concerns about the
definition of torture and the "improper application of the
Convention to legitimate U.S. law enforcement actions. . . ."Yo
Accordingly, the administration proposed several understand-
ings that would protect U.S. law enforcement interests.
"The United States understands that, in order to con-
stitute torture, an act must be a deliberate and calcu-
lated act of an extremely cruel and inhuman nature,
specifically intended to inflict excruciating and ago-
nizing physical or mental pain or suffering."
(examining the doctrine of universal jurisdiction); Kenneth C. Randall, Uni-
versal jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEXAs L. REv. 785, 789 (1988)
(recognizing universal jurisdiction for certain human rights violations in-
cluding torture); Rena Hozore Reiss, The Extradition ofJohn Demjanjuk: War
Crimes, Universal jurisdiction, and the Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 281 (1987) (discussing war crimes and crimes against humanity
being widely recognized as international offenses subject to universal juris-
diction).
68. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3) [2000], 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (recognizing that the Convention
against Torture authorizes universal jurisdiction for torture); Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para.167 (Dec. 10, 1998) (recognizing
that certain international crimes can give rise to universal jurisdiction).
69. S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at iii (1988).
70. Id. at 4.
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"The United States understands that the definition of
torture in Article 1 is intended to apply only to acts
directed against persons in the offender's custody or
physical control."
"The United States understands that 'sanctions' in-
cludes not only judicially-imposed sanctions but also
other enforcement actions authorized by United
States law or by judicial interpretation of such law."
"The United States understands that the term 'acqui-
escence' requires that the public official, prior to the
activity constituting torture, have knowledge of such
activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility
to intervene to prevent such activity."
"The United States understands that noncompliance
with applicable legal procedural standards does not
per se constitute torture."7 '
In its analysis of Article 2, the Reagan administration
highlighted the absolute prohibition against torture.
Article 2 provides that no exceptional circumstances,
such as war or public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification for torture. The use of torture in wartime
is already prohibited within the scope of the Geneva
Conventions, to which the United States and virtually
all other countries are Parties, and which in any event
generally reflect customary international law. The ex-
clusion of public emergency as an excuse for torture
is necessary if the Convention is to have significant
effect, as public emergencies are commonly invoked
as a source of extraordinary powers or as a justifica-
tion for limiting fundamental rights and freedoms.72
Despite its analysis of Article 2, the administration indi-
cated that certain situations might not constitute torture. In
particular, "legitimate acts of self-defense or defense of others
do not constitute torture .. . since they are not performed with
the specific intent to cause excruciating and agonizing pain or
suffering."73 As a result, the Reagan administration proposed
71. Id. at 4-5.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 6.
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the following understanding: "The United States understands
that paragraph 2 of Article 2 does not preclude the availability
of relevant common law defenses, including but not limited to
self-defense and defense of others."7 4
The Reagan administration also discussed the implica-
tions of a claim of superior orders in cases of torture. During
the diplomatic negotiations for the Convention against Tor-
ture, the administration proposed that a claim of superior or-
ders could be used in mitigation of punishment. "While this
proposal was ultimately not adopted, it appears not to have
been rejected. Rather the matter has been left to the judgment
of each State Party, and the United States could thus take su-
perior orders into account in imposing criminal punishment
for torture."75 The administration also noted that a superior
orders defense was recognized by the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, although the defense was limited if "the accused
knew the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense
and understanding would have known the orders to be unlaw-
ful."76 Since a "person of ordinary sense and understanding"
would know that acts of torture are criminal, "no change in
U.S. military law would be required by Article 2 of the Conven-
tion."77
In its analysis of the prosecution requirements set forth in
Articles 4 through 7, the Reagan administration determined
that acts of torture committed within the United States were
already covered by existing state and federal law.
Acts of torture committed in the United States . . . as
well as acts in the United States constituting an at-
tempt or conspiracy to torture, would appear to vio-
late criminal statutes under existing state or federal
law. When such acts are subject to state jurisdiction,
the offense would presumably be a common crime
such as assault or murder. In particular cases, the na-
ture of the activity or persons involved could give rise
to a federal offense as well such as interstate kidnap-
ping or hostage taking.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id.
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Where the acts are subject to federal jurisdiction, sim-
ilar common crimes are defined under federal crimi-
nal law, for example, assault, maiming, murder, man-
slaughter, attempt to commit murder or manslaugh-
ter, and rape. Conspiracy to commit the above
crimes and being an accessory after the fact are also
offenses.78
The administration also referenced other federal statutes
and constitutional provisions that would offer protections
against torture committed in the United States. Thus, addi-
tional legislation was not needed to prosecute such acts when
committed in the United States. However, U.S. jurisdiction did
not extend to acts of torture committed abroad. This was a
significant concern because the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion was a central feature of the Convention against Torture.
A major concern in drafting Article 5 [of the Conven-
tion against Torture], and indeed, in drafting the
Convention as a whole, was whether the Convention
should provide for possible prosecution by any State
in which the alleged offender is found - so-called
"universal jurisdiction." The United States strongly
supported the provision for universal jurisdiction on
the grounds that torture, like hijacking, sabotage,
hostage-taking, and attacks on internationally pro-
tected persons, is an offense of special international
concern, and should have similarly broad, universal
recognition as a crime against humanity, with appro-
priate jurisdictional consequences. Provision for
"universal jurisdiction" was also deemed important in
view of the fact that the government of the country
where official torture actually occurs may seldom be
relied upon to take action.79
78. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 9. The Reagan administration indicated that the principle of
universal jurisdiction was not unique; it was patterned after similar provi-
sions in several other international agreements. See International Conven-
tion against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (au-
thorizing universal jurisdiction for hostage-taking); Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (au-
thorizing universal jurisdiction for attacks on internationally protected per-
sons); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec.
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Accordingly, implementing legislation would be needed
to establish U.S. jurisdiction in such cases. Thus, the adminis-
tration proposed a declaration that provided "[t]he United
States will not deposit the instrument of ratification until after
the implementing legislation of the Convention has been en-
acted."80
With respect to prosecution, the Reagan administration
indicated that the Convention does not require prosecution in
every case. "The decision whether to prosecute entails a judg-
ment whether a sufficient legal and factual basis exists for such
an action."81 Moreover, the United States would prefer to ex-
tradite individuals to the state where the offense was commit-
ted. As a result, the administration submitted a proposed dec-
laration to the Senate with respect to Article 7, indicating its
preference for extradition in lieu of prosecution in such cases.
Following the 1988 presidential election, the administra-
tion of President George H.W. Bush reaffirmed the need for
U.S. ratification of the Convention against Torture. In his May
8, 1989 letter to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
President Bush indicated there was an "urgent need for Senate
approval" of the Convention. Subsequently, Senator Claiborne
Pell, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, sent a letter to the Bush administration expressing con-
cern about the proposed reservations, understandings, and
declarations attached to the Convention. In response, the
Bush administration submitted a revised package of proposed
reservations, understandings, and declarations to the Senate
on December 10, 1989.
Reflecting our consultations with various interested
groups in the private sector, the package now con-
tains a revised understanding to the definition of tor-
ture, which would not raise the high threshold of
pain already required under international law, clari-
fies the definition of mental pain and suffering, and
maintains our position that specific intent is required
for torture. The revised package also eliminates the
understanding regarding to "common-law" defenses,
16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (authorizing universal jurisdiction for seizures of
aircraft).
80. S. TRETY Doc. No. 100-20, supra note 69, at 10.
81. S. TRFATr Doc. No. 100-20, supra note 69, at 11.
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makes it clear that the United States does not regard
authorized sanctions that unquestionably violate in-
ternational law as "lawful sanctions" exempt from the
prohibition on torture, and removes our reservation
to the obligation not to extradite individuals if we be-
lieve they would be tortured upon return.8 2
On January 30, 1990, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations held hearings on the Convention against Torture.8 3
In his prepared remarks to the Committee, Abraham D.
Sofaer, the Legal Adviser for the Department of State, ex-
plained the need for U.S. ratification. "The Bush administra-
tion places a high priority on the early ratification of this im-
portant human rights treaty. The need for this Convention,
Mr. Chairman, stems from the tragic fact that torture contin-
ues to be practiced on a daily basis in many nations through-
out the world, systematically and with the support or acquies-
cence of government officials."8 4 Sofaer noted that existing
U.S. laws adequately addressed situations of torture that occur
in the United States.
Mr. Chairman, some may feel the United States has
no need for the legal protections of the Convention
against Torture. Existing U.S. law makes any acts fall-
ing within the Convention's definition of torture a
criminal offense, as well as a violation of various civil
statutes. Potential civil remedies include incarcera-
tion, compensation, and the full range of equitable
relief. Any Public Official in the United States, at any
level of government, who inflicts torture (or insti-
gates, consents to, acquiesces in, or tolerates torture)
would be subject to an effective system of control and
punishment in the U.S. legal system.
This administration nonetheless believes, Mr. Chair-
man, that, as a member of the international commu-
nity, we must stand with other nations in pledging to
82. Letter fromJanet G. Mullins, Assistant Sec'y, Legislative Affairs, Dep't
of State, to Claiborne Pell, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate (Dec. 10, 1989) (on file with the U.S. Senate).
83. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st.
Cong. 2 (1990).
84. Id. at 7 (statement of Abraham Sofaer).
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bring to justice those who engaged in torture,
whether in U.S. territory or in the territory of other
countries.8 5
In his prepared remarks, Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Criminal Division of the Justice De-
partment, explained the need for including several conditions
to U.S. ratification.8 6 The principle concern involved the defi-
nition of torture, particularly with respect to its treatment of
mental anguish. Specifically, the Bush administration believed
the definition of mental pain or suffering was imprecise be-
cause such suffering is subjective and often transitory. The
proposed understanding offered by the Bush administration
would resolve such imprecision. Such clarity was deemed nec-
essary because of the potential liability U.S. law enforcement
officials would face when traveling abroad.
The Convention places U.S. law enforcement offi-
cials, when traveling overseas, at risk of arrest and
prosecution in foreign jurisdictions, or even extradi-
tion to a third country, for purported violations com-
mitted within the United States. Even when such a
prosecution is well-intended, albeit perhaps mis-
guided, the fact remains that the would[-]be defen-
dant law enforcement official will be subjected to
trial under a definition which, viewed in light of U.S.
Constitutional principles, is so imprecise as to raise
the specter of fundamental unfairness. We believe
that, in becoming a party to the Convention, the
United States has an obligation to raise and if possi-
ble rectify this problem.8 7
During the Senate hearings, several Committee members
expressed concern about the Bush administration's decision
to remove the proposed understanding regarding common
law defenses to torture. In response, the Department of State
sent a letter to several Committee members explaining the rea-
sons for this decision.
Because the Convention applies only to custodial sit-
uations, i.e., when the person is actually under the
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id. at 15-18 (statement of Mark Richard).
87. Id. at 16.
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control of a public official, the legitimate right of self-
defense is not affected by the Convention. Moreover,
to sustain a successful prosecution it will be necessary
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the al-
leged perpetrator formed the specific intent to com-
mit torture. Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Conven-
tion states that "no exceptional circumstances what-
soever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emer-
gency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."
We accept this provision, without reservation. As indi-
cated by President Reagan when he transmitted the
Torture Convention to the Senate, no circumstances
can justify torture.
The Reagan administration, without in any way nar-
rowing the prohibition on torture, had thought it de-
sirable to clarify that the Convention does not pre-
clude the availability of relevant common law de-
fenses, including self-defense and defense of others.
That is, the Convention does not prevent a person
from acting in self-defense, as long as he does not tor-
ture. While there was no opposition to this concept,
substantial concern was expressed that if this under-
standing were included in the instrument of ratifica-
tion, it would be misinterpreted or misused by other
states to justify torture in certain circumstances. We
concluded that this concern was justified and there-
fore reviewed whether the understanding was neces-
sary. We decide it was not, since nothing in the Con-
vention purports to limit defenses of actions which
are not committed with the specific intent to tor-
ture.8 8
On July 19, 1990, the Committee voted favorably for the
Convention. It subsequently presented its report to the full
Senate recommending advice and consent to ratification, sub-
88. Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Sec'y, Legislative Affairs, Dep't
of State to Sen. Larry Pressler (Apr. 4, 1990) (on file with the U.S. Senate).
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ject to several reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions.89
On October 27, 1990, the Senate gave its advice and con-
sent to the Convention against Torture.90 Two reservations,
five understandings, two declarations, and one proviso were
included by the Senate as a condition for its advice and con-
sent. Significantly, the Senate included the following under-
standing with respect to the definition of torture:
(1) (a) That with reference to Article 1, the United
States understands that, in order to constitute tor-
ture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict se-
vere physical or mental pain or suffering and that
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental
harm caused by or resulting from: (1) the intentional
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering; (2) the administration or applica-
tion, or threatened administration or application, of
mind altering substances or other procedures calcu-
lated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the person-
ality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the
threat that another person will imminently be sub-
jected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or
the administration or application of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.
(b) That the United States understands that the defi-
nition of torture in Article 1 is intended to apply only
to acts directed against persons in the offender's cus-
tody or physical control.
(c) That with reference to Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, the United States understands that "sanctions"
includes judicially imposed sanctions and other en-
forcement actions authorized by United States law or
by judicial interpretation of such law. Nonetheless,
the United States understands that a State Party
could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the
89. COMM. OF FoREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC.
Doc. No. 101-30 (1990).
90. 136 CONG. REc. 36192 (1990).
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object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit
torture.
(d) That with reference to Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, the United States understands that the term "ac-
quiescence" requires that the public official, prior to
the activity constituting torture, have awareness of
such activity and thereafter breach his legal responsi-
bility to intervene to prevent such activity.
(e) That with reference to Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, the United States understands that noncompli-
ance with applicable legal procedural standards does
not per se constitute torture.9 '
The Bush administration did not immediately submit the
instrument of ratification to the United Nations. According to
the Bush administration, the United States would not become
a party to the Convention against Torture until the necessary
implementing legislation was adopted. Indeed, President Bush
noted the importance of adopting legislation that would estab-
lish criminal jurisdiction for acts of torture committed abroad
when he signed the Torture Victim Protection Act, legislation
that established civil liability for acts of torture committed
abroad.
I regret the legislation proposed by the Administra-
tion to implement the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment has not yet been
enacted. This proposed implementing legislation
would provide a tougher and more effective response
to the problem, putting in place for torturers the
same international "extradite or prosecute" regime
we have for terrorists. The Senate gave its advice and
consent to the Torture Convention on October 27,
1990, but the United States cannot proceed to be-
come a party until the necessary implementing legis-
lation is in place. I again call upon the Congress to
take prompt action to approve the Torture Conven-
tion implementing legislation.92
91. Id. at 36193.
92. Presidential Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 465 (Mar. 12, 1992).
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A bill to implement U.S. obligations under the Conven-
tion against Torture was first introduced on September 24,
1992.93 H.R. 6017 passed in the House of Representatives but
was not acted upon by the Senate.94 In February 1993, the bill
was reintroduced in the House as H.R. 933.95 In addition, a
separate bill was also introduced that would withdraw sover-
eign immunity from foreign states in cases involving torture
and extrajudicial killing.96 Neither bill was adopted. On June
15, 1993, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994 was
introduced in the Senate.97 Section 304 addressed the imple-
mentation of the Convention against Torture.98 According to
a subsequent Senate report, this legislation would create a fed-
eral criminal offense for acts of torture committed outside the
United States, thereby fulfilling the U.S. obligation under the
Convention against Torture.99 There was no substantive dis-
cussion in either the House or Senate regarding the Torture
Statute. On April 29, 1994, Congress passed the legislation and
sent the bill to the White House for presidential signature. 0 (
On April 30, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the For-
eign Relations Authorization Act of 1994, which codified the
Torture Statute under 18 U.S.C. §2340A.101 By the terms of
93. H.R. 6017, 102d Cong. (1992) ("To Implement for the United States
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.").
94. Senator Joe Biden incorporated the language of H.R. 6017 into a
larger crime bill (S.3349, 102d Cong. (1992)) being considered in the Sen-
ate.
95. H.R. 933, 103d Cong. (1993) ("To Implement for the United States
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.").
96. H.R. 934, 103rd Cong. (1993) ("A Bill to amend title 28, United
States Code, relating to jurisdictional immunities of foreign states, to grant
jurisdiction to the courts of the United States in certain cases involving tor-
ture or extrajudicial killing occurring in that state.").
97. S. 1099, 103d Cong. (1993) ("To authorize appropriations for the
Department of State to carry out its authorities and responsibilities in the
conduct of foreign affairs during the fiscal years 1994 and 1995, and for
other purposes.").
98. Id.
99. S. REP. No.103-107, at 58 (1993).
100. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995,
Pub. L. No. 103-236 (1994) (codified in sections of 22 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.
among other titles).
101. Id.
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the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 18 U.S.C. §2340A
would not become effective until the United States ratified the
Convention against Torture.10 2 President Clinton deposited
the instrument of ratification with the United Nations on Oc-
tober 21, 1994. Pursuant to Article 27(2) of the Convention,
the treaty would enter into force on the thirtieth day after the
deposition of the instrument of ratification. Accordingly, the
Convention against Torture entered into force for the United
States on November 20, 1994. The Torture Statute went into
effect on the same day.103
As currently set forth, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) provides:
Whoever outside the United States commits or at-
tempts to commit torture shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both,
and if death results to any person from conduct pro-
hibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 0 4
102. Section 506(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act provided
that the legislation would "take effect on the later of - (1) the date of enact-
ment of this Act; or (2) the date on which the United States has become a
party to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment." Id. at § 560(c).
103. In addition to 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, the United States has implemented
the provisions of the Convention against Torture in other ways. In 1991, for
example, Congress adopted the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(TVPA) to establish civil liability for acts of torture and summary execution.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. The TVPA has been used on several occasions to
establish civil liability for acts of torture committed abroad. See, e.g., Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing civil liability for torture
under the Torture Victim Protection Act). In 1998, Congress adopted the
Torture Victim Relief Act of 1998 to provide funding for torture victim treat-
ment centers in the United States and abroad. 22 U.S.C. 2152 note. Con-
gress subsequently increased U.S. contributions to these domestic and inter-
national programs. 22 U.S.C. 2151 note.
104. As originally drafted, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A imposed a term of years or
life imprisonment if the act of torture resulted in death.
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be imprisoned for any term of
years or for life.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, supra note
100. It was subsequently amended to impose the death penalty for acts of
torture that result in death. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60020 (1994).
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Torture "means an act committed by a person acting
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffer-
ing incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within
his custody or physical control." 05 Severe mental pain or suf-
fering is further defined in the statute as the prolonged
mental harm caused by or resulting from the following acts:
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction
of severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind-altering sub-
stances or other procedures calculated to disrupt pro-
foundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently
be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffer-
ing, or the administration or application of mind-al-
tering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 06
There is jurisdiction over acts of torture when: (1) the al-
leged offender is a national of the United States or (2) the
alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of
the nationality of the victim or alleged offender. 07 In other
words, a torturer can be held criminally liable for acts of tor-
ture even when such acts occur abroad and regardless of
whether the victim or the perpetrator is a U.S. citizen. In 2001,
the Torture Statute was amended to specifically include a con-
spiracy charge. 0 The Torture Statute is not meant to pre-
clude other methods for establishing criminal liability for acts
of torture.109
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b).
108. Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001). The conspiracy provision states, "A person
who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the
same penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed
for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy."
18 U.S.C. § 2340A(c).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2340B ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as
precluding the application of State or local laws on the same subject, nor
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In several submissions to the U.N. Committee against Tor-
ture, the United States has reiterated that 18 U.S.C. § 2340A
was adopted to implement U.S. obligations pursuant to the
Convention against Torture. In its 2000 submission to the
Committee, the United States explained the scope of the Tor-
ture Statute.
Section 2340A of Title 18 provides for punishment of
acts of torture committed outside the United States
by a United States national or by a person subse-
quendy present in the United States. The definition
of torture set forth in section 2340 conforms to the
definition in the Convention, as interpreted by the
understandings expressed by the United States at the
time of ratification. In sum, in such circumstances,
prosecution can be initiated under United States law
in a manner consistent with the obligations set forth
in article 7. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice
has undertaken measures to ensure that any person
on United States territory believed to be responsible
for acts of torture is identified and handled consis-
tent with the requirements of this provision. 0
The United States added that "any person on U.S. terri-
tory believed to be responsible for acts of torture" would be
"identified and handled consistent with the requirements" of
the Convention."' In its Concluding Observations, however,
the Committee expressed concern regarding "[t]he failure of
the State party to enact a federal crime of torture in terms con-
sistent with article 1 of the Convention . . . ."1l2 In its 2005
submission to the Committee, the United States acknowledged
that several investigations were underway but there had been
no prosecutions under the Torture Statute.
As of January 1, 2005, the United States has consid-
ered applying the statute in several cases, but it has
shall anything in this chapter be construed as creating any substantive or
procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any civil proceeding.").
110. Committee against Torture, United States of America, Initial Report
of States Parties 13, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (2000).
111. Id. at para. 194.
112. U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Committee against Torture,
23d Sess., Nov. 8-Nov. 19 1999, 24th Sess. May I - May 19, 2000, para.
179(a), U.N. Doc. A/55/44; GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 44 (2000).
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not initiated any prosecutions under this provision to
date. In some cases, investigations are pending. As is
necessarily true of any successful criminal prosecu-
tion, the available evidence must establish the various
elements of the offense. Accordingly, in order for the
extraterritorial criminal torture statute to apply, the
conduct must fall within the definition of torture, it
must have been committed subsequent to the effec-
tive date of the statute (November 20, 1994), and it
must have been committed "outside the United
States.""13
The Committee again expressed concerns regarding the
definition of torture set forth in federal law.' 4 The Commit-
tee also asked the United States to address a large number of
issues regarding U.S. compliance with the treaty, including the
treatment of detainees in Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and
Iraq."'5 In response, the United States offered additional in-
formation regarding individuals under the control of the U.S.
military." 6
In preparation for the 2014 U.S. submission, the Commit-
tee requested similar information from the United States. 1 7
In its submission, the United States also described the first ap-
plication of the Torture Statute.
113. Comm. against Torture, Second Periodic Report of States Parties
Due in 1999: United States of America, para. 51, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/
Add.3 (June 29, 2005).
114. Comm. against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recom-
mendations of the Committee against Torture: United States of America,
36th Sess. May 1 - May 19, 2006, para. 13, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2
(July 25, 2006).
115. Comm. against Torture, List of Issues to be Considered During the
Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America,
35th Sess., Nov. 7 - Nov. 25, 2005, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/Q/2 (Feb. 8,
2006).
116. Second Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1999: United States
of America, supra note 113, at 47; List of Issues to be Considered During the
Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America:
Response of the United States of America, available at http://www2.ohchr
.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/AdvanceVersions/listUSA36_En.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2015).
117. Comm. against Torture, List of Issues to Prior to the Submission of
the Fifth Periodic Report of United States of America, 43d Sess., Nov. 2 -
Nov. 20, 2009, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/Q/5 (Jan. 20, 2010).
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The United States has investigated and prosecuted al-
legations of extraterritorial torture over which it has
jurisdiction. On October 30, 2008, Roy M. Belfast, Jr.,
son of Charles G. Taylor, former president of Liberia,
was convicted of crimes related to torture in Liberia
between April 1999 and July 2003 under the U.S. ex-
traterritorial torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340A. On Jan-
uary 9, 2009, he was sentenced to 97 years in prison.
The prosecution of these torture claims was the first
under the Torture Convention Implementation Act,
18 U.S.C. 2340A et seq.' 18
In its Concluding Observations, the Committee against
Torture again expressed concerns about the definition of tor-
ture in U.S. law.119 The Committee also expressed "grave con-
cern over the extraordinary rendition, secret detention and in-
terrogation programme operated by the United States Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) between 2001 and 2008, which
comprised numerous human rights violations, including tor-
ture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearance of persons sus-
pected of involvement in terrorism-related crimes."1 20
III. THE CASE OF Roy BELFAST, JR.
Roy Belfast Jr. was born in the United States in 1977.121
His father, Charles Taylor, would become the leader of the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia and, eventually, the Presi-
dent of Liberia in 1997. Upon assuming the presidency, Taylor
118. Comm. against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention Pursuant to the Optional
Reporting Procedure: Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due
in 2011: United States of America, para. 126, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/3-5
(Dec. 4, 2013). The case of Roy Belfast was first reported to the U.N. Human
Rights Committee in 2011. See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Re-
ports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Fourth
Periodic Report: United States of America, para. 181(f), U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/USA/4 (May 22, 2012).
119. Comm. against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Combined
Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of United States of America, para. 9, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (Dec. 19, 2014) (discussing the U.S. position re-
garding the application of the Convention against Torture).
120. Id. at para. 11.
121. Belfast is also known as Chuckie Taylor, Charles Taylor, Jr., Charles
Taylor II, and Charles McArther Emmanuel. See United States v. Belfast, 611
F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2010).
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asked his son to direct the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) in Libe-
ria. Belfast served in this capacity between 1999 and 2003. He
was responsible for providing security for the president and
worked with various Liberian security and military forces. As
Liberia became engulfed in civil war, Belfast became increas-
ingly brutal in his treatment of civilians. He was personally re-
sponsible for numerous human rights abuses, including tor-
ture and summary execution. Taylor eventually resigned from
the presidency in 2003 and immediately left the country.122
Belfast also left Liberia and moved to Trinidad for several
years. When Belfast returned to the United States in March
2006, he was arrested upon entry at the Miami International
Airport. He was initially charged with passport fraud because
he had lied about his father's identity on his U.S. passport ap-
plication. He pled guilty to this charge, and was scheduled for
sentencing on December 7, 2006.
On December 6, 2006, Belfast was charged by a federal
grand jury in the federal district court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida with one count of torture, one count of con-
spiracy to torture, and one count of using a firearm during the
commission of a violent crime. According to Assistant Attorney
General Alice S. Fisher of the Criminal Division, "[t]his [case]
marks the first time the Justice Department has charged a de-
fendant with the crime of torture . . . . Crimes such as these
will not go unanswered." 23 The indictment was the result of a
joint task force involving the U.S. Attorney's Office, Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement, and the Counterterrorism Di-
vision of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A superseding
122. Taylor first traveled to Nigeria, where he remained in exile for sev-
eral years. See Ben Brumfield, Charles Taylor sentenced to 50 years for war crimes,
CNN (May 31, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/30/world/africa/
netherlands-taylor-sentencing/index.html. While in exile, Taylor was in-
dicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Id. In June 2006, Taylor was transferred to The Hague for
prosecution in the Special Court. Id. On April 26, 2012, Taylor was convicted
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. See generally Recent Case, Prose-
cutor v. Taylor, 127 HARv. L. REv. 1847 (2014) (discussing international
prosecution of Charles Taylor).
123. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Roy Belfast Jr. AKA Chuckie Taylor
Indicted on Torture Charges (Dec. 6, 2006), http://wwwjustice.gov/arch
ive/opa/pr/2006/December/06scrm_813.html.
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indictment issued on September 6, 2007 charged Belfast with
five counts of torture.1 2 4
On November 7, 2007, the federal grand jury issued a Sec-
ond Superseding Indictment against Belfast.1 25 The indict-
ment alleged eight counts, charging Belfast with torture, con-
spiracy to commit torture, and use of a firearm in furtherance
of these crimes. The indictment identified seven torture vic-
tims and provided a detailed description of each victim and
the manner in which they were tortured.
Count One set forth the conspiracy charge, alleging that
Belfast conspired under the color of law and with "the specific
intent to inflict severe physical pain and suffering upon other
persons" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) and (c).1 26
Object of the Conspiracy
It was the object of the conspiracy to maintain, pre-
serve, protect and strengthen the power and author-
ity of Charles McArthur Taylor's presidency, and to
intimidate, neutralize, punish, weaken and eliminate
actual and perceived opponents of and threats to his
administration, by means of torture, in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2340A and
2340(1).
Manner and Means of the Conspiracy
The manner and means by which members of the
conspiracy sought to accomplish its goals included:
that the defendant and others known and unknown
to the grand jury used the ATU and other police and
security forces to seize, imprison at various locations,
and interrogate persons about actual, perceived and
potential opposition to the Taylor presidency, and to
mistreat persons including by acts specifically in-
tended to inflict severe physical pain and suffering.' 27
124. Press Release, Chuckie Taylor Charged with Additional Acts of Tor-
ture in Superseding Indictment (Sept. 6, 2007), http://wwwjustice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2007/September/07_crm688.html.
125. Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d
783 (Nov. 7, 2007) (No. 06-20758).
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id.
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Count One then offered a detailed description of the acts
taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.128 It identified seven
victims, each of whom was tortured by Belfast or with his au-
thorization. The victims were subjected to numerous acts of
brutality. They were stripped of their clothes, bound in stress
positions, and blindfolded for long periods of time. They were
beaten and threatened with execution. The victims were held
in unsanitary conditions in small cells that were often filled
with unsanitary water. Several of the victims were burned with
molten plastic or scalding water and stabbed with a bayonet.
Other victims were sodomized and electrocuted. These acts oc-
curred in Liberia and the victims were citizens of Liberia and
Sierra Leone. One victim was killed while being tortured.
Count Two charged Belfast with conspiracy to use and
carry a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(o).129 Counts Three through Seven charged Bel-
fast with committing torture against five individuals in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.o30 Finally, Count Eight charged Bel-
fast with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to
a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (A). 3 1
Belfast raised several procedural challenges to his prose-
cution.' 3 2 He also moved to dismiss the indictment on consti-
tutional grounds.133 The motion to dismiss offered a broad cri-
tique of the government's prosecution.
[T] he core problem with this case is that in its prose-
cution of Mr. Emmanuel [Belfast], the government
seeks to oversee, through the open-ended terms of
federal criminal law - the internal and wholly domes-
tic actions of a foreign government. Not only does
this constitute an improper attempt to meddle in the
affairs of a foreign sovereign, presenting conflicting
128. Id. at 3-12.
129. Id. at 12.
130. Id. at 12-16.
131. Id. at 17.
132. United States v. Belfast, No. 06-20758, 2007 WL 1879909 (S.D. Fla.
June 29, 2007).
133. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, and Memorandum of
Law in Support Thereof, Based on the Unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
2340A, Both on Its Face and as Applied to the Allegations of the Indictment,
United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 WL 980550 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 2, 2007).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
372015]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
and unintelligible standards for application, but also
impermissibly expands the scope and authority of the
federal government beyond constitutional parame-
ters. In the indictment, the government charges that
Mr. Emmanuel, while working as a leader in a special
anti-terrorism unit, engaged in interrogation tech-
niques that rose to the level of torture. As the govern-
ment concedes, the prosecution of Mr. Emmanuel is
a unique, first-of-its-kind prosecution despite the fact
that the underlying law has existed for over a decade.
However, as demonstrated below, it is an ill-fated
prosecution that should not, and cannot, proceed
without violating the Constitution of the United
States.' 34
Substantively, Belfast made six arguments. First, Belfast ar-
gued that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to im-
plement the Torture Statute. He alleged that such authority
could not be discerned from the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the Treaty Clause, or the Offenses Clause. 35 Second, Belfast
asserted that Congress lacked the authority to apply criminal
law extraterritorially when the locus of the offense is com-
pletely foreign. In this case, Belfast argued there was no con-
nection to the United States and no basis for overcoming the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Third, he challenged
the prosecution as a violation of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. As a government official acting in an official capacity,
Belfast alleged he was immune from prosecution. Fourth, Bel-
fast alleged that the Torture Statute was unconstitutionally
vague because it did not give fair warning of the prohibited
conduct and, therefore, violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Fifth, Belfast argued that prosecuting him
for acts that allegedly occurred outside the United States was
unfair and, therefore, also violated the Fifth Amendment. Cit-
ing U.S. treatment of detainees in the war on terror, he also
argued there was no consensus on the appropriate standards
134. Id. at 1.
135. Belfast also argued that the conduct set forth in the indictment was
not universally condemned. "[T]he United States itself has concluded that
depending on the severity of the domestic and even foreign threats faced by
the government, the infliction of mental and related pain, such as by simu-
lated drowning (waterboarding), is a permissible tactic." Id. at 3-4.
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for interrogation in the context of national security. 36 Finally,
Belfast asserted that the indictment would violate his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial, the right to compulsory
process, and the right to effective assistance of counsel. On
July 5, 2007, the district court denied all of Belfast's claims.' 37
Belfast's trial began on September 29, 2008 before ajury
in the federal district court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida. The trial lasted four weeks and included testimony from
several victims, medical experts, and a State Department offi-
cial. On October 30, 2008, the jury returned guilty verdicts on
all eight counts. Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey an-
nounced that " [t] oday's conviction provides a measure of jus-
tice to those who were victimized by the reprehensible acts of
Charles TaylorJr. [Belfast] and his associates. It sends a power-
ful message to human rights violators around the world that,
when we can, we will hold them fully accountable for their
crimes."' 38 On January 9, 2009, Belfast was sentenced to 97
years in prison.13 9
136. Id. at 10 (citations omitted) ("According to news reports in the Wash-
ington Post and New York Times, the American government has detained
persons and subjected them to torture: prolonged detention away from fami-
lies and legal counsel, deprivation of sleep, sensory deprivation, kidnaping
and delivery to countries not concerned with human rights, killing of civil-
ians, intimidation by vicious dogs, waterboarding and disruption of families.
Is there such a thing any more as a consensus view on the subject of torture
in connection with interrogation touching on vital matters of national secur-
ity?").
137. United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758, 2007 WL 2002452 (S.D.
Fla. July 5, 2007).
138. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Roy BelfastJr. A/K/A Chuckie Taylor
Convicted on Torture Charges (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://wwwjus-
tice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-crm-971.html.
139. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Roy Belfast Jr., A/K/A Chuckie Tay-
lor, Sentenced on Torture Charges (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www
justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2009/January/09-crm-021.html. On January 9,
2009, Belfast was also sued in a civil lawsuit by five plaintiffs from Liberia. See
Kpadeh v. Emmanuel, 261 F.R.D. 687 (S.D. Fla. 2009). One of the plaintiffs,
Rufus Kpadeh, was also one of the victims in Belfast's criminal case. Id. The
lawsuit was filed under the Alien Tort Statute and alleged claims of torture,
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest as well as several
state law claims. Id. Belfast failed to respond to the lawsuit, and the court
granted the plaintiffs a default judgment. Id. On February 5, 2010, the five
plaintiffs were awarded $22,352,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
Id.
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Belfast appealed his conviction to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. According to Belfast, the primary focus of
his appeal concerned the unique nature of the Torture Stat-
ute.
This appeal represents the first time any Court of Ap-
peals will review the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2340A (the "Torture Act," or the "Act"). Emman-
uel [Belfast] respectfully maintains that, by creating
an offense that extends beyond that defined by the
underlying treaty (the Convention against Torture or
"CAT") and recognized as torture by the interna-
tional community, Congress has created a statute that
is ultra vires.140
Belfast raised five issues on appeal. First, he alleged the
statute defined torture "far more broadly" than the definition
set forth in the Convention against Torture. As a result, Con-
gress had exceeded its authority under the Constitution. Sec-
ond, Belfast argued that the statute's effort to criminalize con-
spiracy also exceeded Congress's authority since conspiracy
was not recognized either in the Convention against Torture
or international law. Third, he alleged that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
could not be applied to conduct that occurred abroad. Fourth,
Belfast argued that numerous errors in the lower court pro-
ceedings deprived him of a fair trial. Finally, he alleged that
his sentence had been imposed incorrectly because he had not
been convicted of murder or kidnapping and, therefore, the
cross-references to such acts in calculating his sentence were
wrong.
On July 15, 2010, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Belfast's
conviction. In its opinion, the court noted that "[t]he facts of
this case are riddled with extraordinary cruelty and evil."1 4 1
The court addressed each of the five issues Belfast raised on
appeal. Part I of the opinion reviewed the facts of the case, and
Part II examined the legal obligations established by the Con-
vention against Torture and the Torture Statute.
In Part III of the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit considered
several constitutional challenges Belfast brought regarding the
140. Brief of the Appellant, United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th
Cir. 2010), at 28.
141. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 793.
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Torture Statute.1 4 2 The court began its analysis by considering
the manner in which U.S. treaty obligations were imple-
mented. The court determined that the Necessary and Proper
Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorized the adoption of
federal legislation that was meant to implement treaty obliga-
tions accepted pursuant to the Treaty Clause. For this reason,
the Torture Statute was "a valid exercise of congressional
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, because the
Torture Act tracks the provisions of the CAT [Convention
against Torture] in all material respects."1 4 3 Indeed, the imple-
menting legislation only needs a "rational relationship" 14 4 to
the subject matter of the treaty.14 5 "[Dlifferences in language
and scope between the treaty and its implementing legislation
did not mean that one lacked a rational relationship to the
other."1 46 Thus, slight variations between the treaty and imple-
menting legislation that are not material do not undermine
the legitimacy of the legislation. Based on this analysis, the
court rejected Belfast's constitutional arguments regarding
variances between the Convention against Torture and the
language of the Torture Statute.
The court then reviewed the scope of the Torture Stat-
ute.1 47 Both the language of the Convention against Torture
and the U.S. record regarding ratification made clear that the
treaty obligations were meant to apply during armed conflict.
Thus, the court rejected Belfast's claim that the Torture Stat-
ute was unconstitutional because it applied during armed con-
flicts. The court also rejected Belfast's claim that he could not
be prosecuted for acts of torture that occurred before Liberia
ratified the Convention against Torture.14 8 Such an interpreta-
tion was contrary to the text of the Convention. 149
142. Id. at 803.
143. Id. at 806.
144. Id. at 804.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 806.
147. Id. at 809.
148. Id.
149. The court also rejected Belfast's argument that the torture statute
was invalid because it sought to establish jurisdiction based solely on the
alleged torturer's presence in the United States. Id. at 810. Since the torture
statute also established jurisdiction based on the alleged torturer's U.S. na-
tionality, Belfast's argument was irrelevant.
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Finally, the court considered and rejected Belfast's claim
that the Torture Statute could not be applied to the extraterri-
torial conduct of a U.S. citizen.15 0 The court recognized that
Congress had the authority to regulate extraterritorial acts.
Such intent was evident in the Torture Statute and could be
inferred from the Convention against Torture.
First, the nature of the harm to which the CAT and
the Torture Act are directed-"torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment throughout the world," see CAT, pmbl.-is
quintessentially international in scope. Second, and
relatedly, the international focus of the statute is
"self-evident": Congress's concern was not to prevent
official torture within the borders of the United
States, but in nations where the rule of law has bro-
ken down and the ruling government has become
the enemy, rather than the protector, of its citizens.
Finally, limiting the prohibitions of the Torture Act
to conduct occurring in the United States would dra-
matically, if not entirely, reduce their efficacy.1 5 '
In Part IV of the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
Belfast's argument that Congress exceeded its constitutional
authority by criminalizing conspiracy to commit torture, which
was not recognized in either the Convention against Torture
or international law. 15 2 According to the court, the Conven-
tion against Torture did, in fact, authorize criminal liability for
any acts in support of torture, including conspiracy.' 5 3 The
court also rejected Belfast's reliance on the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1 54 Although the Hamdan deci-
sion found that a conspiracy charge is not recognized under
customary international law, this was irrelevant because the
Convention against Torture authorized criminal liability for
conspiracy.1 5 5
The court addressed two other arguments in Part IV. It
rejected Belfast's assertion that acts committed in support of a
150. Id.
151. Id. at 811.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 811-12.
154. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
155. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 812.
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conspiracy to commit torture were permissible when they were
"governmental self-preservation tactics." 156 In other words,
claims of public emergency could not be used to justify tor-
ture.
[T]he entire premise of Emmanuel's [Belfast's] argu-
ment-that a conspiracy to commit torture is permis-
sible whenever its object is to preserve governmental
power-is unacceptable under the CAT. Official tor-
ture is most likely to occur precisely when an illegiti-
mate regime perceives a threat to its dominance from
dissenters. In recognition of this reality, the CAT it-
self unambiguously provides that "[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justifi-
cation of torture." CAT, art. 2(2). The CAT thus an-
ticipated prosecutions such as this one, where torture
is committed by a regime in order to maintain its bru-
tal control over an unhappy populace. The conspir-
acy prosecution here was fully consistent with the
mandate that such acts may be prosecuted.157
The court also rejected Belfast's assertion that the Torture
Statute could not be applied to prosecute extraterritorial acts
of conspiracy. Since the court had already determined that the
Torture Statute applied to extraterritorial acts of torture, "it
follows that there is extraterritorial jurisdiction to prohibit
conspiracy." 15 8
In Part V of the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit examined
Belfast's challenges to his conviction for using and carrying a
firearm during, and in relation to, a crime of violence.159 Bel-
fast asserted that the statute could not be applied to such ex-
traterritorial conduct. While the applicable statute (18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)) was silent on its extraterritorial application, the
court found that the statute was drafted in broad terms to ap-
ply "to any crime of violence that 'may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States." 160 Since the Torture Statute au-
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 813.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 814 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A)).
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thorized prosecution for torture, a clear act of violence, the
court determined that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) extended to extra-
territorial acts of torture. The court also rejected Belfast's
claims that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was a viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause, holding that Congress had the
authority under the Commerce Clause to adopt the statute.
In Part VI of the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
several evidentiary challenges and other procedural issues
raised by Belfast. 161 It rejected the claim that hearsay state-
ments by two victims should not have been admitted, finding
that such statements fell within well-recognized exceptions to
hearsay evidence. The court applied the same reasoning with
respect to statements made by various individuals, including a
former ATU solider as well as a U.S. State Department official.
The court also found no abuse of discretion when the district
court allowed portions of the victims' medical records or ex-
cerpts from Belfast's personal notebook, which contained rap
lyrics referencing the ATU and acts of violence, to be intro-
duced at trial.1 6 2
In addition, the court found that the jury instructions de-
fining the elements of torture were appropriate. The jury in-
structions set forth the following definition and accompanying
elements for establishing torture:
Torture means an act committed by a person, acting
under the color of law, specifically intended to inflict
severe physical pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon an-
other person within his custody or physical control.
Lawful sanctions include judicially imposed sanctions
and other enforcement actions authorized by law, in-
cluding the death penalty, but do not include sanc-
tions that defeat the object and purpose of the law
prohibiting torture.
161. Id. at 816.
162. The rap lyrics appeared in a notebook that was in Belfast's possession
upon his arrival at Miami International Airport. They included the follow-
ing: "Take this for free, six feet is where you gonna be. ATU niggas on the
scene. Body bag is all you see .. . . More sweat in my training means less
blood in my life. So with the shots from guns keep it dead and precise. Bull-
doze ambushes in the midst of a fight. Try to cut my supply, you'll be losing
your life. . . . army thugs united." Id. at 820.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
44 [Vol. 48:1
UNITED STATES V. GEORGE TENET
The defendant can be found guilty of that offense
only if all of the following acts are proved beyond a
reasonable doubt: First: That the defendant commit-
ted an act with the specific intent to inflict severe
physical pain or suffering; Second: That the defen-
dant was acting under the color of law; Third: That
the act of torture was against another person who was
within the Defendant's custody or physical control;
and Fourth: That the act of torture occurred outside
the United States.163
While the four-part test for establishing torture did not
include the requirement that such conduct could not be inci-
dental to a lawful sanction, the court did not find this omission
problematic. The definition of torture, which appeared in the
jury instructions, included the statement that judicially im-
posed sanctions or other lawful actions did not constitute tor-
ture.
Finally, the court rejected Belfast's argument that the dis-
trict court committed reversible error by refusing to compel
the U.S. government to produce classified memoranda from
the Department of Justice regarding the definition of torture
and the limits of lawful interrogation techniques. In reaching
this decision, the court noted that Belfast had failed to estab-
lish the relevance of these documents in explaining his own
actions. Moreover, the court noted that these documents were
irrelevant for purposes of establishing the meaning of torture.
"The Torture Act contains a specific and unambiguous defini-
tion of torture that is derived from the definition provided in
the CAT. The language of that statute-not an executive
branch memorandum-is what controls the definition of the
crime." 164
In Part VII of the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
Belfast's various challenges to his sentence. 65 It found that
the district court properly calculated Belfast's sentence under
the 2002 Feaeral Sentencing Guidelines Manual. It rejected
Belfast's argument that the district court's use of the kidnap-
ping guideline for determining an appropriate sentence was
163. Id. at 822.
164. Id. at 823.
165. Id.
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inappropriate. It also rejected Belfast's claim that his victims
had not been kidnapped.
On this record, taken in a light most favorable to the
jury verdict, the evidence showed that even if Em-
manuel's [Belfast's] victims were initially detained
under lawful circumstances, the extended length and
nature of their detention, coupled with the utter lack
of access to courts, attorneys, or any information
about their arrest, rendered the duration of their im-
prisonment wholly unlawful. And, in fact, there is ab-
solutely no evidence in this record even suggesting
that the seizure of Emmanuel's victims was lawful, or
that any of his victims had violated, or were even sus-
pected of violating, Liberian law. Instead, Jusu,
Turay, and the other refugees were seized at a check-
point because they were from Sierra Leone; Kpadeh
was seized because he was a member of the non-vio-
lent Unity Party and refused to join the ATU; Dulleh,
a university student, was arrested in his home, in the
middle of the night; and Kamara was never told the
reason for his arrest.
Not one of these victims was ever charged with a
crime or brought before a court, and not one was
given access to a lawyer, even though the Liberian
courts were open and operating. The victims were
transported to secret and remote locations, including
the prison pits at Gbatala Base, the underground
prison pits at Klay Junction, a military officer's ga-
rage, and an abandoned outhouse. Those are not the
places of lawful detention. Indeed, the arrest and de-
tention of the victims in inhumane conditions against
their will was certainly an integral part of their tor-
ture. And, as the CAT itself provides in Article 2(2),
claims of exigency or official justification can never
be a defense to torture. The district court did not err
in applying the kidnapping guideline in calculating
Emmanuel's advisory guidelines range.166
In addition, the court dismissed Belfast's claim that using
the murder cross-reference in calculating his sentence was a
166. Id. at 825-26 (citations omitted).
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violation of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The court held that the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory,
and the district court had wide discretion in considering rele-
vant conduct for purposes of calculating an appropriate sen-
tence. While Belfast had not been convicted of murder or kid-
napping, such information was still relevant under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit rejected all of Belfast's argu-
ments and affirmed the conviction. Belfast's petition for writ
of certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 22,
2011.
After Belfast exhausted his direct appeals, he challenged
his conviction in collateral proceedings and sought a certifi-
cate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He raised
several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. His claims were
found to be without merit and were denied by a magistrate
judge.167 This decision was subsequently affirmed by the dis-
trict court.16 8
The case of Roy Belfast, Jr. is significant for several rea-
sons. 169 It represents the first prosecution and conviction
under the Torture Statute. After 20 years, it still represents the
only use of the statute. It addresses several issues regarding the
legality of the Torture Statute. Finally, it provides a template
for future prosecutions.
IV. THE CASE OF GEORGE TENET
The War on Terror has been a long and violent conflict.
By most accounts, it began on September 11, 2001 even
though some hostilities had occurred before that date.170 The
U.S. response to the attacks of September 11th was extensive.
Counter-terrorism operations began immediately and were
167. Report of Magistrate Judge, Belfast v. United States, 2013 WL 594023
*20 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2012) (No. 12-20754).
168. Belfast v. United States, No. 12-20754, 2013 WL 594023 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 14, 2013).
169. See Elise Keppler, supra note 27 (discussing the criminal prosecution
of Charles Taylor, Jr. in the United States).
170. Michael B. Mukasey, The War on Terror: Where We Are and How We Got
There, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 9 (2011/2012) (arguing that Islamic terrorism
in America started in the late 1980s).
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conducted worldwide. On October 7, 2001, the United States
began military operations in Afghanistan.
An integral component to the War on Terror was the de-
tention and interrogation of suspected terrorists. Several indi-
viduals played a prominent role in developing, authorizing,
and implementing the policies that governed these programs.
At the highest level were President George W. Bush, Vice Pres-
ident Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Attorney General
John Ashcroft, and CIA Director George Tenet.' 7 ' At the next
level were senior government officials, includingJohn Yoo and
Jay S. Bybee (Department of Justice), William J. Haynes (De-
partment of Defense), Alberto R. Gonzales (White House),
and John Rizzo and Jose Rodriguez (Central Intelligence
Agency). Countless other government officials and private
contractors were involved, including those individuals who
physically participated in the interrogation of detainees.
The Central Intelligence Agency played the primary role
in developing and implementing the Detention and Interroga-
tion Program. Its leader was George Tenet.
A. The Defendant
George Tenet was appointed by President Bill Clinton as
the Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI"), and he began his
tenure on July 11, 1997. As DCI, Tenet served as the head of
the U.S. intelligence community, acted as the principal advisor
to the President on intelligence matters, and served as the
head of the Central Intelligence Agency.' 72 In this role, he was
responsible for overseeing intelligence gathering as well as
counterterrorism. He was also responsible for various CIA di-
171. Secretary of State Colin Powell was also a member of the Principals
Committee, but he did not play an active role in the reviewing or authoriz-
ing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
172. The responsibilities of the DCI were subsequently revised in 2004 by
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. See Intelligence Re-
form and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638 (2004). While the DCI maintained responsibility for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the position of Director of National Intelligence was created
to oversee the entire U.S. intelligence community. Id. § 1011.
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rectorates, including the Directorate of Operations. Tenet
served as DCI until July 11, 2004.173
The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the deten-
tion of suspected terrorists was established soon after Septem-
ber 11, 2001.174 Within days of the attacks, the National Secur-
ity Council met to discuss operations for capturing terrorist
suspects around the world.175 On September 17, 2001, Presi-
dent Bush signed a classified Memorandum of Notification
("MON") that authorized the Director of Central Intelligence
to "undertake operations designed to capture and detain per-
sons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or
death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terror-
ist activities."'76 The MON "provided unprecedented authori-
ties, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining
whom to detain, the factual basis for the detention, and the
length of the detention."1 7 7 On October 8, 2001, Tenet dele-
gated the capture and detention authority set forth in the
MON to James Pavitt, the CIA's deputy director for operations
and Cofer Black, the CIA's chief of the Counterterrorism
Center ("CTC") .17s Despite this delegation, Tenet remained
173. GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA
487 (2007). In December 2004, Tenet was awarded the Presidential Medal of
Freedom by President Bush. Ann Gerhart, Bush Gives Medal ofFreedom to "Piv-
otal" Iraq Figures, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2004, at CO1.
174. At the time, CIA policies prohibited "torture, cruel, inhuman, de-
grading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges
or trial." SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (Executive Summary) (quoting
Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX (1) (a)). According to
the CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook, "[i]t is CIA policy to neither
participate directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of
force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or expo-
sure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation." Id.
(quoting Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(1) (a)).
175. See RON SUSKIND, THE PlUCE OF LOYALTY 186 (2004) (There was a CIA
plan for a covert war against terrorists all over the world the weekend after
September 11, 2001.); BoB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 74-92 (2002) (describ-
ing Tenet's briefing for President Bush on September 15, 2001).
176. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 11 (Executive Summary) (citing the
memorandum, which is a classified, unreleased document).
177. Id. (citing the classified memorandum). See also MAYER, supra note 2,
at 38-39 (describing the path the Bush administration took to using contro-
versial interrogation techniques).
178. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 (Executive Summary).
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actively involved in all aspects of the detention and interroga-
tion of individuals in CIA custody.
The need to develop comprehensive procedures for inter-
rogations became evident when Abu Zubaydah was captured
in Pakistan on March 28, 2002. Zubaydah was believed to be a
high-ranking Al-Qaeda official with extensive knowledge of Al-
Qaeda operations. After Zubaydah was stabilized from injuries
suffered during his capture, he was transferred to a CIA deten-
tion facility in Thailand where he received further medical
treatment. He was initially interrogated by FBI officers, but in-
terrogation authority was soon transferred exclusively to the
CIA. 1 7 9 According to Tenet, "it was at this point that we got
into holding and interrogating high-value detainees - 'HVDs,'
as we called them - in a serious way."180
There were several steps in establishing the CIA's Deten-
tion and Interrogation Program. The process for identifying
interrogation techniques actually began in October 2001 when
the CIA hired an outside psychologist, James Mitchell, to write
a paper on Al-Qaeda's interrogation resistance techniques.
Mitchell collaborated with a Department of Defense psycholo-
gist, Bruce Jessen, on the project. 181 Jessen was the senior psy-
chologist at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Re-
covery Agency, which was responsible for managing the mili-
tary's Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape ("SERE")
179. See Ali Soufan, My Tortured Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A27,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/opinion/23soufan.html
("Because the bureau would not employ these problematic techniques [of
interrogation], our agents who knew the most about the terrorists could
have no part in the investigation."). See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's INVOLVEMENT IN AND
OBSERVATIONS OF DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN GUANTANAMo BAY, AFGHANI-
STAN, AND IRAQ (2009).
180. TENET, supra note 173, at 241.
181. In 2005, Mitchell and Jessen formed a company that provided inter-
rogators and debriefers to the CIA as well as general consulting services. By
2010, the CIA had paid over $75 million to the company for its services. The
consulting arrangement included an indemnification agreement that would
cover expenses associated with criminal prosecution. In addition, Mitchell
and Jessen received individual payments totaling $2.6 million. SSCI REPORT,
supra note 3, at 168-69 (Executive Summary). Spencer Ackerman, Senate re-
port on CIA torture claims spy agency lied about 'ineffective' program, THE GUARD-
LAN (Dec. 9, 2014), http://theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/09/cia-tor
ture-report-released.
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training program.18 2 In Spring 2002, Mitchell and Jessen sub-
mitted their paper, Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures
to Al-Qa'ida Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance
Training Perspective, to the CIA.183 Soon thereafter, Mitchell
and Jessen proposed that a series of specialized interrogation
techniques be used against Al-Qaeda detainees in interroga-
tions. These techniques were the subject of extensive discus-
sions within the CIA. Eventually, ten "enhanced" interrogation
techniques were proposed and submitted to CIA legal counsel
for review:
* The attention grasp consists of grasping the de-
tainee with both hands, with one hand on each
side of the collar opening, in a controlled and
quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the
detainee is drawn toward the interrogator.
* During the walling technique, the detainee is pul-
led forward and then quickly and firmly pushed
into a flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades
hit the wall. His head and neck are supported with
a rolled towel to prevent whiplash.
* The facial hold is used to hold the detainee's head
immobile. The interrogator places an open palm
on either side of the detainee's face and the inter-
rogator's fingertips are kept well away from the de-
tainee's eyes.
* With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are
slightly spread apart. The interrogator's hand
makes contact with the area between the tip of the
detainee's chin and the bottom of the correspond-
ing earlobe.
* In cramped confinement, the detainee is placed in
a confined space, typically a small or large box,
which is usually dark. Confinement in the smaller
182. The SERE program is used by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force to
train military personnel on survival tactics in hostile territory. See U.S. DEP'T
OF DEFENSE, No. 1300.21, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS (2001),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/ 13 00 2 1p.pdf.
183. In addition to their work in developing interrogation techniques,
Mitchell and Jessen personally participated as interrogators of CIA detain-
ees. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 66-67 (Executive Summary).
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space lasts no more than two hours and in the
larger space it can last up to 18 hours.
* Insects placed in a confinement box involve plac-
ing a harmless insect in the box with the detainee.
* During wall standing, the detainee may stand about
4 to 5 feet from a wall with his feet spread approxi-
mately to his shoulder width. His arms are
stretched out in front of him and his fingers rest
on the wall to support all of his body weight. The
detainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or
feet.
* The application of stress positions may include
having the detainee sit on the floor with his legs
extended straight out in front of him with his arms
raised above his head or kneeling on the floor
while leaning back at a 45 degree angle.
* Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time.
* The application of the waterboard technique in-
volves binding the detainee to a bench with his feet
elevated above his head. The detainee's head is im-
mobilized and an interrogator places a cloth over
the detainee's mouth and nose while pouring
water onto the cloth in a controlled manner. Air-
flow is restricted for 20 to 40 seconds and the tech-
nique produces the sensation of drowning and suf-
focation.1 8 4
Two additional techniques, mock burials and the use of
diapers on detainees, were considered but not included in the
initial proposal. However, the use of diapers on detainees was
eventually authorized as part of the CIA's Detention and Inter-
rogation Program. Other techniques that were also authorized
include solitary confinement, water dousing, dietary manipula-
tion, sensory deprivation, rectal feeding and hydration, envi-
ronmental manipulation, and forced nudity. The purpose of
184. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL REVIEW:
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER
2001 - OCTOBER 2003) 15 (2004) (emphasis added).
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these interrogation techniques was to make detainees weak,
fearful, and eventually compliant. 185
These interrogation techniques were discussed on several
occasions by the Principles Committee in the Bush administra-
tion: National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Vice Presi-
dent Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ash-
croft, and CIA Director George Tenet.186 The interrogation
techniques were discussed, reviewed, and refined by attorneys
in various government offices, including the CIA's Office of
General Counsel, National Security Council Legal Adviser,
General Counsel to the Department of Defense, Counsel to
the President, Counsel to the Vice President, Attorney Gen-
eral, and the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
185. According to a CIA background paper on interrogation techniques,
Al-Qaeda detainees were well trained and able to resist standard interroga-
tion techniques. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BACKGROUND PAPER ON CIA's
COMBINED USE OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 1, 17 (2004) [hereinafter CIA
BACKGROUND PAPER]. Accordingly, the interrogation process needed to over-
whelm the detainee's resistance. "Effective interrogation is based on the con-
cept of using both physical and psychological pressures in a comprehensive,
systematic, and cumulative manner to influence HPVD [high value detainee]
behavior, to overcome a detainee's resistance posture." Id. at 1. Thus, the
goal of interrogation "is to create a state of learned helplessness and depen-
dence conducive to the collection of intelligence in a predictable, reliable,
and sustainable manner." Id. Interrogation techniques were divided into
three categories. Id. Conditioning techniques set the baseline level of treat-
ment "to demonstrate to the HVD that he has no control over basic human
needs." Id. at 4. These techniques include forced nudity, sleep deprivation,
and dietary manipulation. Id. at 5. Corrective techniques are used "to cor-
rect, startle, or to achieve another enabling objective with the detainee." Id.
These techniques include the insult slap, abdominal slap, facial hold, and
attention grasp. Id. Finally, coercive techniques place the detainee in more
physical and psychological stress. These techniques include walling, water
dousing, stress positions, wall standing, and cramped confinement. Id. at
7-8. In addition to these interrogation techniques, detainees are exposed to
white noise/loud sounds and constant light during the interrogation pro-
cess. Id. at 4.
186. See MAYER, supra note 2, at 143 ("Bush also knew about, and approved
of, White House meetings in which his top cabinet members were briefed by
the CIA on its plans to use specific 'enhanced' interrogation techniques on
various high-value detainees. The meetings were chaired by Rice, who was
then the National Security Adviser . . . The participants were the members of
the Principals Committee ... : Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Pow-
ell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, CIA Director Tenet, and Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft.").
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("OLC").1 87 The OLC eventually played a critical role in the
review process.'"8 Other government offices, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Criminal Division of
the Department ofJustice, were also informed of the proposed
interrogation techniques although they played a less signifi-
cant role in the review process. 8 9
As Zubaydah recuperated at the black site in Thailand
from the wounds he suffered when he was captured, the CIA
sought formal authorization for the use of the proposed inter-
rogation techniques. However, the CIA continued to interro-
gate Zubaydah until mid-June 2002, when he was placed in iso-
lation for 47 days.
During Zubaydah's isolation, the CIA sought an advance
declination of prosecution from the Department of Justice to
protect CIA personnel from possible criminal prosecution for
using enhanced interrogation techniques. On July 8, 2002, a
lawyer for the CIA's Counterterrorism Center drafted a letter
to Attorney General Ashcroft seeking "a formal declination of
prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United
States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the
United States, who may employ methods in the interrogation
of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individu-
als to prosecution." 190 The letter acknowledged that use of ag-
gressive methods would be prohibited by the Torture Statute
"apart from potential reliance upon the doctrines of necessity
187. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General to the Honorable
John D. Rockefeller IV, (Apr. 17, 2009) (containing the declassified "OLC
Opinions on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Submitted by
Senator John D. Rockefeller IV").
188. See generally Dawn E.Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Le-
gal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1559 (2007) (examining
the role of the Office of Legal Counsel in the operations of the executive
branch); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective
from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303 (2000) (examining the
role of the Office of Legal Counsel).
189. Members of Congress were also informed about the Detention and
Interrogation Program. See generally Cent. Intelligence Agency Ctr. for the
Study of Intelligence, Overview of CIA-Congress Interactions Concerning
the Agency's Rendition-Detention-Interrogation Program (approved for re-
lease Dec. 8, 2014) (highlighting the efforts of the CIA to inform Congress
on the rendition and interrogation program).
190. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 33 (quoting classified email dated July
8, 2002).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
54 [Vol. 48:1
UNITED STATES V GEORGE TENET
or of self-defense."' 9 1 Although the letter was widely circulated
within the CIA, it is unclear whether the letter was ever sent to
the Attorney General.1 9 2 At a July 13, 2002 meeting attended
by several CIA and DOJ officials, the CIA's Office of General
Counsel proposed that the Department ofJustice "issue an ad-
vance declination of prosecution for any CIA employee in-
volved in the EIT program whose participation was in good
faith and within the terms and conditions of the [forthcoming
OLC] memorandum."1 9 3 The proposal was immediately re-
jected by Michael Chertoff, the chief of the Department ofJus-
tice's Criminal Division.
Throughout June and July 2002, the CIA was in regular
communication with the OLC as it refined its legal analysis on
the legality of enhanced interrogation techniques. On July 13,
2002, John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General sent John
Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, a two-page letter describing
the elements necessary for establishing the crime of torture
under 18 U.S.C. § 2340.194 The letter was written in response
to questions posed by Rizzo to Yoo at a meeting earlier that
day. In his letter, Yoo indicated that a more detailed memo-
randum regarding 18 U.S.C. § 2340 was forthcoming. Yoo sub-
sequently received a psychological assessment on Zubaydah
from the CIA to assist him in drafting the legal opinion. 19 5 On
July 24 and 26, 2002, the OLC informed the CIA by telephone
that several of the proposed interrogation techniques were
lawful and could be used on Zubaydah. The OLC indicated
that written opinions would be issued shortly.
The now-infamous "torture memos" were issued on Au-
gust 1, 2002. The first memorandum was submitted by Jay S.
Bybee, the Assistant Attorney General and head of the OLC,
for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and ad-
191. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 33.
192. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 33.
193. Rizzo, supra note 15, at 192.
194. Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to John
Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency (uly 13, 2002).
195. LARRY SIEMS, THE TORTURE REPORT: WHAT THE DOCUMENTS SAY
ABOUT AMERICA'S PosT-9/11 TORTURE PROGRAM 52 (2011); Memorandum to
John Yoo on Psychological Assessment of Zain al-'Abedin al-Abideen
Muhammad Hassan, a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah (July 24, 2002), available at http://
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc4.pdf.
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dressed the "Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C. 2340-2340A."1 96
[T]his question has arisen in the context of the con-
duct of interrogations outside of the United States.
We conclude below that Section 2340A proscribes
acts inflicting, and that are specifically intended to in-
flict, severe pain or suffering, whether mental or
physical. Those acts must be of an extreme nature to
rise to the level of torture within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2340A and the Convention. We further conclude
that certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing, but still not produce pain and suffering of the
requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A's pro-
scription against torture. We conclude by examining
possible defenses that would negate any claim that
certain interrogation methods violate the statute.'9 7
The OLC first examined the elements for establishing tor-
ture under the Torture Statute. It determined that acts of tor-
ture must be inflicted with specific intent. "Here, because Sec-
tion 2340 requires that a defendant act with the specific intent
to inflict severe pain, the infliction of such pain must be the
defendant's precise objective."198 Mere knowledge that severe
pain or suffering may result from a defendant's actions is in-
sufficient for establishing criminal liability. In addition, a de-
fendant may negate specific intent if he acted with a good faith
belief that his actions would not cause severe pain or suffering.
196. Memorandum from Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel to Al-
berto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
2002 OLC Memorandum to Gonzales]. John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, was the primary author of the memorandum. SIEMs, supra note 195,
at 53. Yoo also sent Gonzales a separate letter on August 1, 2002 discussing
"whether interrogation methods used on captured al Qaeda operatives,
which do not violate the prohibition on torture found in 18 U.S.C. §2340-
2340A, would either: a) violate our obligations under the Torture Conven-
tion, or b) create the basis for a prosecution under the Rome Statute estab-
lishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)." Letter from Department of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Pres-
ident (Aug. 1, 2002) (citations omitted). Yoo concluded that the interroga-
tion methods would not violate the Convention against Torture and would
not fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Id.
197. 2002 OLC Memorandum to Gonzales, supra note 196, at 1.
198. Id. at 3.
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With respect to severe physical pain or suffering, the OLC
asserted that a victim of torture must experience intense pain
or suffering that rises to a high level, "the level that would or-
dinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condi-
tion or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impair-
ment of body functions."199 With respect to severe mental pain
or suffering, the OLC argued that such acts must cause long-
term mental harm. This temporal element must be extensive
although it need not be permanent. Examples of long-term
mental harm include post-traumatic stress disorder and
chronic depression. By requiring specific intent for acts of tor-
ture, the OLC argued that the "defendant must specifically in-
tend to cause prolonged mental harm" in order to commit tor-
ture. 200
Accordingly, the OLC opinion concluded that torture is
an extreme act and that the Torture Statute is only meant to
apply to the most egregious acts that cause severe physical or
mental pain or suffering. 201 The OLC also reviewed the text
and history of the Convention against Torture, case law sur-
rounding the Torture Victim Protection Act, and several inter-
national decisions, all of which reaffirmed that the Torture
Statute only applies to the most egregious acts. 202
The OLC then examined possible challenges to the Tor-
ture Statute. The OLC asserted that the statute might be un-
constitutional if it infringed on the President's authority to
conduct war against Al-Qaeda and its allies. The Constitution
vested the President with exclusive authority as the Com-
mander-in-Chief. Thus, "[a]ny effort to apply Section 2340A in
a manner that interferes with the President's direction of such
core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy
combatants thus would be unconstitutional." 203 The OLC also
asserted that standard criminal law defenses such as necessity
and self-defense might be available to challenge a prosecution
under the Torture Statute and eliminate criminal liability.204
199. Id. at 6.
200. Id. at 8.
201. Id. at 12.
202. Id. at 22, 31.
203. Id. at 31.
204. Id. at 39.
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The second OLC memorandum was also submitted by Jay
S. Bybee. It was sent to John Rizzo, the Acting CIA General
Counsel, and addressed the "Interrogation of al Qaeda Opera-
tive."205 This document was drafted in response to the CIA's
request for approval of the interrogation techniques that
would be used on Zubaydah.
You have asked for this Office's views on whether cer-
tain proposed conduct would violate the prohibition
against torture found at Section 2340A of title 18 of
the United States Code. You have asked for this ad-
vice in the course of conducting interrogations of
Abu Zubaydah. As we understand it, Zubaydah is one
of the highest ranking members of the al Qaeda ter-
rorist organization, with which the United States is
currently engaged in an international armed conflict
following the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This letter me-
morializes our previous oral advice, given on July 24,
2002 and July 26, 2002, that the proposed conduct
would not violate this prohibition.206
The OLC set forth numerous conditions to its legal analy-
sis.20 7 It presumed that Zubaydah had critical information re-
garding plans to attack the United States or U.S. interests over-
seas. It also presumed that Zubaydah was trained on resisting
interrogation techniques and that he had already refused to
disclose information. In addition, the OLC presumed that the
proposed interrogation techniques would likely be used for
several days and for no more than thirty days. A medical ex-
pert would be present throughout the interrogations, and the
interrogations would stop if deemed medically necessary. 208
The OLC then listed the ten interrogation techniques and of-
fered a detailed description of each: (1) attention grasp; (2)
walling; (3) facial hold; (4) facial slap (insult slap); (5)
cramped confinement; (6) wall standing; (7) stress positions;
205. Memorandum from Department ofJustice, Office of Legal Counsel,
to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency on
the Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative, (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter 2002
OLC Memorandum to Rizzo]. Yoo was also the primary author of this mem-
orandum. SIEMS, supra note 195, at 53.
206. 2002 OLC Memorandum to Rizzo, supra note 205, at 1.
207. Id. at 1-4.
208. Id. at 4.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
58 [Vol. 48:1
UNITED STATES V. GEORGE TENET
(8) sleep deprivation; (9) insects placed in a confinement box;
and (10) the waterboard.209 The OLC noted that most of these
techniques had been used in the SERE training program upon
thousands of U.S. military personnel with minimal harmful
consequences. It then noted that the CIA had completed a
psychological profile on Zubaydah which determined that the
interrogation techniques would not have a negative impact on
his mental condition.210 Finally, the OLC indicated that its le-
gal advice was based upon the facts that had been provided by
the CIA and that the "advice would not necessarily apply" if
these facts were to change.211
In its legal analysis, the OLC indicated that criminal liabil-
ity under the Torture Statute required the establishment of
five elements: "(1) the torture occurred outside the United
States; (2) the defendant acted under color of law; (3) the vic-
tim was within the defendant's custody or control; (4) the de-
fendant specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering;
and (5) that the acted [sic] inflicted severe pain or suffer-
ing."212 The first three elements were presumed: Zubaydah
was in U.S. custody, he was detained outside the United States,
and the CIA interrogators were acting under color of law. Ac-
cordingly, the memorandum focused on the remaining two el-
ements.
The OLC examined whether the application of the ten
interrogation techniques, either in isolation or when applied
as part of a course of conduct, rose to the level of severe physi-
cal or mental pain or suffering.213 With respect to physical
pain or suffering, the OLC indicated that such pain must be
"difficult for the individual to endure and is of an intensity
akin to the pain accompanying serious physical injury."2 14 Ex-
amples of physical pain that could give rise to such claims of
torture include "severe beatings with weapons such as clubs,
and the burning of prisoners." 215 The OLC coricluded that
none of the interrogation techniques, either in isolation or in
209. Id. at 2-4.
210. Id. at 6-9.
211. Id. at 1.
212. Id. at 9.
213. Id. at 9, 11.
214. Id. at 10.
215. Id.
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conjunction, would inflict severe physical pain or suffering as
required by the Torture Statute.
With respect to severe mental pain or suffering, the OLC
noted that the Torture Statute required the establishment of a
predicate act as a condition for finding severe mental pain or
suffering. "Those predicate acts are: (1) the intentional inflic-
tion or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffer-
ing; (2) the administration or application, or threatened ad-
ministration or application of mind-altering substances or pro-
cedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the
threat that any of the preceding acts will be done to another
person." 2 16 The OLC determined that none of the enhanced
interrogation methods to be used on Zubaydah involved
threats to a third party, the use of drugs, or the infliction of
severe physical pain.217 "Thus, the question is whether any of
these acts, separately or as a course of conduct, constitutes a
threat of severe physical pain or suffering, a procedure de-
signed to disrupt profoundly the senses, or a threat of immi-
nent death."2 18 Reviewing each of the proposed interrogation
methods, the OLC concluded that the attention grasp, facial
hold, facial slap, walling, stress positions, wall standing,
cramped confinement, and use of insects in the confinement
box would not be considered a predicate act for purposes of
the Torture Statute. Under the controlled circumstances set
forth by the CIA, such acts would not disrupt the senses or
cause a reasonable person to fear imminent death.
Waterboarding would, however, constitute a threat of immi-
nent death to a reasonable person. 219 "Although the
waterboard constitutes a threat of imminent death, prolonged
mental harm must nonetheless result to violate the statutory
prohibition on infliction of severe mental pain or suffer-
ing." 2 20 According to the information provided by the CIA, the
effects of waterboarding dissipate almost immediately and pro-
longed mental harm is not anticipated. In the absence of pro-
216. Id. at 12.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 15.
220. Id.
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longed mental harm, such "procedures would not constitute
torture within the meaning of the statute."21
Finally, the OLC addressed the specific intent require-
ment in the Torture Statute. "To violate the statute, an individ-
ual must have the specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffer-
ing." 222 In other words, the defendant's goal must have been
to inflict such pain or suffering on the victim. In the absence
of such intent, the OLC determined there would be no viola-
tion of the Torture Statute. Thus, a good faith belief by the
defendant that he was not causing such suffering would negate
the finding of specific intent. In addition, the CIA's research
on the proposed interrogation methods and its consultations
with medical and psychological professionals "demonstrates
the presence of a good faith belief that no prolonged mental
harm will result from using these methods in the interrogation
of Zubaydah." 223
In conclusion, the OLC indicated that the proposed inter-
rogation techniques would not violate the Torture Statute.
However, the OLC added a qualification to its opinion. "We
wish to emphasize that this is our best reading of the law; how-
ever, you should be aware that there are no cases construing
the statute; just as there have been no prosecutions brought
under it."224
Following the OLC's written approval, the CIA immedi-
ately began using the enhanced interrogation techniques on
Abu Zubaydah. Mitchell and Jessen, the psychologists who de-
veloped the techniques, played a primary role in Zubaydah's
interrogation. Detailed descriptions of the interrogation ses-
sions were forwarded to CIA Headquarters. The following ac-
count was presented in the SSCI Report and describes the ini-
tial application of enhanced interrogation techniques on
Zubaydah.
From August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the
CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced interro-
221. Id.
222. Id. at 16.
223. Id. at 18.
224. Id. at 18. The two OLC legal opinions were subsequently withdrawn
by the Office of Legal Counsel in 2004. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDCMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 142-76
(1st ed. 2007).
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gation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. Af-
ter Abu Zubaydah had been in complete isolation for
47 days, the most aggressive interrogation phase be-
gan at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002.
Security personnel entered the cell, shackled and
hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel (Abu
Zubaydah was then naked). Without asking any ques-
tions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around
his neck as a collar, and backed him up into the cell
wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collar
was used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete
wall). The interrogators then removed the hood, per-
formed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah
watch while a large confinement box was brought
into the cell and laid on the floor. A cable states Abu
Zubaydah "was unhooded and the large confinement
box was carried into the interrogation room and
paced [sic] on the floor so as to appear as a coffin."
The interrogators then demanded detailed and veri-
fiable information on terrorist operations planned
against the United States, including the names,
phone numbers, email addresses, weapon caches,
and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records de-
scribe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive.
Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having additional
information, the interrogators would perform a facial
slap or face grab. At approximately 6:20 PM, Abu
Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a
two-and-a half-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed,
vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso
and extremities" during waterboarding.225
The CIA recorded several of these interrogation sessions.
The videos showed Zubaydah being subjected to various inter-
rogation techniques, including waterboarding. In the videos,
Zubaydah was shown screaming and begging the interrogators
to stop the treatment. These recordings were later destroyed at
the request of Jose Rodriguez, the Director of the CIA's
Counterterrorism Center. The destruction of the videotapes
225. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 40-41 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
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would give rise to a criminal inquiry by the Department ofJus-
tice although no charges were ever filed. 2 2 6
Zubaydah was subjected to enhanced interrogation meth-
ods for 20 consecutive days. During this time, he "spent a total
of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) con-
finement box and 29 hours in a small confinement box, which
had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a height of
2.5 feet."2 2 7 Zubaydah was told that "the only way he would
leave the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box."2 2 8
During his interrogation sessions, Zubaydah often became
"hysterical" and he frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded,"
and "whimpered." 229 After one waterboarding session,
Zubaydah became unresponsive, "with bubbles rising through
his open, full mouth" and required medical intervention to
regain consciousness. 230
The CIA viewed the enhanced interrogation techniques
as successful. In fact, Mitchell and Jessen recommended to
CIA Headquarters that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION
SITE GREEN] should be used as a template for future interro-
gation of high value captives."231
Zubaydah remained in CIA custody for four years.232 He
was detained at CIA facilities in Afghanistan, Thailand, and Po-
land. On September 5, 2006, Zubaydah was transferred to
Guantanamo and placed in the custody of the Department of
Defense. In a March 2007 appearance before a Combatant Sta-
226. See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 15, at 181-218 (describing the destruction
of the interrogation tapes).
227. SSCI Report, supra note 3, at 42.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 42-43. The interrogation sessions also had a profound impact
on CIA personnel. Id. at 44-45.
230. Id. at 43-44.
231. Id. at 46.
232. Zubaydah's presence in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Pro-
gram was publicly revealed on December 26, 2002. See Dana Priest & Barton
Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: 'Stress and Duress' Tactics
Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html (discussing the capture of Abu
Zubaydah and CIA interrogation methods).
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tus Review Tribunal at Guantanamo, Zubaydah described his
treatment by the CIA as torture.233
Zubaydah's efforts to challenge his detention in federal
court have been unsuccessful. While Zubaydah filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in August 2008, the federal court has
failed to rule on countless motions in the case. 2 3 4 As of August
2015, the case remains pending in the federal district court for
the District of Columbia. 235 This outcome is consistent with
statements made by CIA officials during Zubaydah's detention.
On July 15, 2002, for example, CIA officers at one of
Zubaydah's detention sites sent a cable to CIA Headquarters
indicating that "[i]n light of the planned psychological pres-
sure techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable
assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and
incommunicado for the remainder of his life."2 3 6 In response,
CIA Headquarters sent the following affirmation:
There is a fairly unanimous sentiment within HQS
that [Abu Zubaydah] will never be placed in a situa-
tion where he has any significant contact with others
and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is
difficult to discuss specifics at this point, all major
players are in concurrence that [Abu Zubaydah]
should remain incommunicado for the remainder of
his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from be-
ing turned over to another country, but a final deci-
sion regarding his future incarceration condition has
yet to be made.2 3 7
233. Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing
for ISN 10016, 22 (March 27, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/pdfs/safefree/csrt abuzubaydah.pdf. Large portions of Zubaydah's
testimony, including descriptions of specific interrogation techniques, were
redacted.
234. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Husayn v. Gates, 08-1360 (RWR)
(D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2008).
235. See Raymond Bonner, The Strange Case of the Forgotten Gitmo Detainee,
POLITICO MAGAZINE, May 12, 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2015/05/abu-zubaydah-tortured-waterboarded-cia-dc-circuit-court-
guantanamo-117833.html#.VYmdKrfbJmM ("Zubaydah's case has been
pending for some 2,400 days, and it will be years before it goes to trial, if it
ever does.").
236. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted) (quoting a confidential cable).
237. Id.
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Two other high profile Al-Qaeda members were captured
in Fall 2002. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, an alleged facilitator for the
September 11 attacks, was captured in Pakistan on September
11, 2002 and soon transferred to CIA custody. He was detained
at CIA detention facilities in Afghanistan, Poland, Morocco,
Romania and transferred to Guantanamo on September 5,
2006. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, an alleged architect of the 2000
attack on the U.S.S. Cole, was captured in Dubai in October
2002. Al-Nashiri was transferred to CIA detention centers in
Afghanistan, Thailand, Poland, Morocco, and Romania before
being sent to Guantanamo on September 4, 2006.238 During
their detention, both al-Nashiri and Al-Shibh were subjected to
enhanced interrogation techniques, but only after the CIA re-
ceived written confirmation from the OLC. According to CIA
General Counsel:
[s]ince the OLC memo we had gotten a couple of
months before was specifically addressed to the EITs
[enhanced interrogation techniques] being applied
only to Zubaydah, I quickly got confirmation from
the DOJ that the conclusions reached by the OLC on
its August 1 memo pertaining to Zubaydah would
also cover similarly high-value - and resistant - Al
Qaeda prisoners. And so the EITs began with al-
Nashiri and bin al-Shibh. 239
Tenet received regular updates from CIA detention cen-
ters on the status of individual detainees. In addition, he re-
mained actively involved in reviewing and approving CIA de-
tention and interrogation procedures. " [E]very single plan was
drawn up by interrogators, and then submitted for approval to
the highest possible level, meaning the director of the CIA.
Any change in the plan - even if an extra day of a certain treat-
ment was added - was signed off on by the Director." 240
238. Memorandum from Headquarters, Joint Task Force Guantanamo,
Department of Defense to Commander, United States Southern Command
6, Dec. 8, 2006.
239. Rizzo, supra note 15, at 194.
240. MAYER, supra note 2, at 167. See also Rizzo, supra note 15, at 177;
WOODWARD, supra note 175, at 146 (describing meetings regarding deten-
tion and interrogation program); Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold:
Memo on Methods of Interrogation Had Wide Review, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004,
at A01 (describing the suspension of interrogation techniques pending a re-
view by the Justice Department and other administration lawyers); Michael
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2015] 65
INTERNATIONAL LAW AD POLITICS
On January 28, 2003, Tenet approved formal guidelines
for the confinement and interrogation of detainees in CIA cus-
tody.241 The Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursu-
ant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 Sep-
tember 2001 identified two sets of permissible interrogation
techniques - Standard Techniques and Enhanced Techniques
- and imposed rules on the application of these techniques. 2 4 2
"Unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and
other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permis-
sible Interrogation Techniques." 243
Standard Techniques were defined as "techniques that do
not incorporate physical or substantial psychological pres-
sure," and which "include, but are not limited to, all lawful
forms of questioning employed by US law enforcement and
military interrogation personnel." 244 Specific examples of
Standard Techniques included: "the use of isolation, sleep
deprivation not to exceed 72 hours, reduced caloric intake (so
long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general
health of the detainee), deprivation of reading material, use of
loud music or white noise (at a decibel level calculated to
avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), and the use of
diapers for limited periods (generally not to exceed 72
hours . .. ) "245 Standard Techniques required prior approval
" [w]henever feasible." 246 Medical and psychological personnel
must be available for consultation and travel to the interroga-
Scheur, A Fine Rendition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005 (addressing meetings be-
tween National Security Council advisors and CIA officials).
241. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS CON-
DUCTED PURSUANT TO THE [REDACTED] (2003) [hereinafter CIA GUIDELINES
ON INTERROGATIONS]. By January 2003, approximately 40 detainees were al-
ready in CIA custody. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 10 (Executive Summary)
(citations omitted).
242. Tenet also approved a document setting forth minimum standards
for detention. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENcy, GUIDELINES ON CONFINEMENT
CONDITIONS FOR CIA DETAINEES (2003).
243. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 1. All person-
nel involved in interrogations had to be screened for medical, psychological,
and security issues. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2.
They were required to read the Guidelines and agree to comply with them.
CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2.
244. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 1.
245. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 1.
246. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 3.
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tion site during interrogations employing Standard Tech-
niques.
Enhanced Techniques were defined as "techniques that
do incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond
Standard Techniques." 2 4 7 Twelve techniques were identified:
attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, abdominal
slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions,
sleep deprivation, use of diapers for prolonged periods, use of
insects, and waterboarding. 248 Other techniques could be used
if specifically approved. In addition, these techniques could
only be used by approved interrogators "with appropriate
medical and psychological participation in the process." 249
Moreover, " [t] he use of each Enhanced Technique is subject
to specific temporal, physical, and related conditions, includ-
ing a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological
state of the detainee."25 o
Enhanced Techniques required prior written approval,
which could only be provided when the Director of the
Counterterrorist Center determined that: "(a) the specific de-
tainee is believed to possess information about risks to the citi-
zens of the United States or other nations, (b) the use of the
Enhanced Technique(s) is appropriate in order to obtain that
information, (c) appropriate medical and psychological per-
sonnel have concluded that the use of the Enhanced Tech-
nique(s) is not expected to produce 'severe physical or mental
pain or suffering,' and (d) the personnel authorized to em-
ploy the Enhanced Technique(s) have completed the attached
Acknowledgment." 25 1 Medical and psychological personnel
must be "on site" during interrogations employing Enhanced
Techniques. All interrogation sessions using Enhanced Tech-
niques had to be documented, and the documents would later
be sent to CIA Headquarters.252
247. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2.
248. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2. Additional
"enhanced techniques" could be added subject to written approval.
249. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2.
250. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2.
251. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 3.
252. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 3. For both
Standard Techniques and Enhanced Techniques, medical and psychological
personnel were authorized to suspend the interrogations "if they determine
that significant and prolonged physical or mental injury, pain, or suffering is
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On March 1, 2003, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was cap-
tured in Pakistan and transferred to CIA custody. Muhammad
was considered one of the highest-ranking members of Al-
Qaeda and the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks. He was
first sent to the Salt Pit, a CIA detention facility located outside
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. CIA Headquarters immedi-
ately authorized the use of enhanced interrogation techniques
on Muhammad, which were used a few minutes after his ques-
tioning began.
KSM [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] was subjected to
facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress posi-
tions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or
above head level), nudity, and water dousing. Chief
of Interrogations [redacted] also ordered the rectal
rehydration of KSM without a determination of medi-
cal need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations
would later characterize as illustrative of the interro-
gator's "total control over the detainee."253
Within a few days, Muhammad was transferred to a CIA
detention facility in Poland (Detention Site Blue).
KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approxi-
mately 6:00 PM local time on March [redacted],
2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in
the standing sleep deprivation position. At 6:38 PM,
after the medical and psychological personnel who
had traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE CO-
BALT cleared KSM for the CIA's enhanced interroga-
tion techniques, the detention site requested CIA
Headquarters' approval to begin the interrogation
process. The detention site received the approvals at
7:18 PM, at which point the interrogators began us-
ing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on
KSM.2 54
Muhammad was stripped naked and subjected to standing
sleep deprivation, attention grab, facial grab, insult slap, ab-
likely to result if the interrogation is not suspended." CIA GUIDELINES ON
INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 3.
253. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 82 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
254. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 84 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
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dominal slap, kneeling stress position, and walling. 255 His fam-
ily was also threatened during these interrogations. 256
On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of
his 15 separate waterboarding sessions. The first
waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10
more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Coun-
sel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed by the
use of a horizontal stress position that had not previ-
ously been approved by CIA Headquarters.2 5 7
Muhammad would eventually be waterboarded 183
times.25 8 He was subsequently transferred to other CIA deten-
tion facilities, including one in Romania, before being sent to
Guantanamo on September 5, 2006.259
In January 2003, the CIA's Office of Inspector General
(OIG) began a review of the CIA's detention and interroga-
tion program.260 The review was initiated in response to a noti-
fication from the CIA Deputy Director for Operations "that
Agency personnel had used unauthorized interrogation tech-
niques with a detainee, 'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another
foreign site, and requested that OIG investigate.'"261 In addi-
tion, the Inspector General had also received "information
that some employees were concerned that certain covert
Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation
site might involve violations of human rights."2 62 Based on this
information, the Inspector General examined CIA detention
and interrogation policies between September 2001 and Octo-
ber 2003.
On May 7, 2004, the Inspector General issued its Special
Review of the CIA's "Counterterrorism Detention and Interro-
255. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 84-85 (Executive Summary).
256. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 85 (Executive Summary).
257. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 85 (Executive Summary).
258. According to Jose Rodriguez, the Director of the Counterterrorism
Center, the reference to 183 instances of waterboarding refers to each in-
stance where water was applied to Muhammad's nose and mouth. RODRI-
GUEZ, supra note 15, at 52.
259. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 96 (Executive Summary).
260. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 2003-7123-
IG, SPECIAL REVIEW: COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION Ac-
TIVITIES 2 (2004) [hereinafter OIG SPECIAL REVIEW].
261. Id. at 1.
262. Id. at 2.
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gation Activities." 2 63 While the OIG Special Review was highly
redacted, the declassified portions described extensive abuses
on several detainees including Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri and
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. For example, the OIG docu-
mented that a debriefer had "racked" an unloaded semi-auto-
matic handgun near Al-Nashiri's head while he was shackled
in his cell. The same debriefer also activated a power drill near
Al-Nashiri's head while AI-Nashiri was standing naked and
hooded in his cell. In addition, the debriefer threatened Al-
Nashiri by saying that "we could get your mother in here," and
"we can bring your family in here."2 6 4 Similar threats were
made to Muhammad, who was told, "we're going to kill your
children." 265 Other examples of "unauthorized" techniques in-
cluded the use of pressure points, threats, blowing smoke into
a detainee's face, and the use of a hard brush on detainees.
The Inspector General offered several conclusions regard-
ing the Detention and Interrogation Program.2 6 6 First, the
OIG determined that the CIA had received several legal opin-
ions affirming the legality of the enhanced interrogation tech-
niques. These legal opinions had been drafted by the OLC
with input from the CIA's Office of General Counsel and
other government agencies. Second, the OIG found that the
CIA had offered different levels of guidance and support to
CIA personnel who were detaining and interrogating high
value detainees, particularly in the early months of the pro-
gram. In this respect, the OIG noted that the CIA had failed to
issue comprehensive written guidelines regarding detention
and interrogation until January 2003.267 Until then, Agency
personnel received only ad hoc guidance through cables and
briefings. Similarly, the Office of Medical Services (OMS) did
not issue guidelines regarding medical and psychological sup-
port to detainee interrogations until April 2003 and, even
263. Id. at 1.
264. Id. at 42. Debriefers were only allowed to question detainees. They
were not allowed to use or administer enhanced interrogation techniques.
Id. at n.6. In contrast, interrogators were authorized to question and admin-
ister enhanced interrogation techniques on detainees. Id.
265. Id. at 43.
266. A set of ten recommendations were redacted from the document. Id.
at 106-09.
267. Id. at 103.
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then, the guidelines were issued in "draft" form.2 6 8 Third, the
OIG found that some Agency personnel did not follow written
procedures. As a result, some " [u] nauthorized, improvised, in-
humane, and undocumented detention and interrogation
techniques were used . . . ."269 For example, "[o]ne key Al-
Qa'ida terrorist was subjected to the waterboard at least 183
times [redacted] and was denied sleep for a period of 180
hours."270 Such actions were inconsistent with the legal advice
received from the Department of Justice.271 Fourth, the OIG
noted that some detainees were subjected to enhanced inter-
rogation techniques without justification based on analytical
assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence or
objective evaluation of available information.272
The OIG concluded its report by expressing concern
about the implications of the Detention and Interrogation
Program. "The Agency faces potentially serious long-term po-
litical and legal challenges as a result of the CTC Detention
and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and the
inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ulti-
mately do with terrorists detained by the Agency."273
Following the release of the OIG report, approximately 20
cases were forwarded to the Department ofJustice for criminal
investigation. 274 Only one of these cases resulted in a prosecu-
tion and conviction although this case did not involve the
268. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DRAFr OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS (2003).
269. OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 260, at 102.
270. Id. at 104.
271. Id. at 103-04.
272. Id. at 104.
273. Id. at 105.
274. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESI-
DENCY AFTER 9/11 108 (2012); David Johnston & Mark Mazzetti, Hurdles
Stand in Way of Prosecuting Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/politics/261egal.html. In addi-
tion, the CIA conducted several administrative review hearings to consider
possible disciplinary action against CIA officers. See, e.g., Joby Warrick & R.
Jeffrey Smith, CIA Officer Disciplined for Alleged Gun Use in Interrogation: Bush
Officials Filed No Charges over Tactics in Terror Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
08/22/AR2009082202287.html (discussing a case involving a CIA officer
who was disciplined for alleged gun use during interrogations).
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treatment of a detainee in CIA custody.275 The CIA also con-
ducted a number of internal disciplinary actions.27 6
Throughout the existence of the Detention and Interro-
gation Program, the CIA sought reaffirmation from political
leaders and legal counsel. Beginning with the detention and
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, the CIA requested written
confirmation from the OLC that enhanced interrogation tech-
niques could be used on specific detainees.277 In addition,
Tenet sought reaffirmation of the Bush administration's con-
tinued support for the Detention and Interrogation Pro-
gram.2 7 8 On July 3, 2003, for example, Tenet sent a memoran-
dum to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seeking
reaffirmation of the program in light of media reports that
suggested certain "stress and duress" interrogation "tech-
niques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer ap-
275. Clyde Haberman, A Singular Conviction Amid the Debate on Torture and
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20
/us/a-singular-conviction-amid-the-debate-on-torture-and-terrorism.html?_r
=0. That case is United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2009). See also
GOLDSMITH, supra note 274, at 108 (discussing criminal and administrative
proceedings); supra text accompanying note 14.
276. The CIA conducted several administrative review hearings to con-
sider possible disciplinary action against CIA officers. See, e.g., Joby Warrick
& R. Jeffrey Smith, CIA Officer Disciplined for Alleged Gun Use in Interrogation:
Bush Officials Filed No Charges over Tactics in Terror Case, WASH. PosT (Aug. 23,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/
22/AR2009082202287.html.
277. See, e.g., Letter from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel to Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency (July 7, 2004) (discussing the general safeguards that
must be adhered to in order to use interrogation techniques on a certain
high value detainee); Letter from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency (Sept. 6, 2004) (confirming that the use of the
interrogation techniques would not violate any U.S. statute, the Constitu-
tion, or any treaty obligation of the United States); Memorandum from Scott
W. Muller on "Humane" Treatment of CIA Detainees (Feb. 12, 2003) (dis-
cussing the use of enhanced interrogation techniques that were approved by
the Attorney General through the OLC).
278. See SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 184, 186 (highlighting the briefing
of the status of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program with the
president). See also Letter from Scott W. Muller, Central Intelligence Agency,
Office of General Counsel to Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel (March 2, 2004) (OLC reaffirming its analyses
in several previously issued memos relating to interrogation).
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proved as a policy matter."27 9 According to Tenet, the CIA was
concerned by White House statements that detainees were be-
ing treated "humanely." 2 8 0 On July 29, 2003, Tenet and CIA
General Counsel Scott W. Muller met with Rice, Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft, Acting Attorney General Patrick Philbin, White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the National Se-
curity Council John Bellinger, and Vice President Cheney to
discuss the Detention and Interrogation Program.28 ' Tenet in-
dicated he was seeking reaffirmation of the Bush administra-
tion's support of these policies. During the meeting, Muller
distributed a set of briefing slides to each attendee that offered
details of the Program, including descriptions of the interroga-
tion methods and an analysis of their use on specific detainees.
At the conclusion of the meeting, the Vice President stated
that the CIA was executing administration policy, a conclusion
supported by Rice and Ashcroft.28 2
On June 4, 2004, Tenet again requested reaffirmation
from Rice.28 3 Tenet expressed concern that increasing media
scrutiny on U.S. interrogation practices caused by the Abu
Ghraib scandal and new questions raised by the Department of
Justice required the Bush administration "to now review its
previous legal and policy positions with respect to detainees to
assure that we all speak in a united and unambiguous voice
about the continued wisdom and efficacy of those positions in
light of the current controversy." 284 On that same day, Tenet
issued a memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations
suspending the use of any interrogation techniques until fur-
ther notice in light of questions raised by the Department of
279. Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
to National Security Advisor on Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence
Agency's Interrogation Program 1 (July 3, 2003).
280. Id. at 2.
281. See Memorandum from Scott W. Muller on Review of Interrogation
Program on 29 July 2003 1 (Aug. 5, 2003) ("The meeting was attended by
the DCI, CIA General Counsel Scott W. Muller, the Attorney General, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin, Dr.
Rice, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the National Se-
curity Council (NSC) John Bellinger and the Vice President.").
282. Id. at 5.
283. See Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelli-
gence to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on [redacted] (June 4,
2004).
284. Id. at 3.
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Justice.2 8 5 The use of enhanced interrogation techniques was
subsequently reauthorized, albeit with different parameters.2 8 6
On July 11, 2004, Tenet resigned as the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. 28 7 After he stepped down, Tenet repeatedly
affirmed the value of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program and its success in providing actionable intelligence.
He emphasized that the program had been subject to repeated
affirmation by political leaders and legal counsel. He also de-
nied that detainees were tortured. 288
On September 6, 2006, President Bush disclosed the exis-
tence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program dur-
ing a televised address to the nation.28 9 He explained that the
program had been necessary in order to acquire valuable intel-
ligence from high-level detainees. The need for such a pro-
gram had become evident when the United States captured
Abu Zubaydah.
We knew that Zubaydah had more information that
could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking. As
his questioning proceeded, it became clear that he
had received training on how to resist interrogation.
And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures.
285. Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
to Deputy Director for Operations on Suspension of Use of Interrogation
Techniques (June 4, 2004). Tenet had previously discussed suspending in-
terrogations with Counterterrorism Center on May 24, 2004. See Memoran-
dum for the Record from [redacted] Legal Group, on Meeting with the DCI
Regarding DOJ's Statement that DOJ Has Rendered No Legal Opinion on
whether CIA's Use of Interrogation Techniques Would Meet Constitutional
Standards (May 24, 2004) (discussing that OLC had not rendered a written
opinion on whether the CIA's use of interrogation techniques would meet
the Constitution's "shocks the conscience" standard).
286. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 143-49. See also Memorandum from
John P. Mudd, Deputy Director DCI Counterterrorist Center on Meeting
with National Security Adviser Rice ([redacted], 2004) (discussing how the
techniques employed by the CIA were legal).
287. William Branigin, CIA Director Tenet Resigns: Bush Says Tenet Will Leave
in Mid-July for Personal Reasons, WASH. PosT (July 3, 2004), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12296-2004Jun3.html. Tenet submitted
his resignation to President Bush on June 2, 2004. Id.
288. See discussion infra.
289. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Discusses Crea-
tion of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2006/09/20060906-3.html (transcript of address).
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These procedures were designed to be safe, to com-
ply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty ob-
ligations. The Department of Justice reviewed the au-
thorized methods extensively and determined them
to be lawful. I cannot describe the specific methods
used - I think you understand why - if I did, it would
help the terrorists learn how to resist questioning,
and to keep information from us that we need to pre-
vent new attacks on our country. But I can say the
procedures were tough, and they were safe and law-
ful, and necessary. 290
President Bush emphasized that the program had been
subjected to extensive legal reviews and complied with U.S.
law. He then added, "I want to be absolutely clear with our
people, and the world: The United States does not torture. It's
against our laws, and it's against our values. I have not author-
ized it - and I will not authorize it."291 President Bush indi-
cated he was acknowledging the program's existence for two
reasons. First, the detainees would be put on trial for their ac-
tions, which required that we "bring them into the open."2 9 2
Second, the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
had put the CIA program into question by holding that Com-
mon Article Three of the Geneva Conventions applied to the
war with Al-Qaeda.293
In his 2007 memoirs, Tenet offered a brief description of
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.294 Once Abu
Zubaydah was captured on March 28, 2002, Tenet indicated
the National Security Council began discussing how to acquire
information possessed by Zubaydah and other "high-value de-
tainees" who might be captured. This soon led to the develop-
ment of the Rendition and Interrogation Program.
Zubaydah and a small number of other extremely
highly placed terrorists potentially had information
that might save thousands of lives. We wondered
what we could legitimately do to get that informa-
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Tenet devoted only a handful of pages in the 549-page book to the
program. TENET, supra note 173, at 240-57.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2015] 75
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
tion. Despite what Hollywood might have you believe,
in situations like this you don't call in the tough guys;
you call in the lawyers. It took until August to get
clear guidance on what Agency officers could legally
do. Without such legal determinations from the De-
partment of Justice, our officers would have been at
risk for future second guessing. We knew that, like
almost everything else in Washington, the program
would eventually be leaked and our Agency and its
people would be inaccurately portrayed in the worst
possible light. Out of those conversations came a de-
cision that CIA would hold and interrogate a small
number of HVDs.
CIA officers came up with a series of interrogation
techniques that would be carefully monitored at all
times to ensure the safety of the prisoner. The admin-
istration and the Department of Justice were fully
briefed and approved the use of these tactics. After
we received written Department of Justice guidance
on the interrogation issue, we briefed the chairmen
and ranking members of our oversight committees.
While they were not asked to formally approve the
program, as it was conducted under the president's
unilateral authorities, I can recall no objections being
raised.295
Tenet explained that "[t] he most aggressive interrogation
techniques conducted by CIA personnel were applied to only a
handful of the worst terrorists on the planet, including people
who had planned the 9/11 attacks and who, among other
things, were responsible forjournalist Daniel Pearl's death."296
Furthermore, these interrogations were "conducted in a pre-
cisely monitored, measured way intended to try to prevent
what we believed to be an imminent follow-on attack."297
Tenet indicated that the information acquired through these
interrogations was used to prevent future terrorist plots
around the world.
295. Id. at 241-42.
296. Id. at 242.
297. Id.
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In an April 2007 interview that coincided with the release
of his memoirs, Tenet engaged in a heated exchange with re-
porter Scott Pelley regarding the treatment of detainees:
George Tenet: We don't torture people. Let me say
that again to you, we don't torture people. OK? So...
Scott Pelley: Come on, George.
George Tenet: We don't torture people.
Scott Pelley: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed?
George Tenet: We don't torture people.
Scott Pelley: Waterboarding?
George Tenet: We do not. I don't talk about tech-
niques ...
Scott Pelley: It is torture.
George Tenet: And we don't torture people.298
In the interview, Tenet indicated the enhanced interroga-
tion sessions were necessary to acquire information from de-
tainees. He indicated that he never watched any of the interro-
gation sessions. He stated, however, that he understood "what
[he] was signing off on."2 9 9
The CIA Detention and Interrogation Program contin-
ued, albeit in a limited form, until 2009. On January 22, 2009,
President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13491 that
revised the interrogation standards for detainees.300 The Exec-
utive Order provided that any individuals detained in an
armed conflict must be treated humanely and consistent with
various rules, including the Convention against Torture, Com-
mon Article Three of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
Torture Statute.30 Such individuals shall not be subject to any
interrogation techniques not authorized by U.S. Army Field
Manual 2-22.3.302 The Executive Order also mandated the clo-
sure of any CIA detention centers "as expeditiously as possi-
ble."30 3 Significantly, "[a]ll executive directives, orders, and
regulations inconsistent with this order, including but not lim-
298. 60 Minutes: George Tenet: At the Center of the Storm (CBS News television
broadcast Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
george-tenet-at-the-center-of-the-storm/.
299. Id.
300. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. pts. 100-02 (2009).
301. Id. § 3(a).
302. Id. § 3(b).
303. Id. § 4(a).
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ited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) from September 11, 2001, toJanuary 20, 2009, concern-
ing detention or the interrogation of detained individuals, are
revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order."3 04
Following the release of the SSCI Report in December
2014, Tenet issued a statement criticizing the report as deeply
flawed. According to Tenet, the Detention and Interrogation
Program "was directed by the President, with the oversight of
the National Security Council, and the legal authorization of
the Attorney General and Department of Justice. These ap-
provals were given notjust once but on multiple occasions."305
In addition, Tenet co-authored an essay in The Wall Street
Journal along with other former CIA Directors and Deputy Di-
rectors.30 6 The essay criticized the SSCI Report, accusing the
Committee of failing to conduct a fair and thorough inquiry of
the CIA's program.307 While the essay did not directly address
whether the CIA committed torture, it discussed the pro-
gram's context. The essay highlighted the benefits of the De-
tention and Interrogation Program, emphasizing that the pro-
gram resulted in actionable intelligence that thwarted several
terrorist attacks.
The detention and interrogation program was formu-
lated in the aftermath of the murders of close to
3,000 people on 9/11. This was a time when:
* We had evidence that al Qaeda was planning a sec-
ond wave of attacks on the U.S.
* We had certain knowledge that bin Laden had met
with Pakistani nuclear scientists and wanted nuclear
weapons.
* We had reports that nuclear weapons were being
smuggled into New York City.
304. Id. § 1.
305. George Tenet, Statement by George J. Tenet on the Release of the
SSCI Report on CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (Dec. 9, 2014),
available at http://ciasavedlives.com/statements.html.
306. George J. Tenet et al., Ex-CIA Directors: Interrogations Saved Lives, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 10, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-interroga
tions-saved-lives-1418142644. Former CIA Directors Porter J. Goss and
Michael V. Hayden along with former CIA Deputy Directors John E. Mc-
Laughlin, Albert M. Calland and Stephen R. Kappes co-authored the essay.
307. Id.
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* We had hard evidence that al Qaeda was trying to
manufacture anthrax.
It felt like the classic "ticking time bomb" scenario-
every single day.
In this atmosphere, time was of the essence and the
CIA felt a deep responsibility to ensure that an attack
like 9/11 would never happen again. We designed
the detention and interrogation programs at a time
when "relationship building" was not working with
brutal killers who did not hesitate to behead in-
nocents. These detainees had received highly effec-
tive counter-interrogation training while in al Qaeda
training camps. And yet it was clear they possessed
information that could disrupt plots and save Ameri-
can lives.30
In September 2015, a group of eight former CIA officials,
including George Tenet, released a rebuttal to the SSCI Re-
port.3 0 9 Tenet was highly critical of the Report because it
failed to consider the historical context in the United States
following the 9/11 attacks. "Nightly meetings in the CIA Direc-
tor's conference room presented threat reporting of a quantity
and quality that led us to believe that the world was in great
danger."3 1 0 Tenet also criticized the Report's methodology,
which he noted had failed to interview any CIA officials who
were directly involved in the Rendition and Interrogation Pro-
gram. Significantly, Tenet argued that the CIA worked "to en-
sure that the program was being implemented in a manner
consistent with the U.S. laws, the Constitution, and interna-
tional treaty obligations."3 1 1 And yet, Tenet acknowledged mis-
takes. "There were indeed things that went wrong in the early
days of this program, failures of leadership and management
that left a stain on our record. To be sure, during these early
tumultuous days our own oversight did not meet our profes-
308. Id.
309. REBUrrAL: THE CIA RESPONDS TO THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMIT-
TEE'S STUDY OF ITS DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM (Bill Harlow ed.
2015).
310. George J. Tenet, Introduction: CIA Interrogation of al Qa'ida Terrorists -
The Rest of the Story, in REBUTTAL: THE CIA RESPONDS TO THE SENATE INTELLI-
GENCE COMMITTEE'S STUDY OF ITS DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 1,
2 (Bill Harlow ed. 2015).
311. Id. at 3.
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sional standards." 312 While Tenet indicates these errors were
immediately corrected and that the CIA was fully transparent
regarding the program, the record reveals otherwise.
B. The Victims
It is unclear how many individuals the CIA detained as
part of the Detention and Interrogation Program. The SSCI
Report indicated that the CIA detained at least 119 individuals
in the program, although an accurate count was simply not
possible because some CIA records remained classified and
other records were unclear.313 These individuals, referred to
as "High Value Detainees," were held in a variety of locations
throughout the world, designated by the SSCI Report as De-
tention Sites Cobalt (Afghanistan), Grey (Afghanistan), Brown
(Afghanistan), Orange (Afghanistan), Blue (Poland), Green
(Thailand), Black (Romania), and Violet (Lithuania). The ma-
jority of detainees were held at Detention Site Cobalt (also
known as the Salt Pit), which was located outside of Bagram
Air Base in Afghanistan. According to the SSCI Report, 39 of
the 119 detainees were subjected to enhanced interrogation
techniques.314 Of the 39 detainees, 17 of them were subjected
to enhanced interrogations between January 2003 and August
2003.
Detailed reports regarding detainee treatment have been
prepared by various groups, including the SSCI and the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross.3 1 5
312. Id. at 4.
313. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (Executive Summary). According to
aJuly 20, 2007 memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, the CIA had
custody of 98 detainees between March 2002 and July 2007. Memorandum
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to
John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency on Ap-
plication of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be
Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees 5
(July 20, 2007). The memorandum indicated that the CIA had used "en-
hanced techniques" on approximately 30 detainees. Id.
314. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 96.
315. To date, only a handful of first person accounts by detainees have
been released. The accounts of Majid Khan, one high value detainee, were
released after review by the U.S. government. David Rohde, Detainee Alleges
CIA Sexual Abuse, Torture Beyond Senate Findings, REUTERS, June 2, 2015, availa-
ble at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-torture-khan-id
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1. SSCI Report
The SSCI Report provided extensive details regarding the
treatment of four detainees: Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-
Nashiri, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.
The details regarding detainee treatment were based on CIA
cables, email communications, internal reports, and other
sources. 1 6 The SSCI did not interview any of the detainees.
a. Abu Zubaydah
The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation tech-
niques - including "walling, attention grasps, slap-
ping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confine-
ment, white noise and sleep deprivation" - continued
in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day" for 17
straight days, through August 20, 2002. When Abu
Zubaydah was left alone during this period, he was
placed in a stress position, left on the waterboard
with a cloth over his face, or locked in one of two
confinement boxes. According to the cables, Abu
Zubaydah was also subjected to the waterboard "2-4
times a day . . . with multiple iterations of the water-
ing cycle during each application."
The "aggressive phase of interrogation" continued
until August 23, 2002. Over the course of the entire
20 day "aggressive phase of interrogation," Abu
Zubaydah spent a total of 266 hours (11 days, 2
hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box
and 29 hours in a small confinement box, which had
a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a height
of 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah
that the only way he would leave the facility was in the
coffin-shaped confinement box.
According to the daily cables from DETENTION
SITE GREEN, Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried,"
"begged," "pleaded," and "whimpered," but contin-
USKBNOOI1TW20150602. For a first person account of life at Guantanamo
and the consequences of torture, see MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAui, GUANTA-
NAMo DIARY (Larry Siems ed., 2015).
316. Words that were redacted from the original documents are desig-
nated [Redacted].
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ued to deny that he had any additional information
on current threats to, or operatives in, the United
States.317
At times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical"
and "distressed to the level that he was unable to ef-
fectively communicate." Waterboarding sessions "re-
sulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg,
chest and arm spasms" and "hysterical pleas." In at
least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "be-
came completely unresponsive with bubbles rising
through his open, full mouth." According to CIA
records, Abu Zubaydah remained unresponsive until
medical intervention, when he regained conscious-
ness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid."318
b. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interro-
gated using the CIA's "enhanced interrogation tech-
niques, including being subjected to the waterboard
at least three times. In December 2002, when DE-
TENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and
Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE
BLUE.319
[CIA OFFICER 2] arrived at DETENTION SITE
BLUE on December [redacted] 2002, and the CIA
resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation tech-
niques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the
fact that [redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] had not been
trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's en-
hanced interrogation techniques. [Redacted] [CIA
OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters
that "[al]-Nashiri responds well to harsh treatment"
and suggested that the interrogators continue to ad-
317. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 42 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
318. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-44 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
319. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 67 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
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minister "various degrees of mild punishment," but
still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introduc-
ing some 'minute rewards."'
It was later learned that during these interrogation
sessions, [redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2], with the per-
mission and participation of the DETENTION SITE
BLUE chief of Base, who also had not been trained
and qualified as an interrogator, used a series of un-
authorized interrogation techniques against al-
Nashiri. For example, [redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2]
placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with
"his hands affixed over his head" for approximately
two and a half days. Later, during the course of al-
Nashiri's debriefings, while he was blindfolded, [re-
dacted] [CIA OFFICER 21 placed a pistol near al-
Nashiri's head and operated a cordless drill near al-
Nashiri's body. AI-Nashiri did not provide any addi-
tional threat information during, or after, these inter-
rogations.320
After receiving the proposed interrogation plan for
al-Nashiri on January 21, 2003, [redacted], the CIA's
chief of interrogations-whose presence had previ-
ously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear-
emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that he had
"informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no
longer be associated in any way with the interroga-
tion program due to serious reservation [s] [he had]
about the current state of affairs" and would instead
be "retiring shortly." In the same email, [redacted]
wrote, "[t]his is a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen
and I intend to get the hell off the train before it
happens." [Redacted] drafted a cable for CIA Head-
quarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising
320. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 69 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted). The SSCI Report indicates that both the DETENTION SITE
BLUE CIA chief of base and CIA Officer 2 were reprimanded and sus-
pended for using unauthorized interrogation techniques on al-Nashiri. Id. at
70 n.356 (Executive Summary).
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a number of concerns that he, the chief of interroga-
tions, believed should be "entered for the record."321
Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by
[redacted], CIA Headquarters approved a plan to
reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interroga-
tion techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with
shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing him
in a standing sleep deprivation position with his aims
affixed over his head. CIA cables describing subse-
quent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was
nude and, at times, "put in the standing position,
handcuffed and shackled." According to cables, CIA
interrogators decided to provide al-Nashiri clothes to
"hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and
prevent them from deteriorating," noting in a cable
the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a head
cold which caused his body to shake for approxi-
mately ten minutes during an interrogation. Begin-
ning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to
five different CIA detention facilities before he was
transferred to U.S. military custody on September 5,
2006.322
c. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
On February [redacted], 2003, in anticipation of bin
al-Shib's arrival, interrogators at the detention site,
led by the CIA's chief interrogator, [redacted], pre-
pared an interrogation plan for bin al-Shibh. The
plan became a template, and subsequent requests to
CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interro-
gation techniques against other detainees relied
upon near identical language."
The interrogation plan proposed that immediately
following the psychological and medical assessments
conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be
subjected to "sensory dislocation." The proposed sen-
321. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 71 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
322. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 72 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
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sory dislocation included shaving bin al-Shibh's head
and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room
with white lights, keeping him "unclothed and sub-
jected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and
shackling him "hand and foot with arms outstretched
over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and
not allowed to support his weight with his arms)."
Contrary to CIA representations made later to the
Committee that detainees were always offered the op-
portunity to cooperate before being subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan
stated that bin al-Shibh would be shackled nude with
his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discus-
sion with interrogators or any assessment of his level
of cooperation." According to a cable, only after the
interrogators determined that his "initial resistance
level [had] been diminished by the conditions"
would the questioning and interrogation phase be-
gin.
The interrogation phase described in the plan in-
cluded near constant interrogations, as well as con-
tinued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep
deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan
stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation tech-
niques would be used, including the "attention grasp,
walling, the facial hold, the facial slap. . . the abdomi-
nal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress
positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the
waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of
resistance."3 2 3
d. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
Between March [redacted], 2003 and March 9, 2003,
contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA in-
terrogator, [redacted], used the CIA's enhanced in-
terrogation techniques against KSM, including
nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention grab
and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap,
323. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 76-77 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
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the kneeling stress position, and walling. There were
no debriefers present. According to the CIA interro-
gator, during KSM's first day at DETENTON SITE
BLUE, SWIGERT and DUNBAR first began threaten-
ing KSM's children.3 24
On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of
his 15 separate waterboarding sessions. The first
waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10
minutes more than anticipated in the Office of Legal
Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed by
the use of a horizontal stress position that had not
previously been approved by CIA Headquarters. The
chief of Base, worried about the legal implications,
prohibited the on-site medical officer from reporting
on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of offi-
cial CIA cable traffic.3 25
Beginning the evening of March 18, 2003, KSM be-
gan a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the
standing position, which would last for seven and a
half days, or approximately 180 hours.3 2 6
On March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected
to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
throughout the day, including a period of "intense
questioning and walling." KSM was described as
"[t]ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles,
shins, and wrists, as well as on the back of his head.
He also suffered from pedal edema resulting from
extended standing. After having concluded that
there was "no further movement" in the interroga-
tion, the detention site personnel hung a picture of
KSM's sons in his cell as a way to "[heighten] his im-
324. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 84-85 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
325. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 85-86 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
326. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 90 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
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agination concerning where they are, who has them,
[and] what is in store for them."3 27
2. ICRC Report
From October 6 through 11, 2006, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") was allowed to visit the U.S.
detention facilities at Guantanamo. During the visit, the ICRC
met with government personnel and toured the facilities. In
addition, they met privately with several detainees. Following
the visit, the ICRC prepared a confidential report ("ICRC Re-
port") on the detention of 14 "high value detainees."328 The
ICRC Report was based on private interviews conducted with
the detainees. The report was submitted to the United States
on February 14, 2007 and sent directly to John Rizzo, the Act-
ing General Counsel for the CIA.
Each detainee interviewed by the ICRC had been in CIA
custody prior to their transfer to Guantanamo. 29 They were
interviewed separately and outside the presence of U.S. gov-
ernment officials. The ICRC noted the similar stories offered
by each detainee with respect to their capture, detention, and
treatment. Indeed, "the consistency of the detailed allegations
provided separately by each of the fourteen adds particular
weight to the information provided below."330
The fourteen .. . described being subjected, in partic-
ular during the early stages of their detention, lasting
from some days up to several months, to a harsh re-
gime employing a combination of physical and psy-
chological ill-treatment with the aim of obtaining
compliance and extracting information. This regime
began soon after arrest, and included transfers of de-
tainees to multiple locations, maintenance of the de-
tainees in continuous solitary confinement and in-
communicado detention throughout the entire pe-
327. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 90-91 (Executive Summary) (citations
omitted).
328. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROss, ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF
FOURTEEN "HIGH VALUE DETAINEES" IN CIA CusToDy, WAS 07/76 (Feb. 14,
2007) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT]. The ICRC Report was confidential and
not supposed to be released without the approval of the ICRC. Id. at I.
329. Id. at 4.
330. Id. at 5.
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riod of their undisclosed detention, and the infliction
of further ill-treatment through the use of various
methods either individually or in combination, in ad-
dition to the deprivation of other basic material re-
quirements.33 '
Each of the detainees was subjected to solitary confine-
ment and incommunicado detention.332 The ICRC identified
several additional forms of ill treatment, including suffocation
by water, prolonged stress standing positions, beatings by use
of a collar, beating and kicking, confinement in a box, pro-
longed nudity, sleep deprivation, exposure to cold tempera-
ture, prolonged shackling, threats of ill-treatment, forced shav-
ing, and deprivation/restriction of solid food.33 3 The detain-
ees were also deprived of access to open air, exercise, and
appropriate hygiene facilities, and their access to the Koran
was restricted.334
The ICRC Report provided details regarding the treat-
ment of several detainees, including Abu Zubaydah and
Khaled Shaykh Muhammad.335 These statements represent
verbatim transcripts of the ICRC interviews.33 6
a. Abu Zubaydah
Then the real torturing started. Two black wooden
boxes were brought into the room outside my cell.
One was tall, slightly higher than me and narrow.
Measuring perhaps in area Im x 0.75m and 2m in
height. The other was shorter, perhaps only Im in
height. I was taken out of my cell and one of the in-
terrogators wrapped a towel around my neck, they
then used it to swing me around and smash me re-
peatedly against the hard walls of the room. I was also
repeatedly slapped in the face. As I was still shackled,
331. Id. at 4.
332. Id. at 7.
333. Id. at 8-9.
334. Id. at 9.
335. Id. The ICRC's interview with Walid Bin Attash is not included in this
article.
336. Verbatim interviews of these three detainees were provided in Annex
I to the ICRC Report. Id. at 28-37 (Annex I).
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the pushing and pulling around meant that the
shackles pulled painfully on my ankles.
I was then put into the tall back box for what I think
was about one and a half to two hours. The box was
totally black on the inside as well as the outside. It
had a bucket inside to use as a toilet and had water to
drink provided in a bottle. They put a cloth or cover
over the outside of the box to cut out the light and
restrict my air supply. It was difficult to breathe.
When I was let out of the box I saw that one of the
walls of the room had been covered with plywood
sheeting. From now on it was against this wall that I
was then smashed with the towel around my neck. I
think that the plywood was put there to provide some
absorption of the impact of my body. The interro-
gators realized that smashing me against the hard
wall would probably quickly result in physical injury.
During these torture sessions many guards were pre-
sent, plus two interrogators who did the actual beat-
ing, still asking questions, while the main interroga-
tor left to return after the beating was over. After the
beating I was then placed in the small box. They
placed a cloth or cover over the box to cut out all
light and restrict my air supply. As it was not high
enough even to sit upright, I had to crouch down. It
was very difficult because of my wounds. The stress
on my legs held in this position meant my wounds
both in the leg and stomach became very painful. I
think this occurred about 3 months after my last op-
eration. It was always cold in the room, but when the
cover was placed over the box it made it hot and
sweaty inside. The wound on my leg began to open
and started to bleed. I don't know how long I re-
mained in the small box, I think I may have slept or
maybe fainted.
I was then dragged from the small box, unable to
walk properly and put on what looked like a hospital
bed, and strapped down very tightly with belts. A
black cloth was then placed over my face and the in-
terrogators used a mineral water bottle to pour water
on the cloth so that I could not breathe. After a few
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minutes the cloth was removed and the bed was ro-
tated into an upright position. The pressure of the
straps on my wounds was very painful. I vomited. The
bed was then again lowered to a horizontal position
and the same torture carried out again with the black
cloth over my face and water poured on from a bot-
tle. On this occasion my head was in a more back-
ward, downwards position and the water was poured
on for a longer time. I struggled against the straps,
trying to breathe, but it was hopeless. I thought I was
going to die. I lost control of my urine. Since then I
still lose control of my urine when under stress.
I was then placed again in the tall box. While I was
inside the box loud music was played again and
somebody kept banging repeatedly on the box from
the outside. I tried to sit down on the floor, but be-
cause of the small space the bucket with urine tipped
over and spilt over me. I remained in the box for sev-
eral hours, maybe overnight. I was then taken out
and again a towel was wrapped around my neck and I
was smashed into the wall with the plywood covering
and repeatedly slapped in the face by the same two
interrogators as before.
I was then made to sit on the floor with a black hood
over my head until the next session of torture began.
The room was always kept very cold.
This went on for approximately one week. During
this time the whole procedure was repeated five
times. On each occasion, apart from one, I was suffo-
cated once or twice and was put in the vertical posi-
tion on the bed in between. On one occasion the suf-
focation was repeated three times. I vomited each
time I was put in the vertical position between the
suffocation.
During that week I was not given any solid food. I was
only given Ensure to drink. My head and beard were
shaved everyday.
I collapsed and lost consciousness on several occa-
sions. Eventually the torture was stopped by the inter-
vention of the doctor.
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I was told during this period that I was one of the first
to receive these interrogation techniques, so no rules
applied. It felt like they were experimenting and try-
ing out techniques to be used later on other peo-
ple.337
b. Khaled Shaykh Muhammad
It was here that the most intense interrogation oc-
curred, led by three experienced CIA interrogators,
all over 65 years old and all strong and well trained.
There were the "emirs." Although of course they
never revealed their own names, I gave them names
by which I could refer to them, all beginning with
"Abu". I think that "Abu Captain" was of South Amer-
ican origin, whereas "Abu Hanan" was perhaps of
Moroccan origin and "Abu White" was of Eastern Eu-
ropean descent.
As the interrogation again resumed I was told by one
of the "emirs" that they had received the green-light
from Washington to give him "a hard time". They
never used the word "torture" and never referred to
"physical pressure", only to "a hard time", I was never
threatened with death, in fact I was told that they
would not allow me to die, but that I would be
brought to the "verge of death and back again".
Apart from when I was taken for interrogation to an-
other room, I was kept for one month in the cell in a
standing position with my hands cuffed and shackled
above my head and my feet cuffed and shackled to a
point in the floor. Of course during this month I fell
asleep on some occasions while still being held in this
position. This resulted in all my weight being applied
to the handcuffs around my wrists resulting in open
and bleeding wounds. The cuffs around my ankles
also created open, bleeding wounds. [Scars consis-
tent with this allegation were visible on both wrists as
well as on both ankles.] Both my feet became very
swollen after one month of almost continual stand-
ing.
337. Id. at 29-31.
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Initially I was interrogated for approximately eight
hours each day. This gradually became less until after
one month it was about four hours each day. For the
interrogation I was taken to a separate room. The
number of people present varied greatly from one
day to another. Other interrogators, including wo-
men, were also sometimes present along with the
"emirs". A doctor was also usually present. If I was
perceived not to be cooperating I would be put
against a wall and punched and slapped in the body,
head and face. A thick flexible plastic collar would
also be placed around my neck so that it could then
be. held at the two ends by a guard who would use it
to slam me repeatedly against the wall. The beatings
were combined with the use of cold water, which was
poured over me using a hose-pipe. The beatings and
use of cold water occurred on a daily basis during the
first month.
In addition I was also subjected to "water-boarding"
on five occasions, all of which occurred during that
first month. I would be strapped to a special bed,
which could be rotated into a vertical position. A
cloth would be placed over my face. Cold water from
a bottle that had been kept in a fridge was then
poured onto the cloth by one of the guards so that I
could not breathe. This obviously could only be done
for one or two minutes at a time. The cloth was then
removed and the bed was put into a vertical position.
The whole process was then repeated during about
one hour. Injuries to my ankles and wrists also oc-
curred during the water-boarding as I struggled in
the panic of not being able to breathe. Female inter-
rogators were also present during this form of ill-
treatment and a doctor was always present, standing
out of sight behind the head of bed, but I saw him
when he came to fix a clip to my finger which was
connected to a machine. I think it was to measure my
pulse and oxygen content in my blood. So they could
take me to breaking point.
After each session of torture I was put into a cell
where I was allowed to lie on the floor and could
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sleep for a few minutes. However, due to shackles on
my ankles and wrists I was never able to sleep very
well.
The harshest period of the interrogation was just
prior to the end of the first month. The beatings be-
came worse and I had cold water directed at me from
a hose-pipe by guards while I was still in my cell. The
worst day was when I was beaten for about half an
hour by one of the interrogators. My head was
banged against the wall so hard that it started to
bleed. Cold water was poured over my head. This was
then repeated with other interrogators. Finally I was
taken for a session of water boarding. The torture on
that day was finally stopped by the intervention of the
doctor. I was allowed to sleep for about one hour and
then put back in my cell standing with my hands
shackled above my head.3 3 8
In its report, the ICRC stated that the forms of mistreat-
ment suffered by the detainees, both in isolation and in combi-
nation, amounted to torture as well as cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment.3 3 9 The ICRC also found that the CIA de-
tention program "amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of
liberty and enforced disappearance, in contravention of inter-
national law." 3 4 0 More broadly, the ICRC expressed great con-
cern with the coordinated and systematic nature of the deten-
tion program. "When understood in their totality, the undis-
closed detention regime to which these persons were
subjected becomes all the more disturbing."3 4 1
Other descriptions of CIA detainee treatment corroborate
the details offered in the SSCI and ICRC reports.342 On No-
338. Id. at 35-36.
339. Id. at 5, 24.
340. Id. at 24.
341. Id. at 5.
342. Several reports on detainee treatment were issued by nongovernmen-
tal organizations and members of civil society. E.g., AMNESTY INT'L, WE TOR-
TURED SOME FOLKS (2014); REED BRODY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING
AwAy WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATMENT OF DE-
TAINEES (Andrea Prasow et al. eds., 2011); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE
REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT'S TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREAT-
MENT (Randy Auerbach ed., 2013); FARNOOSH HASHEMIAN ET AL., PHYSICIANS
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAws, BROKEN LIVES: MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF TOR-
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vember 20, 2008, for example, the Senate Armed Services
Committee issued a report on detainee treatment.343 While
the report focused on the treatment of detainees in military
custody, it also addressed the CIA's Detention and Interroga-
tion Program. The report noted that authorization for aggres-
sive interrogation techniques came from the highest levels of
government, which sent a clear message to military personnel
at detention centers in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo.
The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply
be attributed to the actions of "a few bad apples" act-
ing on their own. The fact is that senior officials in
the United States government solicited information
on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the
law to create the appearance of their legality, and au-
thorized their use against detainees. 344
The report explained how CIA interrogation practices be-
gan to influence the Department of Defense and, as a result,
many CIA interrogation practices migrated to military deten-
tion facilities. For example, "[i]nterrogation techniques such
as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them in stress
positions, and using military working dogs to intimidate them
appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in
Afghanistan and at GTMO [Guantanamo]." 3 The report em-
phasized that abusive treatment of detainees was contrary to
American values and longstanding military policies. Other re-
ports prepared by the U.S. military also raised concerns about
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and its impact
on the military. 346
Because some detainees were held in Europe, several Eu-
ropean governments and intergovernmental agencies have un-
dertaken investigations regarding the CIA detention pro-
TURE BY U.S. PERSONNEL AND ITS IMPACT (Tara Gingerich ed., 2008); AREwT
SINGH, OPEN Soc'v FOUNDS., GLOBALIZINc TORTURE: CIA SECRET DETENTION
AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION (David Berry ed., 2013).
343. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREAT-
MENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (Comm. Print 2008).
344. Id. at xii.
345. Id. at xxix.
346. E.g., GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABu GHRAIB DE-
TENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MI BRIGADE (2004); ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, AR
15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004).
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gram.3 4 7 In addition, several detainees have filed actions
against European countries based on their detention in those
countries. Abu Zubaydah filed actions against Poland and
Lithuania, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri filed actions against
Poland and Romania.348 Their applications provide details re-
garding their treatment and corroborate the information pro-
vided in the SSCI Report and the ICRC Report. On July 24,
2014, the European Court of Human Rights issued decisions
in both cases involving Poland.349 The Court found that the
CIA subjected both Zubaydah and al-Nashiri to torture during
their detentions in Poland. Accordingly, the Court held that
Poland had violated their rights under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. In particular, Poland had violated their
right to be free from torture and ill treatment by allowing the
CIA to detain and torture them in Polish territory and by fail-
ing to carry out effective investigations into their claims of
abuse. The Court also held that Poland had violated their
rights to liberty and security, their right to private and family
life, and their right to an effective remedy. Poland was ordered
to pay 130,000 euros to Zubaydah and 100,000 euros to al-
Nashiri.3 50 On February 18, 2015, Poland agreed to pay repara-
tions to both Zubaydah and al-Nashiri.35 1
347. E.g., Eur. Parl. Ass., Secret Dets. & Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving
Council ofEurope Member States: Second Report (June 7, 2007), available at http:/
/assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2007/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo
.pdf.
348. Application, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, No. 7511/13 (Mar.
26, 2013); Application, al Nashiri v. Romania, App. No. 33234/12 (June 1,
2012); Application, Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, No. 46454/11 (July 14,
2011); Application, al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 (May 6, 2011).
349. Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, No. 7511/13 (July 24, 2014); al
Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11 (July 24, 2014).
350. Husayn v. Poland, supra note 349, 11 567, 569; al Nashiri v. Poland,
supra note 349, 1 100.
351. Alan Yuhas, Poland Agrees to Pay Reparations to Guantanamo Detainees,
THE GUARDmAN, Feb. 18, 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/feb/18/poland-agrees-reparations-guantanamo-detainees. See
also Carol J. Williams, Poland Feels Sting of Betrayal over CIA "Black Site," L.A.
TIMES, May 10, 2015, available at http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-
fg-poland-cia-blacksite-20150510-story.html (discussing political ramifica-
tions in Poland arising out of the detention and interrogation program).
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According to the United States Attorneys' Manual, cases
involving torture "raise issues of national and international
concern."35 2 As a result, such cases are subject to additional
oversight requirements within the Criminal Division of the De-
partment of Justice. "Successful prosecution of these matters
requires both careful coordination within the Department of
Justice and careful coordination between the Department and
senior officials in the foreign affairs and military communi-
ties."35 3 A U.S. Attorney must notify the Human Rights and
Special Prosecutions Section of the Criminal Division when
opening any torture matter as well as with any significant de-
velopments in the investigation or prosecution of such mat-
ter.3 54 Prior express approval by the Assistant Attorney General
of the Criminal Division is required before filing an applica-
tion for a search warrant, a material witness warrant, a criminal
complaint or information, or for seeking the return of an in-
dictment.3 5 5
A. The Prosecution Memorandum
To establish criminal liability under the Torture Statute,
the Department ofJustice must establish five elements beyond
a reasonable doubt. First, the alleged offender must be a "na-
tional of the United States" or "present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged of-
fender."3 5 6 Second, the alleged acts must be "committed by a
person acting under the color of law."3 5 7 Third, these acts
must be committed upon another person within the of-
fender's custody or physical control.3 5 8 Fourth, the alleged
acts must be "specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering inciden-
tal to lawful sanctions) upon another person."35 9 Fifth, the al-
352. DEP. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.139(A) (1997)
(These requirements also apply to cases involving war crimes, genocide, and
the recruitment of child soldiers.).
353. Id.
354. Id. §§ 9-2.139(C)-9-2.139(D).
355. Id. § 9-2.139(E).
356. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b).
357. § 2340(1).
358. Id.
359. Id.
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leged acts must have been committed outside the United
States.360
The Torture Statute authorizes criminal liability for tor-
ture. Based on the facts surrounding Tenet's role in the devel-
opment and implementation of the Detention and Interroga-
tion Program, Tenet could be prosecuted for committing tor-
ture and attempting to commit torture.
First, George Tenet is a U.S. citizen and, therefore, meets
the first requirement for prosecution under the Torture Stat-
ute. The nationality of the victims is irrelevant.
Second, the alleged acts were committed under color of
law. In United States v. Belfast, the district court explained that
acting under color of law occurs when an "official was purport-
ing or pretending to act in the performance of official du-
ties." 3 6 ' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this interpretation on
appeal, citing the legislative history of the Torture Act.3 6 2 The
color of law requirement is met even if the defendant acts be-
yond the bounds of lawful authority as long as the power to
take such acts only exists because that person is a government
official.3 63
Tenet was acting as a government official when he person-
ally authorized the use of interrogation techniques on high
value detainees, including enhanced interrogation techniques.
Tenet's authority for such actions came solely from his status
as the Director of Central Intelligence, which was statutorily
established by the National Security Act of 1947.364 While
Tenet was acting under color of law, he cannot assert his ac-
tions were justified because he was implementing government
policies, a determination made by the Eleventh Circuit in Bel-
fast.365
Third, the alleged acts were committed upon the victims
who were within Tenet's custody and control. As the Director
360. § 2340A(a).
361. Court's Instructions to the jury at 5, United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d
783 (11th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-20758) [hereinafter BelfastJury Instructions].
362. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 808.
363. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). See also 18 U.S.C. § 242 (per-
mitting criminal liability for deprivation of rights under color of law); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (allowing civil liability for deprivation of rights under color of
law).
364. 50 U.S.C. § 3036.
365. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 808.
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of Central Intelligence, Tenet had responsibility over the Di-
rectorate of Operations and the Counterterrorism Center,
which implemented the Detention and Interrogation Pro-
gram. The victims were detained at CIA detention centers op-
erated by the Directorate. The Supreme Court has indicated
that "[a]n individual is held 'in custody' by the United States
when the United States official charged with his detention has
'the power to produce' him." 366 In its communications with
the OLC, the CIA did not question that detainees held in the
Detention and Interrogation Program were within its custody
and control or that such acts were committed under color of
law.367
Fourth, the alleged acts were specifically intended to in-
flict severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the
detainees. In United States v. Belfast, the district court defined
torture in the jury instructions as "extreme, deliberate, and un-
usually cruel practices rather than lesser forms of cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment."3 68 Severe physi-
cal pain was defined as "bodily pain that is extreme in intensity
and difficult to endure," and severe physical suffering was de-
fined to mean "physical distress that is extreme considering its
intensity and duration or persistence and that is difficult to
endure."369 The Eleventh Circuit rejected efforts to use other
sources beyond the Convention against Torture and the Tor-
ture Statute to define torture.370 While the Belfast courts only
addressed physical pain and suffering, their analysis is instruc-
tive for understanding the meaning of mental pain and suffer-
ing.
The Belfast courts also clarified the requirement of intent
under the Torture Statute.371 In the jury instructions, the dis-
366. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2217 (2008) (citing Wales v.
Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (specifying
that habeas corpus is directed to the person having custody of the detained
person).
367. 2002 OLC Memorandum to Rizzo, supra note 205, at 9.
368. Belfast Jury Instructions, supra note 361, at 5.
369. Id.
370. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the use of executive branch doc-
uments to define torture. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 823.
371. With respect to attempts to commit torture, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that "an attempt to commit torture is exactly the same as an act done
with the specific intent to commit torture." Id. at 808.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
98 [Vol. 48:1
UNITED STATES V GEORGE TENET
trict court indicated that torture requires specific intent.3 7 2 It
then defined specific intent to mean: "to act with the intent to
commit the act as well as the intent to achieve the conse-
quences of the act, namely the infliction of the severe physical
pain or suffering."373 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit indicated
that the Torture Statute was consistent with the Convention
against Torture in requiring torture to be intentionally in-
flicted on another person.374 The Eleventh Circuit added,
however, that the defendant's motive is not material. Citing
the legislative history of the Convention against Torture as well
as several federal cases that examined the meaning of torture,
the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that a defendant must act
with purpose to inflict pain. The reasons for a defendant's ac-
tions are not relevant for purposes of criminal prosecution
under the Torture Statute.375
The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was de-
signed so that individuals who had allegedly been trained to
resist traditional interrogation techniques would become com-
pliant and cooperate with CIA interrogators. According to the
CIA, the high value detainees had been trained by AI-Qaeda to
resist interrogation. As a result, they would not willingly reveal
valuable intelligence. To counter such training, the CIA identi-
fied techniques used in the SERE Program that would create
significant physical and psychological pressure on detainees,
thereby inducing their compliance. The CIA's goal was to use
"physical and psychological pressures in a comprehensive, sys-
tematic, and cumulative manner" that would "create a state of
learned helplessness and dependence" and "overcome a de-
tainee's resistance posture."3 7 6
The interrogation techniques were intentionally designed
to cause severe physical pain and suffering. Indeed, the Guide-
lines on Interrogations approved by Tenet specifically indi-
372. Belfast Jury Instructions, supra note 361, at 5.
373. Id.
374. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 807.
375. Id. "The 'for such purposes' language [in the Convention against
Torture] is meant merely 'to illustrate the common motivations that cause
individuals to engage in torture . . . [and to] ensure . . . that, whatever its
specific goal, torture can occur . .. only when the production of pain is
purposive, not merely haphazard."' (citing Price v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
376. CIA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 185, at 1.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2015] 99
INTERNATIONAL LAW AD POLITICS
cated that these interrogation techniques "incorporate physi-
cal or psychological pressure."377 For example, stress positions,
wall standing, and cramped confinement were specifically in-
tended to cause intense pain and suffering that was difficult to
endure. Waterboarding caused such intense physical distress
that it could only be performed for short periods of time.3 7 8
Sleep deprivation caused significant physical distress, particu-
larly when it was authorized for in excess of 72 hours and
when it was combined with other techniques. The CIA author-
ized the use of coercive techniques-walling, water dousing,
stress positions, wall standing, and cramped confinement-be-
cause these techniques would place detainees in severe physi-
cal and psychological stress.379
The enhanced interrogation techniques were also de-
signed to cause severe mental pain and suffering. Waterboard-
ing and mock burials were specifically designed to instill a fear
of death in the detainees, which is a form of mental suffering
listed in the Torture Statute.380 Sleep deprivation and
377. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2. The guide-
lines added that medical personnel should suspend interrogations if they
determined that "significant and prolonged physical or mental injury, pain,
or suffering is likely to result if the interrogation is not suspended." Id.
378. John Rizzo, I Could Have Stopped Waterboarding Before It Happened: An
Exclusive Account From The CIA's Former Top Lawyer, PoLITIcO MAGAZINE (Jan.
5, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/waterboard
ing-cia-lawyer-john-rizzo-torture-101758_full.html#.ViIrvmrTIU. Water-
boarding was found to constitute torture by the International Military Tribu-
nal for the Far East. INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR E., JUDGMENT OF 4
NOVEMBER 1948 1059 (1948), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/
PTO/IMTFE/. See generally Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of
Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468 (2007) (discuss-
ing interrogation techniques using water and finding that such techniques
have been condemned by U.S. courts). The CIA has acknowledged
waterboarding three detainees, Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad,
and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, and that the last waterboarding session oc-
curred in March 2003. Memorandum to Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Cham-
bliss on CIA Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Re-
port on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program (June 27,
2003), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAsJune20l3_Response-to_
theSSCIStudyon theFormerDetention andInterrogationProgram
.pdf.
379. CIA GUIDELINES ON INTERROGATIONS, supra note 241, at 2.
380. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. In his interview with the ICRC, Zubaydah de-
scribed the fear, of death he experienced during waterboarding. "I struggled
against the straps, trying to breathe, but it was hopeless. I thought I was
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cramped confinement were intended to disrupt the senses,
which is another form of mental suffering listed in the Torture
Statute. In addition to these interrogation techniques, envi-
ronmental manipulation, sensory deprivation, solitary confine-
ment, dietary manipulation, and forced nudity were also used
to disrupt the senses. The pain and suffering experienced by
detainees continued even after the interrogation techniques
ceased to be applied. This was essential so that the detainees
would continue cooperating through weeks and months of in-
terrogations. In fact, many of the detainees suffered insomnia,
depression, and anxiety for years after they were subjected to
the interrogation techniques. As a result, detainees were often
medicated to counter the effects of their symptoms. The psy-
chological trauma experienced by detainees was still evident
when the ICRC interviewed them at Guantanamo in October
2006. It was also manifest in several detainee hearings before
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantanamo.38 1
The interrogation techniques were not applied in isola-
tion. They were, in fact, applied concurrently and repeatedly
for days and weeks. Such extensive treatment heightened the
physical and mental pain and suffering experienced by the de-
tainees. The cumulative and concurrent nature of the treat-
ment was of significant concern to the ICRC because it height-
ened the severity of pain and suffering experienced by the de-
tainees.
In sum, Tenet authorized the use of interrogation tech-
niques on detainees that were specifically intended to inflict
severe physical and mental pain and suffering. None of the
detainees had been charged or convicted of any crimes and so
their pain and suffering could not have been incidental to law-
ful sanctions. Even if the detainees were initially captured
under lawful circumstances, "the extended length and nature
of their detention, coupled with the utter lack of access to
courts, attorneys, or any information about their arrest, ren-
dered the duration of their.imprisonment wholly unlawful."382
going to die. I lost control of my urine. Since then I still lose control of my
urine when under stress." ICRC REPORT, supra note 328, at 30.
381. See, e.g., Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing
for ISN 10015, ACLU (Mar. 14, 2007), www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/csrt-al
nashiri.pdf (Combat Status Review Hearing transcript of Al Nashiri detailing
the psychological trauma experienced by detainees).
382. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 825 (11th Cir. 2010).
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Finally, the alleged acts were committed outside the
United States. The term "United States" is defined in the Tor-
ture Statute to mean "the several States of the United States,
the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories,
and possessions of the United States."38 3 The victims were tor-
tured at CIA detention centers located outside the United
States, including Afghanistan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania
and Thailand. All four of the victims were ultimately trans-
ferred to Guantanamo. It is well established that Congress can
impose legal obligations on U.S. citizens for actions taken
outside the United States. In Belfast, the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed that Congress had the authority to criminalize the ex-
traterritorial conduct of U.S. citizens.3 84 Moreover, the lan-
guage of the Torture Statute "evinces an unmistakable con-
gressional intent to apply the statute extraterritorially."3 85
For these reasons, Tenet could be directly liable for com-
mitting torture and attempting to commit torture. He could
also be liable for aiding and abetting torture under the gen-
eral aiding and abetting statute in the U.S. Code, which pro-
vides that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
its commission, is punishable as a principal."386 It also provides
that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if di-
rectly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is punishable as a principal." 3 87 Aid-
ing and abetting broadens Tenet's liability because he would
be held responsible for assisting others who committed tor-
ture. 3 8 8
383. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(3).
384. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 809-10.
385. Id. at 811.
386. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
387. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).
388. This is analogous but distinct from the doctrine of command respon-
sibility, which is a theory of liability recognized in both domestic and inter-
national law. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE?:
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES (2005), available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/us0405.pdf (documenting
how high-raking U.S. civilian and military leaders made decisions and issued
policies that facilitated serious and widespread violations of the law); James
P. Pfiffner, US. Torture Policy and Command Responsibility, in EXAMINING TOR-
TURE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF STATE REPRESSION 103 (Tracy Lightcap & James
P. Pfiffner eds., 2014) (arguing that harsh interrogation policies were clearly
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In addition to these charges, Tenet could be liable for
conspiracy to commit torture. Criminal liability for conspiracy
is set forth in the Torture Statute.38 9 A conspiracy charge for
torture contains three elements.390 First, two or more persons
must agree to try to accomplish a common plan. Second, the
defendant must knowingly and voluntarily join or participate
in the plan. Third, the object of the unlawful plan must be to
commit torture. Conspiracy is also recognized under the gen-
eral conspiracy statute in the U.S. Code although this statute
requires an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.391
The nature of a conspiracy charge can be quite broad.
Essentially, a conspiracy is an agreement in which each mem-
ber of the conspiracy becomes an agent or partner of every
other member of the conspiracy.392 According to the district
court in Belfast, it is "not necessary for the Government to
prove that all of the people named in the indictment were
members of the scheme; or that those who were members had
entered into any formal type of agreement; or that the mem-
bers had planned together all of the details of the scheme or
the 'acts in furtherance of the conspiracy' that the indictment
charges would be carried out in an effort to commit the in-
tended crime."393 Thus, the conspirator does not need to
know the name and identity of every member of the conspir-
acy. Instead, the conspirator only needs to have a general un-
derstanding of the unlawful purpose of the plan and must
knowingly and voluntarily join in that plan. In these circum-
stances, the conspirator can be convicted for conspiracy even
though he only played a small role.39 4
Tenet developed the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program along with other high ranking government officials
established at the uppermost levels of the executive branch). See generally
THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (M.P.W. Brouwers ed., 2012) (exam-
ining the doctrine of command responsibility); GutNAIL METTRIAUX, THE
LAw OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (2009) (examining the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility).
389. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(A)(c).
390. Belfast Jury Instructions, supra note 361, at 4-5. See generally Neal
Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003) (discussing the
conspiracy doctrine in federal criminal law).
391. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
392. BelfastJury Instructions, supra note 361, at 3.
393. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
394. Id.
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and numerous CIA personnel and private contractors. They
sought to develop a plan that would apply severe physical and
mental pain and suffering on detainees to make them compli-
ant and cooperative during interrogations. Thousands of
emails and cables were exchanged among the conspirators re-
garding detainee treatment. 395 Numerous meetings were held
among the conspirators. Hundreds of interrogations took
place. The interrogation plans for each detainee were regu-
larly reviewed and updated by the conspirators to reflect the
effectiveness of the interrogation techniques. Transcripts and
summaries of detainee interrogations were provided to Tenet
and the other conspirators. Tenet knowingly and voluntarily
participated in this plan and remained an active member of
the conspiracy until his retirement from the CIA on July 11,
2004.
As a member of a conspiracy, Tenet could also be crimi-
nally liable for other criminal acts perpetrated by members of
the conspiracy, including torture.39 6 Known as Pinkerton liabil-
ity, this is a significant consequence of a conspiracy charge.
Establishing Pinkerton liability requires three steps. First, a con-
spirator must commit the underlying offense during the exis-
tence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of its objectives.397
Second, Tenet must have been a knowing and voluntary mem-
ber of the conspiracy at the time the offense was committed.398
Third, the commission of such an offense by a conspirator
must have been a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
conspiracy. 399
Each CIA interrogator and debriefer acted under Tenet's
oversight and authority. They implemented interrogation
plans that he authorized. They received his approval to per-
395. See, e.g., Vaughn Index Regarding Abu Zubaydah Interrogation, ACLU
(2009), www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/torturefoia-vaughn1
20090501.pdf (collecting various Vaughn Indices submitted by the Depart-
ment of Defense to shield documents for American Civil Liberties Union v.
Dep't of Defense, 2010 WL 9499016 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). See also SSCI REPORT
passim, supra note 3.
396. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (stating that
acts in furtherance of a conspiracy are attributable to all members of the
conspiracy).
397. See Belfast Jury Instructions, supra note 361, at 6.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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form the interrogation techniques. When they committed tor-
ture, they did so as part of the conspiracy to inflict severe phys-
ical and mental pain and suffering on the detainees for the
purpose of making them compliant and obtaining information
from them. Even acts not specifically authorized by Tenet can
give rise to criminal liability because such acts were reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy. Thus, Tenet
could be liable when interrogators exceeded their purported
authority such as by using unauthorized interrogation tech-
niques or by exceeding the permitted time and frequency of
authorized interrogation techniques. Such acts were a clearly
foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. Tenet was a know-
ing and voluntary member of the conspiracy until his retire-
ment from the CIA.
In sum, Tenet could be liable for each substantive count
of torture under three separate theories of liability: direct lia-
bility, aiding and abetting liability, and Pinkerton liability.400
Tenet could also be subject to liability for conspiracy.
B. The Indictment
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that an
indictment must contain a "plain, concise, and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged."o4 0 The indictment need not offer a detailed sum-
mary of all the facts and evidence. Rather, it "need only con-
tain those facts and elements of the alleged offense necessary
to inform the accused of the charge so that he or she may
prepare a defense and invoke the Double Jeopardy clause
when appropriate." 402
This indictment charges George Tenet with five counts:
conspiracy and four separate counts of torture. The four un-
named victims are Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad,
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, and Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh. Because the
torture occurred outside the United States, venue is appropri-
400. U.S. ArroRNEYs' MANuAL, supra note 352, § 2482 (Criminal Re-
sources Manual).
401. FED. R. CRm. P. 7(c) (1). See United States v. Belfast, No. 06-20758,
2007 WL 844508, (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2007).
402. U.S. ATrorEYs MANUAL, supra note 352, § 222 (Criminal Resources
Manual).
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ate in the federal district where the defendant is arrested. 403
The federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia is
also an appropriate venue because it is the district in which
CIA headquarters is located.
403. 18 U.S.C. § 3238; United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 114-15 (2d
Cir. 2003).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) CASE NO:
) INDICTMENT
v. ) 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a)
) 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(c)
) 18 U.S.C. § 2
GEORGE J. TENET )
The Grand Jury charges that:
INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS
1. The defendant, GEORGE J. TENET, is a national of
the United States who was born in Flushing, New York on Jan-
uary 5, 1953.
2. The defendant, GEORGE J. TENET, is present in the
United States and works in New York City and Washington,
D.C., through and including the filing date of this Indictment.
At all times relevant to this Indictment:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1. The Central Intelligence Agency is an official federal
agency of the United States Government.
2. The offices of the Central Intelligence Agency are lo-
cated in Langley, Virginia, which is located in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia.
3. On July 11, 1997, the defendant, TENET, was ap-
pointed Director of Central Intelligence.
4. As the Director of Central Intelligence, the defendant,
TENET, served as the head of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity, acted as the principal advisor to the President on intelli-
gence matters, and served as the head of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. In this role, he was responsible for overseeing
intelligence gathering as well as counterterrorism. He was also
responsible for overseeing the Directorate of Operations, in-
cluding the Counterterrorism Center.
5. On or around September 17, 2001, President George
W. Bush authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to un-
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dertake operations designed to capture and detain persons
who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to
U.S. persons and interests, or who are planning terrorist activi-
ties.
6. In response to this authorization, the defendant,
TENET, developed and implemented the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
7. The defendant, TENET, made decisions regarding the
Detention and Interrogation Program from CIA headquarters
in Langley, Virginia.
8. Between September 11, 2001 and July 11, 2004, the
Central Intelligence Agency maintained detention centers at
several locations around the world, including Afghanistan,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Thailand.
9. Between September 11, 2001 and July 11, 2004, the
Central Intelligence Agency gained custody and maintained
physical control of persons known to the Grand Jury (collec-
tively referred to herein as "the victims").
10. Between September 11, 2001 and July 11, 2004, the
defendant, TENET, approved the use of interrogation tech-
niques that caused severe physical and mental pain and suffer-
ing on the victims. These interrogation techniques included:
attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, cramped con-
finement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, use
of diapers for prolonged periods, use of insects, mock burials,
water dousing, and waterboarding. Victims were also sub-
jected to forced nudity, dietary manipulation, sensory depriva-
tion, environmental manipulation, and solitary confinement.
.11. Between September 11, 2001 and July 11, 2004, the
defendant, TENET, was notified that each victim was subjected
to both authorized and unauthorized interrogation tech-
niques.
12. On January 28, 2003, the defendant, TENET, ap-
proved the Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant
to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 Sep-
tember 2001. These Guidelines distinguished between stan-
dard and enhanced interrogation techniques and authorized
their use on detainees. Standard interrogation techniques in-
cluded the following: use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to
exceed 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, deprivation of read-
ing materials, use of loud music or white noise, and use of
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diapers for limited periods. Enhanced interrogation tech-
niques included the following: attention grasp, walling, facial
hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress
positions, sleep deprivation, use of diapers for prolonged peri-
ods, use of insects, mock burials, and waterboarding.
13. At all times, detainees were held outside the territory
of the United States.
14. Throughout his tenure as Director of Central Intelli-
gence, TENET had the authority to suspend or terminate the
use of standard and enhanced interrogation techniques on de-
tainees.
15. On June 2, 2004, TENET submitted his resignation as
Director of Central Intelligence. TENET's final day with the
Central Intelligence Agency was on July 11, 2004.
COUNT ONE: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT TORTURE
1. Paragraphs 1-2 of the Introductory Allegations con-
tained in this Indictment and Paragraphs 1-15 of the General
Allegations contained in this Indictment are realleged and in-
corporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
2. From September 11, 2001 to July 11, 2004, the defen-
dant, TENET, did knowingly combine, conspire, confederate,
and agree with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury
to commit torture, in that the defendant, TENET, and others
conspired to commit acts, under the color of law, with the spe-
cific intent to inflict severe physical and mental pain and suf-
fering upon other persons, including persons known to the
Grand Jury (collectively referred to herein as "the victims"),
within the conspirators' custody and physical control.
3. The manner and means by which members of the con-
spiracy sought to accomplish its goals included: that the defen-
dant, TENET, and others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury used the Central Intelligence Agency, other government
agencies, and private contractors to seize, detain, and interro-
gate persons who might possess information about actual, per-
ceived, or potential threats to the United States, and to mis-
treat these persons by acts specifically intended to inflict severe
physical and mental pain and suffering.
4. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to accomplish its
purpose and objects, at least one of the conspirators commit-
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ted and caused to be committed, outside the United States, at
least one of the following acts, among others:
VICTIM #1
1. On or about March 28, 2002, Victim #1 was captured in
Pakistan and transferred to CIA custody at a facility outside the
United States. During his capture, Victim #1 sustained serious
gunshot wounds that required immediate medical attention.
2. Victim #1 was detained under the direct authorization
of the defendant, TENET.
3. In April and May 2002, Victim #1 was interrogated on
several occasions by CIA interrogators outside the United
States. During these interrogations, Victim #1 was typically
handcuffed and wore leg shackles. When he was not interro-
gated, Victim #1 was kept in solitary confinement in his cell.
He was typically kept naked and sleep deprived. Loud music or
machine noise was often used to enhance his sense of hope-
lessness.
4. In or aboutJune and July 2002, Victim #1 was detained
in complete isolation in a CIA facility outside the United States
for approximately 47 days.
5. On or about August 4, 2002, Victim #1 was shackled,
hooded, and stripped by CIA interrogators. The interrogators
then placed a rolled towel around his neck and slammed Vic-
tim #1 against a concrete wall. The interrogators then re-
moved the hood and performed an attention grab. A confine-
ment box was brought into the cell and placed on the floor so
as to appear like a coffin. Victim #1's hood was then removed
and he was questioned by the interrogators. Each time Victim
#1 denied having information, the interrogators would per-
form a facial slap or face grab. During this interrogation ses-
sion, Victim #1 was waterboarded.
6. Between August 4 and 23, 2002, Victim #1 was sub-
jected to several interrogation techniques, including walling,
attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions,
cramped confinement, white noise, sleep deprivation, and
waterboarding.
7. During his detention, Victim #1's hair and beard were
shaved every day.
8. During his detention, Victim #1 was waterboarded 2-4
times a day, with multiple iterations of the watering cycle dur-
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ing each application. These waterboarding sessions resulted
in immediate fluid intake, involuntary leg, chest, and arm
spasms. In at least one waterboarding session, Victim #1 be-
came unresponsive. Bubbles began rising from Victim #1's
open mouth, and he remained unresponsive until medical in-
tervention.
9. During his detention, Victim #1 was forced to spend a
total of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in a confinement box that
was the size of a coffin. The interrogators informed Victim #1
that the only way he would leave the facility would be in the
confinement box. Victim #1 was also forced to spend a total of
29 hours in an even smaller confinement box. The dimensions
of the smaller confinement box were 21 inches in width, 29
inches in depth, and 29 inches in height.
10. During his detention, Victim #1 was doused with cold
water while he was naked and shackled.
11. During his detention, Victim #1 frequently cried and
whimpered. He also begged and pleaded with his interro-
gators. At times, Victim #1 became hysterical and distressed.
12. In total, Victim #1 was waterboarded approximately
83 times.
13. The defendant, TENET, approved each interrogation
session of Victim #1 and received summaries of each session
after they had been completed.
14. Victim #1 was eventually transferred to the Guanta-
namo Bay Detention Facility on or about September 5, 2006.
VICTIM #2
1. On or about March 1, 2003, Victim #2 was captured in
Pakistan and transferred to CIA custody at a facility outside the
United States.
2. Victim #2 was detained under the direct authorization
of the defendant, TENET.
3. On or about March 2, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected to
facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions,
standing sleep deprivation, nudity, and water dousing by CIA
interrogators. Victim #2 was also subjected to rectal rehydra-
tion.
4. On or about March 5 and 6, 2003, Victim #2 was sub-
jected to nudity, sleep deprivation, and rectal rehydration.
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5. On or about March 7 and 8, 2003, Victim #2 was
stripped and placed in a standing sleep deprivation position.
CIA interrogators made statements to Victim #2 threatening
his children.
6. On or about March 9, Victim #2 was subjected to
nudity, standing sleep deprivation, attention grab, insult slap,
facial grab, abdominal slap, kneeling stress position, and wall-
ing.
7. On or about March 10, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected
to waterboarding. His first waterboarding session lasted 30
minutes. He was subjected to 15 separate waterboarding ses-
sions. After the waterboarding sessions, Victim #2 was sub-
jected to a horizontal stress position.
8. On or about March 12, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected
to several waterboarding sessions. Victim #2 ingested large
quantities of water during the waterboarding sessions. He
vomited during and after the waterboarding sessions. He was
subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap, abdominal slap,
and walling. Victim #2 was subjected to waterboarding for the
next ten days.
9. On or about March 13, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected
to three waterboarding sessions. He vomited during and after
each of these procedures.
10. On or about March 18, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected
to an extended period of sleep deprivation for seven and a
half days, most of it in a standing position.
11. On or about March 20, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected
to several interrogation techniques throughout the day. Vic-
tim #2 suffered abrasions on his ankles, shins, wrists, as well as
the back of his head. Victim #2 also suffered from pedal
edema. At the end of the last interrogation session, the inter-
rogators left a picture of one of Victim #2's sons in his cell to
remind Victim #2 that his family was in custody and that they
were at risk.
12. On or about March 22, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected
to several interrogation techniques throughout the day. He
was thrown against the wall and waterboarded.
13. On or about March 24, 2003, Victim #2 was subjected
to several interrogation techniques throughout the day, in-
cluding waterboarding.
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14. In total, Victim #2 was waterboarded approximately
180 times.
15. The defendant, TENET, approved each interrogation
session of Victim #2 and received summaries of each session
after they had been completed.
16. Victim #2 was eventually transferred to the Guanta-
namo Bay Detention Facility on or about September 5, 2006.
VICTIM #3
1. In or about October 2002, Victim #3 was captured in
the United Arab Emirates. He was eventually transferred to
CIA custody in a facility outside the United States in Novem-
ber 2002.
2. Victim #3 was detained under the direct authorization
of the defendant, TENET.
3. In or about November 2002, Victim #3 was interro-
gated and subjected to waterboarding at least three times by
CIA interrogators.
4. In or about December 2002 and January 2003, Victim
#3 was interrogated and subjected to waterboarding on several
occasions. During his detention, he was also subjected to sen-
sory deprivation, loud noises, isolation, and dietary manipula-
tion.
5. In or about December 2002, Victim #3 was placed in a
standing stress position with his hands affixed over his head
for approximately two and a half days. While Victim #3 was
bound and blindfolded, a CIA interrogator placed a pistol
near his head and racked it. While Victim #3 was bound and
blindfolded, a CIA interrogator activated a power drill near his
head.
6. During interrogation sessions, Victim #3 was slapped
on the back of the head several times. CIA interrogators in-
formed Victim #3 that his mother would be brought before
him and sexually abused. CIA interrogators blew cigar smoke
in his face. They also gave Victim #3 a bath using a stiff brush.
7. In or about January 2003, Victim #3 was shaved, his
clothes were removed, and he was placed in a standing sleep
deprivation position with his arms affixed over his head. Dur-
ing interrogation sessions, Victim #3 was nude, handcuffed,
and shackled in a standing position.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2015] 113
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
8. The defendant, TENET, approved each interrogation
session of Victim #3 and received summaries of each session
after they had been completed.
9. Victim #3 was eventually transferred to the Guanta-
namo Bay Detention Facility on or about September 4, 2006.
VICTIM #4
1. On or about September 11, 2002, Victim #4 was cap-
tured in Pakistan. He was eventually transferred to CIA cus-
tody in a facility outside the United States in February 2003.
2. Victim #4 was detained under the direct authorization
of the defendant, TENET.
3. Victim #4 was subjected to sensory dislocation, which
included shaving his head and face, exposing him to loud
noise, keeping him naked, and subjected to cold tempera-
tures. Victim #4 was shackled with his arms outstretched over
his head.
4. Victim #4 was subjected to sleep deprivation during his
detention. He was also subject to other interrogation tech-
niques, including the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold,
the facial slap, the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall
standing, and stress positions.
5. The defendant, TENET, approved each interrogation
session of Victim #4 and received summaries of each session
after they had been completed.
6. Victim #4 was eventually transferred to the Guanta-
namo Bay Detention Facility on or about September 5, 2006.
All such acts were in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2340A(a) and Section 2340A(c).
COUNT TWO: TORTURE (VICTIM #1)
1. Paragraphs 1-2 of the Introductory Allegations con-
tained in this Indictment and Paragraphs 1-15 of the General
Allegations contained in this Indictment are realleged and in-
corporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
2. From on or about March 28, 2002 to on or about Sep-
tember 4, 2006, while outside the United States, the defen-
dant, TENET, and others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury did, while specifically intending to inflict several physical
and mental pain and suffering, commit and attempt to com-
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mit torture, while acting under color of law, by committing
and causing and aiding and abetting others to commit acts
against another person known to the Grand Jury (referred to
herein as Victim #1), that is: by subjecting Victim #1 to various
interrogation techniques, including attention slap, walling, fa-
cial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing,
stress positions, sleep deprivation, water dousing, and
waterboarding as well as forced nudity, dietary manipulation,
sensory deprivation, environmental manipulation, and solitary
confinement, all while Victim #1 was within the custody and
physical control of the defendant, TENET, and others known
and unknown to the Grand Jury, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 2340A and Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2.
COUNT THREE: TORTURE (VICTIM #2)
1. Paragraphs 1-2 of the Introductory Allegations con-
tained in this Indictment and Paragraphs 1-15 of the General
Allegations contained in this Indictment are realleged and in-
corporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
2. From on or about March 1, 2003 to on or about Sep-
tember 4, 2006, while outside the United States, the defen-
dant, TENET, and others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury did, while specifically intending to inflict several physical
and mental pain and suffering, commit and attempt to com-
mit torture, while acting under color of law, by committing
and causing and aiding and abetting others to commit acts
against another person known to the Grand Jury (referred to
herein as Victim #2), that is: by subjecting Victim #2 to various
interrogation techniques, including attention slap, walling, fa-
cial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing,
stress positions, sleep deprivation, water dousing, and
waterboarding as well as forced nudity, dietary manipulation,
sensory deprivation, environmental manipulation, and solitary
confinement, all while Victim #2 was within the custody and
physical control of the defendant, TENET, and others known
and unknown to the Grand Jury, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 2340A and Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2.
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COUNT FOUR: TORTURE (VICTIM #3)
1. Paragraphs 1-2 of the Introductory Allegations con-
tained in this Indictment and Paragraphs 1-15 of the General
Allegations contained in this Indictment are realleged and in-
corporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
2. From in or about October 2002 to on or about Septem-
ber 4, 2006, while outside the United States, the defendant,
TENET, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury
did, while specifically intending to inflict several physical and
mental pain and suffering, commit and attempt to commit tor-
ture, while acting under color of law, by committing and caus-
ing and aiding and abetting others to commit acts against an-
other person known to the Grand Jury (referred to herein as
Victim #3), that is: by subjecting Victim #3 to various interroga-
tion techniques, including attention slap, walling, facial hold,
facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress posi-
tions, sleep deprivation, water dousing, and waterboarding as
well as forced nudity, dietary manipulation, sensory depriva-
tion, environmental manipulation, and solitary confinement,
all while Victim #3 was within the custody and physical control
of the defendant, TENET, and others known and unknown to
the Grand Jury, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 2340A and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.
COUNT FIVE: TORTURE (VICTIM #4)
1. Paragraphs 1-2 of the Introductory Allegations con-
tained in this Indictment and Paragraphs 1-15 of the General
Allegations contained in this Indictment are realleged and in-
corporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
2. From on or about September 11, 2002 to on or about
September 4, 2006, while outside the United States, the defen-
dant, TENET, and others known and unknown to the Grand
Jury did, while specifically intending to inflict several physical
and mental pain and suffering, commit and attempt to com-
mit torture, while acting under color of law, by committing
and causing and aiding and abetting others to commit acts
against another person known to the Grand Jury (referred to
herein as Victim #4), that is: by subjecting Victim #4 to various
interrogation techniques, including attention slap, walling, fa-
cial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing,
stress positions, sleep deprivation, and water dousing as well as
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forced nudity, dietary manipulation, sensory deprivation, envi-
ronmental manipulation, and solitary confinement, all while
Victim #4 was within the custody and physical control of the
defendant, TENET, and others known and unknown to the
Grand Jury, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sec-
tion 2340A and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.
Dated: A True Bill
United States Attorney Foreperson
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C. Possible Defenses
Several defenses that Tenet could raise to challenge his
indictment were considered and rejected by the district court
and the Eleventh Circuit in Belfast. The constitutionality of the
Torture Statute was upheld. The extraterritorial application of
the statute was also affirmed. The legitimacy of a conspiracy
charge for torture was recognized. The meaning of torture
and the role of specific intent in torture cases were estab-
lished. Likewise, both the district court and Eleventh Circuit in
Belfast rejected the legitimacy of a "sovereignty" defense, and
the Eleventh Circuit also rejected a "necessity" defense. 4 0 4
Tenet cannot argue that his actions were justified to pro-
tect the United States. Neither the Convention against Tor-
ture nor the Torture Statute offer such exceptions from liabil-
ity. In this regard, the Convention against Torture is quite
clear: "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or
any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture." 405 Moreover, the legislative history of U.S. ratifica-
tion of the Convention against Torture reveals a clear under-
standing that the prohibition was absolute and that even pub-
lic emergencies could notjustify torture. The legislative history
also reveals that a proposed understanding regarding the via-
bility of several defenses to torture, including superior orders,
self-defense and defense of others, was rejected.
Tenet cannot argue that his actions were justified because
they were taken to prevent a terrorist attack. While Tenet may
have acted with good intentions in seeking to prevent another
attack, such motivation is not a valid defense in criminal pro-
ceedings. As noted in Belfast, "[g]ood motive alone is never a
defense where the act done or omitted is a crime. The motive
of the defendant is, therefore, immaterial except insofar as evi-
dence of motive may aid in the determination of state of mind
or the intent of the defendant." 4 06 Other courts have rejected
404. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 809, 812-13; Emmanuel, 2007 WL at *14.
405. Convention against Torture, supra note 31, art. 2(2). See generally
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNTY (2007) (critiquing the law-
yers who wrote the torture memos); Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 175 (2006) (discussing how the torture memos were
inconsistent with international law).
406. Belfast Jury Instructions, supra note 361, at 8.
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similar claims that sought to justify the use of excessive force
against a shackled detainee because the detainee might have
information about potential terrorist threats. 407
Tenet cannot argue that his actions were protected be-
cause he had sought and received the advice of counsel. 408 As
a general matter, defendants cannot invoke advice of legal
counsel as a blanket defense, immunizing them from criminal
liability. "If unreasonable advice of counsel could automati-
cally excuse criminal behavior, criminals would have a straight
and sure path to immunity." 4 09 Numerous courts have rejected
an "advice of counsel" defense when the advice was sought as a
way to justify the illegal activity or when the attorney was a
partner in the illegal activity. 410 A limited exception is recog-
nized, however, for reasonable reliance on good faith advice.
This element does not exist in Tenet's case.4 11
In considering the legitimacy of the proffered legal ad-
vice, it is relevant to consider that the torture memos were
withdrawn soon after their principal authors, Jay Bybee and
John Yoo, left the OLC.4 12 The legal reasoning contained in
the memos was criticized by their successor in OLC as one-
407. E.g., United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 221 (4th Cir. 2009) (use
of force against shackled defendant constitutes criminal act). See also Gra-
ham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (examining liability of law enforcement
officials who use excessive force).
408. See Note, The Immunity-Conferring Power of the Office of Legal Counsel,
121 HARv. L. REv. 2086 (2008) (addressing the immunizing effect of OLC
opinions). Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010) (discussing implications of OLC opinions); Ross
L. Weiner, The Office of Legal Counsel and Torture: The Law as Both a Sword and
Shield, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 524 (2009) (discusses the background of the
OLC and its role in shaping the Bush administration's position on torture).
409. United States v. Urfer, 287 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2002).
410. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
the defense of "advice of counsel").
411. See Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers
and Torture, 98 AM.J. INT'L L. 689, 694 (2004) (" [T]hese memoranda cannot
in themselves insulate or immunize persons engaging or complicit in torture
or war crimes from international or domestic criminal responsibility for
their conduct. It is well settled that advice of counsel-the "My lawyer said it
was OK" defense-cannot serve as an excuse for violating the law, especially
in cases where legal advice is deliberately sought and given for the very pur-
pose of providing such an excuse.").
412. Carrie Johnson, Senators Seek Ethics Findings, WASH. POST (Feb. 17,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/
16/AR2009021601198.html. The overturning of an OLC opinion is a rare
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sided and legally flawed.413 It is equally relevant that the De-
partment of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR) censured Bybee and Yoo for their work on the
memos. 4 1 4 According to the OPR, Yoo failed to provide a
"thorough, objective, and candid interpretation of the law."4 15
Similarly, Bybee "should have known that the memoranda
were not thorough, objective, or candid in terms of the legal
advice they were providing to the clients and that thus he ac-
ted in reckless disregard of his professional obligations." 4 1 6
The OPR found that the memos were incomplete, one-sided,
and misstated law and precedent. For these reasons, the OPR
found that Yoo and Bybee had committed professional mis-
conduct in their drafting of the torture memos.4 1 7 However, a
recommendation to refer OPR's findings of misconduct to the
appropriate bar counsel in the states where Yoo and Bybee
were licensed was subsequently rejected.4 18
occurrence. To have this occur within the same administration is unprece-
dented. GOLDSMITH, supra note 274, at 145-46.
413. Id. at 146-51. It should be noted, however, that OLC subsequently
issued new legal analysis that found most of the enhanced interrogation
techniques to be lawful. Memorandum from Principal Deputy Assistant At-
torney General, Steven G. Bradbury to Senior Deputy General Counsel, CIA
John Rizzo regarding Application of United States Obligations Under Article
16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005),
http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2013/10/21 /memo-
bradbury2005.pdf.
414. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT: INVESTIGA-
TION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES
RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTER-
ROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (2009) [hereinafter OPR
REPORT]. Both Bybee and Yoo submitted detailed responses challenging
OPR's analysis and conclusions.
415. Id. at 251.
416. Id. at 256.
417. Id. at 260.
418. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror
Memos, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/
us/politics/20justice.html?_r=0. Pursuant to justice Department procedures,
the OPR Report recommended that its findings be transmitted to the appro-
priate bar counsel in the states where Yoo and Bybee were licensed. Memo-
randum from David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney General, to the At-
torney General on OPR Report Findings (Jan. 5, 2010), https://www.aclu
.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20100105-DAGMargolis-Memo.pdf.
This decision was subsequently rejected by David Margolis, the Associate
Deputy Attorney General. Memorandum from David Margolis, Associate
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The close relationship between the CIA and OLC, and the
outcome-driven nature of the legal advice, further undermine
the legitimacy of an "advice of counsel" defense. 4 1 9 The OLC
was in frequent contact with the CIA throughout the drafting
process for the torture memos. 420 And, in fact, OPR "found
evidence that the OLC attorneys were aware of the result de-
sired by the client and drafted memoranda to support that re-
sult. . . ."421
For these reasons, the controversial provisions in the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA") should not offer Tenet
a defense from prosecution. 4 2 2 The DTA offers a defense in
civil or criminal proceedings to claims arising out of the opera-
tional practices of U.S. officials involved in the detention and
interrogation of detainees if such officials "did not know that
the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense
and understanding would not know the practices were unlaw-
ful."42 3 The DTA added that "[g]ood faith reliance on advice
of counsel should be an important factor, among others, to
consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would have known the practices to be unlaw-
ful."4 2 4 This defense applies to "an officer, employee, member
Deputy Attorney General, to the Attorney General on OPR Report Findings
(Jan. 5, 2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20O0
0219/20100105 DAGMargolisMemo.pdf. Margolis criticized the OPR
findings and concluded that Yoo and Bybee exhibited poor judgment but
had not committed misconduct. Id. at 68.
419. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assist-
ing a Client in Unlawful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAin L. REV. 669 (1981) (discussing
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer
shall not counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fraudulent); John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpre-
tations of Law, 25 Am. J. CmM. L. 1 (1997) (discussing the defense of reasona-
ble reliance on official interpretations of law).
420. Rizzo, supra note 15, at 188-93.
421. OPR REPORT, supra note 414, at 227. But see JOHN Yoo, WAR BY
OTHER MEANs: AN INSIDER's AccouNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 170 (2006).
422. Detainee Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1. The Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 subsequently amended the Detainee Treatment Act to
make it retroactive so it would extend its coverage to acts committed from
September 11, 2001 through December 30, 2005. Military Commissions Act
of 2006, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109s3930enr/pdf/BILLS-
109s3930enr.pdf.
423. § 2000dd-1 (a).
424. Id.
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of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States Gov-
ernment who is a United States person. "4 2 5 Essentially, the
DTA codified the public authority and entrapment by estoppel
defenses recognized by federal courts. 426 The public authority
defense provides an affirmative defense to a defendant who
acts in reliance of a grant of authority from a government offi-
cial to commit an illegal act. In contrast, entrapment by estop-
pel provides a defense to a defendant who reasonably relies on
an official misrepresentation that certain conduct is legal.
Given that the DTA only applies to those individuals "engaging
in specific operational practices, that involve detention and in-
terrogation," it is unclear that these provisions would even ap-
ply to Tenet.4 2 7 Moreover, Tenet's reliance on the DTA to pro-
vide a defense would be further undermined in light of the
CIA's own internal policies that prohibited "the use of force,
mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities
or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to
interrogation." 428 And, the CIA has faulted its "handling of ac-
countability for problems in the conduct and management" of
the Detention and Interrogation Program. 4 2 9
Reliance on these defenses is further undermined by in-
ternational law. Since the Nuremberg Tribunal, international
law has routinely rejected claims that legal opinions, statutory
provisions, or superior orders can obviate liability for viola-
425. Id.
426. SeeJohn Sifton, United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency Per-
sonnel Abroad: Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 487 (2006)
(discussing the detainee abuse problem). See also Mark W.S. Hobel, Note, "So
Vast an Area of Legal Irresponsibility"? The Superior Orders Defense and Good Faith
Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 574, 578 (2011) (noting how
the Detainee Treatment Act "may not only immunize government officials
and agents involved in interrogations, but also disrupt emerging interna-
tional legal norms surrounding the superior orders defense."); Jonathan
Hafetz, Torture, judicial Review, and the Regulation of Custodial Interrogations, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 433 (2007) (discussing custodial interrogations in
counterterrorism detention operations).
427. § 2000dd-1 (a).
428. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (Executive Summary) (quoting Di-
rectorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(1) (a) (Oct. 9, 2001)).
429. DIR. OF THE CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, COMMENTS ON THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE'S STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY'S FORMER DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 8 (2013) [here-
inafter CIA COMMENTS ON SSCI REPORT].
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tions of fundamental norms. 43 0 International tribunals have
also rejected such claims.4 3 ' And, in fact, U.S. courts have re-
coiled at the "Nuremberg" defense and have interpreted the
law narrowly so that a defendant cannot "transform an illegal
act into a legal one" by simply referencing statutory provisions
or superior orders.432 Moreover, government actions that ef-
fectively function as amnesty decrees or which otherwise grant
immunity for violations of fundamental norms have also been
rejected by the international community.433 At a more funda-
mental level, a person of "ordinary sense and understanding"
would have known that the abusive treatment imposed on the
detainees was unlawful, something the Reagan administration
acknowledged would occur in cases of torture when it first sub-
mitted the Convention against Torture to the Senate for con-
sideration in 1988.
430. See, e.g., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. See also
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (Rome, July 17, 1998)
UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
431. See, e.g., United States v. von Weizsaecker (Ministries Case), 14 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CON-
TROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, at 959 (1949) ("If the program was in violation of
international law the duty was absolute to so inform the inquiring branch of
the government."); United States v. von Leeb (High Command Case), 11
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, at 508 (1948) ("A directive to violate
international criminal common law is therefore void and can afford no pro-
tection to one who violates such law in reliance on such a directive."). See also
United States v. Alstoetter (Justice Case), 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10,
at 1170 (1951) (affirming that crimes against humanity violate international
law).
432. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
433. See generally FAUSTIN Z. NTOUBANDI, AMNESTIES FOR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (2007) (examining amnesties for
crimes against humanity in the context of transitional justice in post-conflict
or post-dictatorial societies); Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in
International Humanitarian Law: The Lomi Amnesty Decision of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, 86 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 837 (2004) (focusing on the Lom6
Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a step toward the abolition
of blanket amnesties for mass atrocities); Yasmin Naqvi, Amnesties for War
Crimes: Defining the Limits of International Recognition, 85 INT'L REv. RED CROSS
583 (2003) (discussing the criteria for recognition of amnesty for war
crimes).
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Even if Tenet could rely on the advice of counsel or other
authorization as a legal defense, this would only offer protec-
tion for those acts that fell directly within the scope of such
legal advice or authorization. Thus, Tenet would still be liable
for acts he sanctioned before such advice or authorization was
proffered as well as for acts he sanctioned that exceeded the
scope of advice or authorization. For example, Abu Zubaydah
was stripped naked and subjected to sleep deprivation well
before the OLC submitted the torture memos to the CIA in
August 2002.434 In fact, Zubaydah's treatment was so extreme
that an FBI official informed FBI Headquarters that he was
prepared to arrest CIA personnel involved in these interroga-
tion sessions.4 3 5
In addition, the OLC expressed concerns to the CIA's
General Counsel in May 2004 that actual practice within the
Detention and Interrogation Program "may not have been
congruent" with the assumptions and limitations previously
discussed.436 "In particular, it appears that the application of
the waterboard technique may have deviated in some respects
from the descriptions in our opinion."4 3 7 The CIA has itself
acknowledged that detainees were subjected to interrogation
techniques that "deviated from representations originally
made by CIA to OLC in 2002."438
Tenet would also be liable for unauthorized acts taken by
co-conspirators if such acts were a foreseeable consequence of
the conspiracy. For example, the CIA Inspector General's Spe-
cial Review identified several unauthorized acts taken against
detainees including the use of pressure points, water dousing,
434. SSCI REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-29 (Executive Summary).
435. See generally AL H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF
9/11 AND THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA (2011) (discussing the criteria for rec-
ognition of amnesty for war crimes); Frontline: The Interrogator (PBS television
broadcast Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/the-interrogator/ (interview with FBI agent Ali Soufan). See also
Michael Isikoff, Ali Soufan Breaks His Silence, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.newsweek.com/ali-soufan-breaks-his-silence-77243 (dis-
cussing how the enhanced interrogation techniques were ineffective).
436. Letter from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel to Scott Muller, General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency (May 27, 2004), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-muller2004.pdf.
437. Id.
438. CIA COMMENTS ON SSCI REPORT, supra note 429, at 55.
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threats to family members, and use of guns and power drills to
threaten detainees. Even John Yoo, who helped author the tor-
ture memos, acknowledged that criminal liability could extend
to acts that were not specifically authorized by the OLC
memos. 
4 3 9
While federal law recognizes a statute of limitations for
certain criminal offenses, it would not be applicable in cases of
torture. Federal law generally requires that an indictment be
brought within eight years after the offense was committed.440
There is an exception, however, in cases where the "offense
resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious
bodily injury to another person." 4 4 1 By definition, torture re-
quires the infliction of serious physical or mental pain or suf-
fering. 442 Waterboarding, stress positions, walling, striking de-
tainees, and cramped confinement created a foreseeable risk
of serious bodily injury to detainees. Other enhanced interro-
gation techniques also created a foreseeable risk of injuries.
In sum, there is ample evidence to support an indictment
against George Tenet and sufficient grounds for rejecting pos-
sible defenses to his prosecution.
VI. CONCLUSION
From its inception, the War on Terror led to an escalating
set of harms, all of which were implemented in the purported
defense of the United States and liberal democracy. "Black
sites" were established to hold "high value" detainees who were
subjected to "extraordinary rendition" as they were transferred
439. Conor Friedersdorf, John Yoo: If the Torture Report is True, CIA Officers
Are at Legal Risk, THE ATLANTIc, Dec. 16, 2014, available at http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/1 2/john-yoo-if-senate-report-is-true-
cia-interrogators-are-at-legal-risk/383790/ ("[1]f these things happened as
they are described in the report,. . . those were not authorized by the Justice
Department. They were not supposed to be done and those people who did
those are at risk legally because they were acting outside their orders."). But
c.f William R. Levi, Interrogation's Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1434, 1440 (2009)
(" [A]pplicable proscriptive language in the various legal instruments gov-
erning interrogation was opaque and open to interpretational latitude.").
440. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3286(a) ("[N]o person shall be prosecuted ... un-
less the indictment is found or the information is instituted within 8 years
after the offense was committed.").
441. Id. at § 3286(b).
442. Nezirovic v. Holt, 779 F3d 233, 238 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3286(a)).
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from one detention facility to another in secrecy. At these
sites, the detainees were subjected to "enhanced interrogation
techniques" to make them compliant and to acquire informa-
tion that might prevent another terrorist attack. Euphemisms
became commonplace and were used to hide the truth.
The debate over the efficacy of torture-whether it led to
actionable intelligence-has dominated the discourse sur-
rounding the release of the SSCI Report and the broader War
on Terror.443 It is, however, an irrelevant debate. The Conven-
tion against Torture provides that no circumstances justify tor-
ture, and there are no exceptions to this fundamental norm.
Likewise, the Torture Statute offers no exceptions to torture
under federal law. There is, in fact, a legal obligation to investi-
gate and, where appropriate, to prosecute individuals who
have committed, attempted to commit, or conspired to com-
mit acts of torture.
This Article has focused on the criminal liability of
George Tenet. As the Director of Central Intelligence, he was
primarily responsible for the development and implementa-
tion of the Detention and Interrogation Program. But, other
government officials who participated in and approved the De-
tention and Interrogation Program should also be held ac-
countable. Political leaders who authorized the program are
responsible. 444 Government lawyers who drafted legal opin-
443. See David Bromwich, Working the Dark Side, 37 LONDON REV. BOOKS
15-16 (2015) ("A whole subset of the argument on torture has asked
whether it works . . . . With the same propriety, one might ask whether slav-
ery works."); David Cole, Did the Torture Report Give the C.IA. a Bum Rap?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2015, at SR6 (suggesting that discourse surrounding the Tor-
ture Report has improperly focused on the questionable efficacy of torture
as an intelligence tool, rather than on torture's immoral nature and illegal
status). See generally ROBERT L. GRENIER, 88 DAYS To KANDAHAR: A CIA DIARY
(2015) (describing the value of detainee interrogations and evidence alleg-
edly acquired through torture); RODRIGUEZ, supra note 15, at 71 (arguing for
the efficacy of interrogation methods in acquiring actionable intelligence);
MARc A. THIESSEN, COURTING DISASTER: HOW THE CIA KEPT AMERICA SAFE
AND How BARACK OBAMA IS INVITING THE NEXT ArrACK (2010) (discussing
reasons for the Bush administration's interrogation policies).
444. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 169 (2010) ("I approved
the use of the interrogation techniques."); Rachel L. Swarns, Cheney Offers
Sharp Defense of C.IA. Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 2009, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/us/politics/31cheney.html (quot-
ing Dick Cheney, who says that "we had approved [of waterboarding]");
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
126 [Vol. 48:1
UNITED STATES V GEORGE TENET
ions justifying the interrogation techniques are liable.4 4 5 Medi-
cal professionals who developed the interrogation techniques
are also responsible. 446 The interrogators and debriefers who
directly participated in torturing detainees are liable. Admit-
MAYER, supra note 2, at 143 (describing the path the Bush administration
took in using controversial interrogation techniques).
445. See, e.g., HAROLD H BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH'S LAWYERS IN THE WAR
ON TERROR (2009) (discussing legal advice given to President Bush during
the war on terror); THE UNITED STATES AND TORTURE: INTERROGATION, IN-
CARCERATION, AND ABUSE (Marjorie Cohn ed., 2011) (analyzing the U.S. pol-
icy of torture); Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 193
(2010) (addressing whether the lawyers who had authored or signed the tor-
ture memos should face professional sanction or prosecution); Michael P.
Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 389 (2010) (critiqu-
ing the lawyers who wrote the torture memos). But see JOHN YOO, WAR BY
OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006) (argu-
ing that memos were properly researched and made good faith arguments
in support of interrogation program); Julian Ku, The Wrongheaded and Dan-
gerous Campaign to Criminalize Good Faith Legal Advice, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 449 (2009) (arguing criminal punishment of the Bush administration law-
yers for their legal advice on interrogation policy is both wrong-headed and
dangerous); Michael B. Mukasey, National Security and the Rule of Law, 32
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 831 (2009) (discussing how criminal investigations
and legal disagreements could endanger future national security); David
Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Memos Prove We Didn't Torture, WALL STREET J.,
updated Apr. 20, 2009, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1240186
65408933455 (discussing how the interrogations were continuously moni-
tored and did not cause severe pain).
446. See, e.g., STEVEN H. MILES, OATH BETRAYED: TORTURE, MEDICAL COM-
PLICITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006) (discussing how doctors and medics
had cleared detainees for interrogations and monitored abuse); STEPHEN
SOLDZ ET AL., ALL THE PRESIDENT'S PSYCHOLOGISTS: THE AMERICAN PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ASSOCIATION'S SECRET COMPLICITY WITH THE WHITE HOUSE AND US
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN SUPPORT OF THE CIA's "ENHANCED" INTERROGA-
TION PROGRAM (2015), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.document
cloud.org/documents/2069718/report.pdf (examines role that Bush ad-
ministration played in shaping the American Psychological Association's eth-
ics policy on psychologist participation in national security interrogations);
Jeffrey S. Kaye, Isolation, Sensory Deprivation, and Sensory Overload: History, Re-
search, and Interrogation Policy, from the 1950s to the Present Day, 66 GUILD PRAC.
2 (2009) (discussing the role of psychologists in interrogations); James
Risen, Report Finds Collaboration over Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2015, at Al
(discussing the collaboration between the American Psychological Associa-
tion and the Bush administration). On Oct. 13, 2015, a federal lawsuit was
filed pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute against James Mitchell and Bruce
Jessen, the two psychologists who helped develop the enhanced interroga-
tion techniques. Complaint, Salim v. Mitchell, No. 2:15-CV-286-JLQ (E.D.
Wa. Oct. 14, 2015). The complaint raised two causes of action: torture, cruel,
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tedly, the sheer number of government officials implicated in
the torture of detainees may pose an additional challenge to
accountability efforts.447 However, such difficulties cannot be
used to justify inaction.
A cloud of impunity has settled over a dark period in our
nation's history. As more information is released about the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, it will become in-
creasingly difficult to ignore the brutality of enhanced interro-
gation techniques and the responsibility of those individuals
who authorized, developed, and implemented the program. 4 4 8
Even the CIA has acknowledged that it failed to hold its own
senior leadership accountable. 449 Only 499 of the SSCI Re-
port's 6,700 pages have been released.45 0 It is troubling to con-
sider what other evidence of torture may exist in those
thousands of yet-to-be released pages.
inhuman, or degrading treatment and non-consensual human experimenta-
tion.
447. In order to gain "legal cover," CIA officials sought support for the
Detention and Interrogation Program from throughout the Bush adminis-
tration. See, e.g., Rizzo, supra note 15, at 188-201 (describing efforts to get
"legal cover" for CIA programs); TENET, supra note 173, at 241-42 (describ-
ing CIA efforts to receive "legal determinations" on what Agency officers
could legally do).
448. There are growing calls for the Department of Justice to reopen its
criminal investigation of the Rendition and Interrogation Program. See, e.g.,
Letter from Haureen Shah, Director, Security with Human Rights, Amnesty
International USA, to Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept.
21, 2015); Letter from William C. Hubbard, President of the American Bar
Association, to Attorney General Loretta Lynch (June 23, 2015).
449. CIA COMMENTS ON SSCI REPORT, supra note 429, at 8-10.
450. Efforts to compel the release of the full SSCI report have been unsuc-
cessful. E.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Central Intelligence Agency,
No. 13-1870 (JEB), 2015 WL 2406825 (D.D.C. May 20, 2015).
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